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Ttois research provides an analysis of the forces and
actors, internal and external, that presently effect Yugo-
slavia ' s domestic and foreign policies. The departure of
Josip Broz Tito will challenge the country's multinational
balance, its socio-economic system, and the leadership
capabilities of both the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
and the Yugoslav Peoples Army. Additionally, Yugoslavia's
relationships with the Soviet Union, the United States, the
Eurocommunists, the nonaligned nations, and the Peoples
Republic of China will be severely tested. Thus far, the
interactions of these forces and actors have resulted in a
delicate balance of multinational and economic pressures
interwoven with an equally precarious foreign policy. Much
evidence indicates Yugoslavia can survive Tito's passing,
but internal weakness combined with external superpower
interests may lead to instability. A concerted dedication
to peace in Yugoslavia and Europe will be necessary if
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is often stated that Yugoslavia has played a much
greater role in international politics than would normally be
expected of a country of its limited size, population, and
resources. This has been true primarily of the past 30 years,
during which it has managed to be intermittantly courted by
the superpowers, treated with suspicion by communist and
democratic states alike, and respected and emulated by Third
World nations. Yugoslavia has not always enjoyed such an
exalted international status. On the contrary, it has been a
state only a relatively short time and its people are histori-
cally more accustomed to subjugation than independence.
The past 30 years have also marked one of the most domes-
tically stable and economically affluent periods in the
history of Yugoslavia ' s peoples. The traditional ethnic
animosities between Yugoslavia's numerous nationalities and
the economic underdevelopment that once characterized this
Balkan region have ceased to dominate the people's lives.
Instead there has been at least an appearance of unity and
growing wealth.
It is no coincidence that Yugoslavia's recent era of
stability and international importance corresponds directly
to the period of Josip Broz Tito's leadership. He became
head of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1937 and leader
of the newly formed Communist state of Yugoslavia in 1945.

Since that time, his leadership has dominated the internal
and external affairs of the country. There is little debate
over the assertion that it is Tito's talents and abilities
that have achieved for Yugoslavia its present stability and
its status among the world's nations. There is considerable
argument, however, over whether the country can maintain its
present degree of stability and elevated international status
without him. Despite the fact that scholars have been dis-
cussing the post-Tito era for well over two decades, he
continues, almost defiantly, to celebrate birthdays. He turned
86 years old in May of 1978. But not even Tito can go on
forever, and it can be assumed that Yugoslavia is moving ever
closer to the post-Tito era.
During the last three decades the world has grown com-
fortable, so to speak:, with Tito-led Yugoslavia. In fact, his
departure would cause little concern if Yugoslavia could be
expected to remain as it is today; that is nonallgned, inde-
pendent of military, political, and ideological blocs, and
politically and economically stable. But it is very question-
able whether it can do so, and it is what Yugoslavia might
become that causes great concern in Washington and Moscow, as
well as in various other capitals in Western and Eastern Europe.
This study will investigate the unique combination of
social, political, and economic characteristics and policies
that sets Yugoslavia apart from other European socialist
states. By describing the country's historical evolution and
its present status on several separate but interwoven levels,

a picture will be developed of the balanced nature of Yugoslavia's
society and international posture, as well as the principal
forces, actors, and relationships likely to bear upon the
country in the post-Tito era.
Chapter II deals with Yugoslavia's domestic environment.
It is a state whose ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity
dates back to the very settlement of the region. Superimposed
upon this diversity are conflicts between old ways and the new,
between East and West, between Communism and democracy, and
between urban industrialization and rural peasant values.
Consequently, Yugoslavia is a state with potential internal
conflicts that may make it ripe for upheaval.
Chapter III examines the mutual and conflicting interests
of the Soviet Union and the United States regarding Yugoslavia.
Additionally, Yugoslavia's position between the major military
blocs and its role in the European balance of power will be
analyzed in order to assess the implications of any shifts In
its alignment.
Chapter IV will provide an examination of Yugoslavia's
defense policy in order to test its validity vis-a-vis the
Yugoslav foreign policy. In addition to describing the organ-
ization and strategy of its security, an investigation of the
often mentioned "Soviet Attack Scenario" will be presented in
order to assess the likelihood of attack and its possible
outcome.
Finally, Chapter V will Investigate Yugoslavia's rather
distinctive role in relation to other states on the global and
8

Communist scenes. Few states can claim to practice both a
balanced nonalignment and a balanced socialism. Yugoslavia
can, and its policies of nonaligned leadership and active
support of Eurocommunism are examples of its unique posture.
Additionally, its rapidly improving relations with the Peoples
Republic of China bear close analysis due to their implications
for Yugoslavia's relations with various other countries and
Communist parties.
It is the thesis of this research that the various dimen-
sions presented are interrelated to such a degree that only
through a complete understanding of each aspect and its rela-
tionship to the others, can an understanding of Yugoslavia now,
and in the future, be achieved. By studying Yugoslavia in this
manner, it is hoped that a better understanding of its possible
courses in the post-Tito era will result.
This study has benefited greatly by the excellent Soviet
and European studies program at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Dr. Jiri Valenta and Dr. David P. Burke were especially help-
ful, both by their personal tutelage and by virtue of those
who they brought to the school from other institutions. Their
seminar in Soviet-European affairs in the Spring of 1978 and
the Conference on Eurocommunism and the USSR and Eastern Europe
afforded the author the opportunity to meet and to benefit from
some of the preeminent American scholars in the fields of





A. ORIGINS OF THE YUGOSLAV STATE
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is a
Balkan country, a Danubian country, and an Adriatic-Mediter-
ranean country. It is part of the land bridge between central
Europe and the Middle East. It shares borders in the northwest
with Italy and Austria, in the north with Hungary and Romania,
in the east with Bulgaria, and in the south with Greece and
Albania. (Figure l) The western limit of the country is defined
by over 1300 miles of Adriatic coastline. With an area of 98,766
square miles, it is roughly the size of Wyoming. Mountains and
rugged terrain on the west coast and in the south and east cover
about three quarters of the land. The remaining quarter, in the
northeast section of the country, is part of the Danubian plain.
A comparatively young state, Yugoslavia was created in 1918.
Born out of the wreckage of World War I and out of the inten-
tions of the world's leaders to grant self-determination to the
peoples of Europe, it was to be the independent and unified
home of the several diverse groups of South Slavs that had
settled in the Balkans. The South Slavs were people who migrated
from north of the Carpathians into the Balkans in the 6th and
7th centuries. Those who settled in the north came under
Frankish rule while those who settled in the south had Byzantine
rulers. The people remained in small, loosely organized groups
of tribes. In the 8th and 9th centuries most were converted to
10
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Christianity. Those in the south and east, who were to become
the ancestors of the Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians,
received their conversion from the Orthodox Church in the East.
Ancestors of the Croats and Slovenes received theirs from the
Roman Church in the West. The eventual split between the
Orthodox and Catholic Churches divided the South Slavs into
two contentious religious groups.
Until the late 19th century, the South Slavs had little in
common other than domination by external powers. By 1389 most
of the southern and central Balkans had been overrun by the
Ottoman Turks. The remaining Adriatic coastal regions, as well
as some northern territories were controlled by Venice and the
Kingdom of Hungary. By the early l800's, however, other powers
such as France, Russia, and Austria began to dominate the
region. 2 Especially noteworthy was Napoleon's intervention
during which he created the Illyrian Provinces, merging the
Slovene lands with major portions of Dalmatia and Croatia.
According to most authors, this union was the birth of the
"Yugoslav idea. "3 It was the first time different South Slav
peoples were grouped together in one political unit. As
nationalism took root amongst all the peoples of Europe and the
Balkans, the idea of a union of South Slavs grew more and more
popular.
At the outbreak of World War I, Serbia (which included what
is now the Republic of Macedonia) and Montenegro were small,
independent states. The remainder of modern-day Yugoslavia was
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the end of the war
12

these three political units were unified as the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes with King Alexander of Serbia on the
throne. Nationalism and the Yugoslav idea had coincided with
Woodrow Wilson's desire to employ the concept of self-determin-
ation in the drawing of national boundaries. At that time, the
South Slavs were willing to accept union under a Serbian King
as a major step forward, especially when compared to domination
by Austria, Hungary, or Turkey. It was the first time that all
of present-day Yugoslavia was united under one ruler.
The new state faced enormous problems from the beginning.
It was much easier to draw boundaries than it was to actually
make the new state function. Political inexperience born of
centuries of domination was reflected in the Yugoslav's scant
understanding of such concepts as pluralism, democracy, and
voting. Finally, the diversity of the various peoples made
democracy even more difficult. Not only were they ethnically
different, but centuries of influence by opposing Western and
Byzantine cultures had imbued the various groups with very
different attitudes regarding the role and purpose of government
All of this became evident when the leaders began to organize
their new state.
The first Indication of conflict was the realization that
two types of nationalism existed in Yugoslavia. The first
focused on a unity of the South Slavs; that unity that had won
them their independence. The second was a local or ethnic




A3 long as many Yugoslavs were fighting together against
common enemies, Yugoslav nationalism had considerable
appeal. However, when the enemies had been defeated
and independence became a reality disputes arose regarding
the rights and powers the respective peoples would have
in the new state, and local loyalties tended to compete
with loyalty to the country as a whole.
4
The fierce competition that resulted characterized the Yugoslav
state throughout the entire interwar period.
The new government, while a monarchy, of necessity had to
embrace some form of federalism. The degree of federalism to
be adopted became the basis of a major political conflict, and
divided the people into two opposing factions. The centralists,
mostly Serbs, argued for a strong government based upon their
already well established monarchy, organization, and army. The
autonomists, led by the Croats, resented having achieved inde-
pendence to be ruled by Serbia, and therefore demanded a liberal
federation.
The debate made the new state virtually ungovernable during
the interwar years. 5 In 1928, a Croat leader was assassinated
and the government was a shambles. In 1929> King Alexander
suspended the Constitution, dissolved parliament, banned poli-
tical parties, restricted civil liberties, and proclaimed a
royal dictatorship named the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1934 he
was assassinated in France by members of a Croatian chauvinist
group called the Ustashe. The King's son, Peter, was only 11
at the time, so his uncle, Prince Paul, ruled in his stead.
There was little improvement under Paul. In 1939, an
agreement was reached which gave the Croats a degree of autonomy.
While it temporarily satisfied the Croats, in reality it served
14

only to alienate other ethnic groups who began to resent the
Croats as well as the Serbs. Then on March 25, 19^1* in an
effort to find a place for Yugoslavia in Europe's political
scene, Prince Paul joined the Axis Pact, This proved to be his
undoing, for on the following day he was overthrown by a group
of Serbian officers who proclaimed Peter the King. Hitler,
displeased with the Yugoslav people's insulting attitude toward
the Axis, invaded the country on April 6, 1941. The weakness
of the state was clearly illustrated when, within just a few
days, Peter fled the country and the Yugoslav army surrendered.'
When the Axis powers overran Yugoslavia the state collapsed
and virtually ceased to exist as a political entity. It was
immediately divided among the German, Italian, Hungarian,
Bulgarian, and Albanian occupation forces. Furthermore, when
they invaded, the Nazis found willing allies in the Ustashe in
Croatia. Hitler therefore gave control of Croatia over to the
Ustashe leader, Ante Pavelic. It was not long before there
were four groups of people fighting each other in Yugoslavia.
The first group was comprised of the occupation forces. The
second group was the Ustashe. Third was a group of Serbian
royalists known as the Chetniks, and led by Draza Mihajlovic,
The last group was the Yugoslav Partisans, comprised mainly of
Communists and led by Josip Broz (his code name was Tito),
Tito and the Partisan leaders claimed no loyalty other than to
Yugoslavia, and wisely spoke very little of Communism during




Like most of history's civil wars, Yugoslavia's was charac-
terized by the bloody antagonism of the feuding sides. The
Ustashe committed many atrocities in the name of Croatia and
Roman Catholicism, striking mainly at their traditional foes,
the Orthodox Serbs. According to George Hoffman, "...in some
cases whole village populations were herded into Orthodox
churches and burned alive. These atrocities produced a frenzy
of fear and hatred on both sides which led only to greater
excesses. "° The Partisans and the Chetniks, who occasionally
fought side by side and occasionally fought against each other,
were equally brutal in their reprisals. By the close of World
War II, 1,100,000 Yugoslavs- had died. 9 Of those, it is estimated
that only about 300,000 were killed by the Germans. The majority
of the rest were the victims of the fratricidal warfare between
the Ustashe, the Chetniks, and the Partisans. 1 ^
Tito made wise use of the opportunity provided him by World
War II. It was not hard to muster support against the Axis
forces or against the turncoat Ustashe. After a while, Yugoslav
people and Allied leaders became hesitant to support Mihajlovic,
for his forces were not resisting very actively. Tito, on the
other hand, practiced a dynamic resistance, displayed an
unswerving desire to liberate Yugoslavia, and thus won the
support the Chetniks had lost. His Partisan forces were
organized on a territorial basis and were characterized as the
"...combat forces of the Yugoslav peoples." 11 This, coupled
with the specific effort made to avoid linking the Partisans
with Communist political ambitions, enabled Tito to present
16

himself and his movement as a group with broad "Yugoslav" appeal
The Partisans continued to grow, and with Allied assistance,
eventually achieved victory and control of the country. The
Yugoslav Communists faced little post-War political competition
and on 29 November 1945, the Federal People's Republic of
Yugoslavia (FPRY) was established (the name was changed to the
present Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 19^3)
.
In the immediate post-War years the Yugoslavs took their
place as faithful followers of Moscow's Communist leadership.
But disagreements between Stalin and Tito regarding foreign
policy and Soviet mistreatment of Yugoslavia caused a break
between the two leaders in 19^8. Stalin, assuming he could
force the Yugoslavs back in line, excommunicated them from the
Communist bloc, imposed an economic boycott, and threatened
military invasion. Ke proved wrong and the Yugoslavs, with
military and economic assistance from the West, remained
independent.
Despite occasional rapprochements between Belgrade and
Moscow, Yugoslavia has remained poised between the two blocs
since 19^8. In the 1950' s it founded the Nonallgned Movement
with the assistance of Nasser's Egypt and Nehru's India.
Internally it developed the concept of worker's self-management,
achieved a degree of ethnic stability unknown during the inter-
war period, and made extensive economic progress. Today
Yugoslav officials refer to their country as "Socialist, Self-
Managing and Nonallgned Yugoslavia." 12
17

B. PROBLEMS OF MULTINATIONALISM
1. The People
Due to Yugoslavia's location, it is not surprising to
find that it is a multinational state "par excellence". The
1971 census listed no fewer than twenty-four nationalities
living within the country's borders. While the majority of
these each represent less than one per cent of the total
population, even the most numerous group, the Serbs, accounts
for slightly less than 40 per cent of the total. As a result
of the diversity of its peoples, according to Charles Jelavich,
"The chief internal problem of the state of Yugoslavia, .. .has
been that of governing and attempting to develop a national
consciousness among peoples with different historical experiences
and at various economic levels. 3 This is as true today as it
was in 1918, for the country remains as ethnically diverse as
it ever was. One still hears it said that there is "...only
one true Yugoslav: Tito." 1
The men who assumed control of the government in 19^5
recognized the challenge of nationalist divisions and responded
by establishing a federal state which openly honored the dominant
peoples living within its borders. The federation they estab-
lished consists of six Socialist republics and two Socialist
autonomous provinces. The criteria used to establish these
units was based on an official distinction between "Yugoslav
nationalities", those ethnic groups indigenous to the Yugoslav
state, and "national minorities", those ethnic groups living in
Yugoslavia but indigenous to another state. There are six
18

official Yugoslav nationalities. They are the Serbs, the
Croats, the Slovenes, the Yugoslav Muslims, the Montenegrins,
and the Macedonians. With the exception of Bosnia -Herzegovina
where most of the Muslims reside, the names of the republics
correspond to the principal nationality living there. While
there are numerous national minorities, the two largest groups
are the Albanians and the Hungarians, who reside mainly in the
autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina respectively.
Both of these provinces are located within Serbia. It is
important to note that the ethnic groups are not nicely
compartmented within their respective republics or provinces.
Instead they tend to be spread amongst each other throughout
the country. (Table I)
There are a number of factors which have caused
Yugoslavia's nationalities to develop into distinct cultures
and ethnic groups. The first is religion. According to George
Hoffman, it is "...intrinsically bound up with the complex
nationality problems of the country. m1 5 Most of the people are
either Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, or Moslem. Over 50
per cent of the population is Serbian Orthodox. Strongest in
Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia -Herzegovina, this Church has its
own Patriarchate and it differs slightly from both Russian and
Greek orthodoxy. Roman Catholicism is practiced by about 31
per cent of the people, most of whom live in Slovenia and
Croatia. Roughly twelve per cent of the people are Moslems,
who live primarily in Bosnia -Herzegovina and Kosovo. Fewer
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differing religious practices are closely associated with the
differing empires that have conquered the Yugoslav peoples.
Historical masters have also directly effected the
cultural development of Yugoslavia's nationalities. Croats and
Slovenes had the "advantage" of being part of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and thereby received the benefits of the
Western world's educational and cultural systems. The Mace-
donians, on the other hand, have been ruled primarily by the
Ottoman Turks, who governed with a heavy hand and did little for
the cultural development of the area. The Serbs and Montenegrins
were also greatly influenced by the Byzantine Empire.
Another factor that has greatly influenced the out-
looks of the different nations is the degree of historical
autonomy they have achieved. The Slovenes have never had an
independent state. The Serbs, though ruled by outsiders for
hundreds of years, were a growing Balkan power in the early
1900*3. And the Montenegrins were never fully conquered even
by the Turks. The differing levels of independence have tended
to shape the attitudes of the ethnic groups toward the value
of being members of the Yugoslav federation.
The fourth and most obvious difference between the
nationalities is language. The principal languages of Yugoslavia
evolved from primitive Slavic and belong to the South Slavic
linguistic group. 1 " Over many centuries the common language
broke into a number of dialects due to differing cultural,
political, and religious development. There is no Yugoslav
language. The major ones spoken are Serbian, Croatian,
21

Slovenian, and Macedonian. All four are related enough to
enable communication between the various peoples. The first
two are alike enough to be called Serbo-Croatian, though Serbian
utilizes a Cyrillic alphabet and Croatian employs the Latin
alphabet. Slovenian is similar to Slovak, and though it uses
the Latin alphabet, it is more akin to Russian than to Serbo-
Croatian. Macedonian utilizes the Cyrillic alphabet and tends
to be a cross between Serbian and Bulgarian. Other commonly
spoken languages are Albanian, Hungarian, and Turkish. In
cases where languages differ a great deal, the people tend to
be bilingual simply out of necessity.
a. Serbs
The Serbs, like the other nationalities, are descend-
ants of the Slavs who moved into the Balkans from south-western
Russia in the 6th century. 1? They are centered in the eastern
part of the country, though they tend to be more spread out
than most of the other nations. Linguistically and racially,
they are almost indistinguishable from the Croats. Religiously
however, they are quite different and while under Byzantine rule,
the Serbs founded their own Orthodox Church, which contributed
to their national consciouness. °
After the Byzantine period, the Serbs achieved their
independence and lived under native kings, who in the mid-1300'
s
ruled much of the Balkans. In 1389, however, the state was
conquered by the Turks and remained under their domination for
almost five centuries. It was during this period that many
Serbs moved into Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary, where they
22

lived under the Habsburgs and led a more prosperous life than
their fellow Serbs in the Ottoman Empire. *9 By the early 19th
century, Serbia had once again achieved autonomy, and at the
outbreak of World War I it was an expansionist Balkan "power".
Since the creation of the Yugoslav state in 1918, Serbs have
been identified with a "centralist" attitude that is equated
by other ethnic groups to a desire for Serbian hegemony within
the federation. Today, the 8,143,000 Serbs account for about
40 per cent of the Yugoslav population. (Tables II and III,
pages 28, 29 )
b. Montenegrins
The Montenegrins number slightly over 500,000 and
comprise only 2.5 per cent of the total population. They are
closely related to the Serbs and, in fact, are descendents of
Serb tribes that moved to the mountains along the Adriatic
coast during the Middle Ages. They are a rugged people and are
known as fierce fighters. ® Though the Turks overran Montenegro
several times, they were never able to achieve control over the
population. Due to a common struggle against the Turks, there
is a tradition of friendship between Russians and Montenegrins
that may still exist today. 21 In 1799, they became the first
Yugoslavs to acquire full independence. Though they speak
Serbian and are predominantly Orthodox, they possess a fiery
nationalism that is distinctly Montenegrin and not Serbian.
c. Slovenes
The Slovenes occupy the northwest corner of
Yugoslavia. Their population of 1.7 million is 8.2# of the
23

country's. Slovenia is the most homogenous of the republics
since 97$ of its people are Slovenes, Part of Austria until
1918, Slovenia benefited greatly from its contact with Austria's
relatively advanced German culture. Slovenia traditionally
has had higher levels of literacy, industrialization, and
general cultural development than other parts of Yugoslavia.
The Slovenian language is the most difficult for other Yugoslavs
to understand, but communication is still possible. The Slovenes
are strongly Roman Catholic. While they have occasionally
expressed nationalistic tendencies, there has never been a
serious independence movement in Slovenia. In fact, according
to one author, at least one reason why the Slovenes seem to
enjoy the federation is because Iz gives them an excellent
market for their manufactured goods. 22
d. Croats
The Croats, who number 4,527,000, are the second
largest Yugoslav ethnic group and the source of the most active
independence movement in the country. They have historically
occupied the land southeast of Slovenia, between the Adriatic
and the Drava River. An independent state until 1102, Croatia
wa3 in that year acquired by Hungary. Thereafter, various parts
of Croatia enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy. The Dalmatian
coast along the Adriatic was for centuries associated with
Venetian culture, and the effects of that relationship can still
be seen in the architecture of some of Yugoslavia's seaports.
Other sections of Croatia were captured and held by the Turk3.
24

The rest continued under Hungarian rule, at times with consid-
erable independence, until 19l8. 23
It is the rivalry between the Croats and the Serbs
that has the most potential for violence. The Croats, besides
being Roman Catholic, like to call Croatian a separate language.
It is the Croats who have been most opposed to Serbian hegemony
in the Yugoslav government. It does not help that Belgrade,
seat of the central government is located in Serbia. It is
among the Croats that the concept of independence is most
commonly discussed. Finally the Republic of Croatia has its
own minority problem in that there are 626,000 Serbs living
there, 14. 2# of the Croatian population.
e. Macedonians
The Macedonians occupy one of the most strategic
areas of the Balkans, for their territory lies at the juncture
of Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, and historical Serbia. According
to Jelavich, it "...is the most controversial of the republics.
Macedonia has throughout its history been fought over by
Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs and Albanians, all of whom maintain
ri?4
claims on her territory. Bulgaria and Greece actually deny
the existence of a Macedonian nation, while Yugoslavia recognized
25it and gave it republican status at the end of World War II.
Today the Macedonian people are divided among Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, and Greece.
One of the most backward regions of Yugoslavia,
Macedonia and its people have made substantial economic and
educational progress. There is now a Macedonian Orthodox Church
25

which has a degree of freedom from its parent in Serbia and
represents the growing nationalism of the Macedonian people.
They number approximately 1.1 million and represent about 6$
of Yugoslavia's population.
f. Moslems
Yugoslav officials now allow the term Moslem to be
used to identify those Yugoslavs who were muslimized during the
five centuries of Turkish rule." Thus, some 1.8 million people
who previously called themselves Croat-Moslems or Serb-Moslems
now call themselves Moslems in an ethnic sense. They have
become the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia and account
for almost 8.5$ of the population. They are located primarily
in Bosnia -Herzegovina, a region of mountainous territory lying
between Serbia and Croatia, and long disputed over by the two.
The Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina itself is populated 40$ by
Moslems, 37$ by Serbs and about 20$ by Croats and is, therefore,
the least homogenous republic in the federation.
g. Minorities
Only the two major national minorities residing in
Yugoslavia will be discussed, the Albanians and the Hungarians.
It is interesting to note that the Albanians outnumber both the
Macedonians and the Montenegrins. Furthermore, there are more
Hungarians in Vojvodina than there are Montenegrins in Montenegro
Yet due to the definition of national minorities, the Albanians
and Hungarians were established in provinces rather than
republics. The autonomous provinces were not meant to be home-
lands for these minorities. Rather, these regions were regarded
26

as areas in need of special handling due to the mixture of
nationalities living in them. 2? The number of Serbs living in
both Kosovo and Vojvodina is the principal reason that special
handling was required.
(1) Albanians . There are about 1.3 million
Albanians in Yugoslavia, over three quarters of whom reside in
Kosovo. They are almost all practicing Moslems and speak a
distinct Albanian language that uses a Latin alphabet. 2
"
They are the least assimilated of Yugoslavia's minorities.
They live in the most densely populated but least productive
region of the country. In recent years the Albanian percentage
of Kosovo and of Yugoslavia has been increasing. It has been
increasing so rapidly, in fact, that by 1981 it is predicted
that the Albanians will be the third largest ethnic group in
Yugoslavia. 9 That trend has been paralleled by increased
demands for "republican" status. While that status has not
been forthcoming, greater autonomy and representation have been
granted, and the central government has recently spent more
funds on raising living standards in Kosovo than in the past.
(2) Hungarians . About 90^ of Yugoslavia's
477*000 Hungarians live in Vojvodina. They are not considered
a major ethnic problem since Vojvodina itself is 56^ Serb. The
Hungarians speak their own language, but are normally fluent in
Serbo-Croatian as well. Most are Roman Catholic. They have
been less demanding for greater autonomy than the Albanians for
the simple reason that they do not predominate in their region.
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2. Communism and Nationalism Since 19^5
With the creation of the FPRY, Tito completed a truly
meteoric rise to power in Yugoslavia. Prior to the war, the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was weak and illegal. The
principal reasons for the ease with which the Communists
assumed power were the disastrous ineffectiveness of the inter-
war parties and the broad national appeal achieved by the
Partisans during the war. Faced with possible annihilation,
sickened by fratricide, and probably just tired of the nation-
alist feuding, the people were willing to give federation under
Tito a try. Thus, while national feelings remained strong,
Paul Shoup writes that "...the Party could with justification
claim that the advent of Communist rule was marked by a sharp
decrease in national tensions. "30
Since 19^5* however, Tito and his fellow Communists have
faced a revival of the national problem. They have been forced
to deal on an increasing basis with a resurgence of nationalistic
trends. Since the centrifugal forces of nationalism threaten
not only the success of Yugoslav socialism, but the whole
concept of the Yugoslav state, the two concepts have found
their destinies intertwined. 31
At the outset, it was fortunate for the Communists that
nationalist tensions were temporarily set aside because, ideolo-
gically, Communism and nationalism do not mix well.32 Marx
hardly dealt with the concept of nationalism at all and dis-
counted it as a major force. Lenin recognized it to be tacti-
cally useful in revolution, but of no use after that. 33
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Yugoslavia's own Communist Party of the 1920' s had split on
the question to the extent that the Party was severely weakened. 3^
The Yugoslav Communists, however, had learned some
lessons about nationalism; at least Balkan nationalism. They
had discovered that it could not be ignored. As a result, it
was dealt with directly and openly in the new state. In addi-
tion to creating a federation, the Communists passed a law
against inciting national antagonisms or discriminating for
reasons of race, religion, or nationality. 35 Such measures
resulted in a further decrease in national tension and a growth
in allegiance to the new central, and apparently, all-Yugoslav
government. As George Hoffman states, "If the new regime was
unpopular, it was primarily for reasons other than national
favoritism. "3° Serbian domination had, in reality, been replaced
by domination by a pan-Yugoslav Communist elite.
The new government was not entirely free of ethnic
problems, however. As early as December 19^4, the Albanians in
Kosovo had rebelled in hopes of achieving association with
Albania Instead of Yugoslavia. The rebellion was forced under-
ground, but in order to quiet things, the Party established
Albanian schools, allowed Albanian to be considered an official
language in the area, granted Kosovo its semi -autonomous status,
and gave some Albanians access to government. 37 These offerings
virtually satisfied the Albanian minority for almost 20 years.
Other anti-Yugoslav opposition existed in the mid-1940" s, but
only the Albanians took part in an actual armed uprising.
31

The Albanian uprising illustrates an important aspect
of the "federation" established in 19^5. Theoretically the
union had been established due to a mutual desire of the separate
nations to live together. In the Constitution, the right to
self-determination and even the right to separation were guar-
anteed. In fact, however, it is doubtful that even a republic,
not to mention an autonomous region like Kosovo, would have
been allowed to secede. According to Wayne Vucinich, the
Yugoslav Communists may very well have provided for equality
among nationalities, "But they never gave the peoples of Yugo-
slavia the opportunity to exercise self-determination,..."^
The Communists may not have been Serbs, but they were most
definitely centralists, regardless of what the Constitution
might have said.
The unity of the Yugoslav peoples was strengthened
considerably by the split between Stalin and Tito in 19^8. As
was the case during the war against Germany, unity was the only
possible course to follow in defying outside pressure. R.V.
Burks, in The National Problem and the Future of Yugoslavia
,
states that "...the unity displayed by all the populations of
Yugoslavia in the face of heavy Cominform pressure amounted to
a major political victory for the CPY."39 The spoils of that
victory are still evident in the Soviet-Yugoslav relationship
today.
Thus Yugoslavia entered the 1950' s with its national
problems suppressed, united against a Soviet threat, and proud
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of its successes as an independent state. The Party optimis-
tically set out to create a Yugoslav nationalism. It is most
important to keep in mind that the Party hierarchy was a group
of dedicated Communists, who had set aside their own nation-
alist loyalties. It was natural for them to believe they could
motivate the people to do the same, especially in light of the
unity achieved during the war and in response to Stalin.
Throughout the 1950 's the Communists tried to elevate
the concept of a Yugoslav nation. They called for an end to
the cultural isolation that still existed between the ethnic
groups. Emphasis was placed on cultural, educational, and
linguistic integration, while use of ethnic languages was dis-
couraged. Amendments to the Constitution removed the previous
emphasis on the federal nature of the state. The Party's prin-
cipal theoreticians began writing of the importance of national
development in the achievement of Socialism — that is Yugoslav
national development as opposed to the republican variety.
^
It was hoped that Bosnia, the meeting point of Croatian, Serbian,
and Moslem cultures would prove to be a "melting pot" and
produce the first example of a new Yugoslav consciousness.
Despite this significant campaign, the Party was
fighting a losing battle. To begin with, some of the policies
of the Party and the government tended to revive or indirectly
contribute to national feelings. First, in order to ensure
equal representation amongst the groups, government staffing
and political posting was done with indigenous personnel up and
down a direct line from local community, through the republic,
33

to the central government. This vertical bureaucratic structure
resulted in six chains of official communication that met only
in Belgrade. 1 Otherwise contact between republics was limited
or nonexistent.
Isolation also occurred as a result of the state's
policy toward cultural practices. The Party tried to spread
Yugoslav nationalism more by example than by cultural repression.
In truth, cultural autonomy was a necessity, because there simply
was no Yugoslav culture. As Paul Shoup points out, there was
ho
no Yugoslav theater, or ballet, or Academy of Sciences. ^ On
the other hand, there were ample Croatian, Macedonian, Serbian,
Montenegrin, Moslem, and Slovenian cultural traditions that
would not be forgotten and could not be repressed.
In the late 1950' s, another situation began to develop
which further isolated nationalities and therefore contributed
to the national revival. Economic and industrial development
had not taken place evenly among the six republics. Yugoslavia
had its own internal North-South problem. Croatia and Slovenia
were much more developed than the southern republics. Those in
the South resented the wealth of those in the North. Further-
more, in their efforts to distribute wealth equally throughout
the federation, the Communists had made a practice of utilizing
northern profits to subsidize southern industrial development.
While this pleased those in the South, the policy was far from




If to the people of Macedonia, for example, economic
betterment means advancement to the level of Croatia
and Slovenia, for the people of these republics
economic betterment means advancement to the level of
Western Europe. In a country as comparatively poor as .
Yugoslavia, both goals cannot be achieved simultaneously. 3
It is not difficult to imagine how such conflicts of interest
were transformed into national animosities.
As the I960' s dawned, the Party began to realize that
if it was to maintain close contact with the people it would
have to shift its emphasis back toward recognition of histori-
cal nationalities. It was clear that national tendencies could
not be eclipsed by pride in the Federation, and the Communists
chose to allow the national revival to continue. There was
growth in the use of ethnic languages and increased display of
cultural-national emblems. Not only did- historical national-
ities reassert themselves, but new ones were actually born when
the Macedonians and Moslems achieved ethnic recognition.
Greater recognition of the national groups led to more
emphasis on the federal concept of the state. In order to
satisfy the demands for greater republican independence, the
government continued a general move toward decentralization
which it had started during the fifties. This was done first
in the area of economic controls and later took hold in politics
and government. This trend, combined with the continued national
isolation enabled Republican leaders to build a political machine
of their own. Thus, according to Paul Lendvai, "The dynamics of
economic decentralization steadily increased the importance of
the republican parties, which in turn broadened their popular
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support to the extent that they were standing up for the
interests of their nations. 5 Yet Yugoslavia's leaders
granted even more independence, as in 1964 when republican
parties were allowed to convene their own congresses prior to
and in preparation for the statewide Congress of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY).
Eventually the revival of nationalism infiltrated the
LCY's top ranks as well. The opposite of the dreams of 19^5
had occurred. Instead of imbuing the people with a Yugoslav
consciousness, many of the Communists had themselves become
nationalists. The Party was deeply split along national lines.
Burks asserts that it had actually become "...a set of six
organically related but nationally distinct parties that carried
on the business of the country by negotiating with each other."
These negotiations were not always very productive.
They caused union of the traditionally close national groups,
the Croats and the Slovenes opposing the Serbs, Montenegrins,
and Macedonians. This was especially true regarding economic
questions since Slovenia and Croatia were growing tired of
supporting their less fortunate brothers to the south. On the
other hand, the political support Serbia received from areas
like Macedonia and Montenegro caused renewed accusations of
Serbian hegemony. The debate evolved into a political question
between hardliners, who felt decentralization had clearly gone
too far, and nationalists, who desired even more autonomy,
especially in regard to their finances.
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In July 1966, the hardliners were dealt a severe blow.
Alexander Rankovic, long a close associate of Tito, was purged
on the grounds that he was responsible for abuses in the opera-
tion of the state security organs. He had been expected by
many to succeed his aging leader, but it appeared that he was
trying to speed the process along. One of the abuses referred
to was the bugging of Tito's home and offices. ' Rankovic was
also a major proponent of centrism and very much a Serbian
nationalist. His demise assured the continuation of decentral-
ization for at least a while longer.
The Rankovic case caused even greater mistrust of Serbs
and, therefore, more passionate nationalist feelings among the
other groups. Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians led the way in
asserting their rights. People in Kosovo and Vojvodina demanded
greater autonomy. It was discovered that Rankovic had discrim-
inated heavily against Albanians and Hungarians, and realization
of that resulted in violent demonstrations for republican status
for Kosovo in 1968.^" In response to such pressures, the Party
did grant increasing amounts of freedom and again attempted to
acquire widespread appeal by "...sacrificing the Yugoslav idea
for the sake of maintaining its multinational character... "
The nationalist revival of the 1960's culminated in a
domestic crisis in Croatia in 1971. The new nationalism had
been expressed clearly in 1967 when Croatian intellectuals had
demanded official separation of the Croatian and the Serbian
languages. Then, in January 1970, the Croatian League of Com-
munists called for work to promote Croatian, rather than
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Yugoslav interests, and for a purge of all centrists. 5° By
1971, Croatian leaders felt strong enough to bargain for
greater independence and to express the growing Croatian
resentment over use of Croatian profits to subsidize the South.
Impending constitutional amendments in 1971 actually
set things in motion. The amendments had been designed to
provide for a smooth transition after Tito. They indicated a
definitional change in the federation such that it would be
considered a creature of the republics and the provinces.
Central government would thus be more responsive to the demands
of the republics. The Croats openly greeted this reform and
employed it to demand immediate economic change. By April,
their nationalist movement had picked up considerable momentum.
Croats tried to replace Serb officials in local positions. Again
there were demands for purification of the Croatian language.
Additionally, there were demands for currency reform and complete
financial independence. Finally, Croatian nationalists assumed
the leadership of student organizations and made demands for
Croatian representation in the United Nations. 51
Croatian nationalism was causing reaction in other parts
of the country. Serbs, especially, were concerned about the
rights of the 626,000 Serbs living in Croatia. Denunciation of
the entire movement by Tito in April proved to have little effect
Events quieted but did not slow significantly. Then, in late
November, students at Zagreb University struck and demanded
Croatian independence. Croatian Party leadership indicated
their support through inaction. Tito, however, did take definite
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action. He called for a halt to the strike, met with top Party
leaders from all parts of the state, employed the state police
to maintain order, hinted at a renewed military role in domestic
stability, and purged Croatia's leadership. The crisis was
over by the first part of 1972.
The events in Croatia had been brought under control,
but ironically, only through Tito's unifying presence and con-
cern. According to Robin Remington, the amendments had clearly
backfired. They "...became the vehicle of both national (ethnic)
demands and a republican (regional) challenge to the central
Party authority of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia ... "^2
Tito set about immediately to meet the challenge of republicanism,
Tito saw the threat to Belgrade's authority as a function
of Party ideological weakness and disunity. It was in the Party
structure and its role in society that he instituted changes.
The LCY was strengthened at the national level and new attention
was given to the concept of democratic centralism. William
Zimmerman states that, "...the term (democratic centralism) was
interpreted in ways more confining for dissenting party members
at any given level. Competence within the LCY was recentralized,
at the expense of republic party organizations. "53 Some powers,
however, were left with republican party cadres and local govern-
ment officials. The crackdown was a "limited recentralization"
and was designed to make the Party a more effective instrument
of political authority and ideological guidance. 5^
Tito did not crack down on nationalist movements, at
least not those external to the Communist Party. The amendments
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became part of the new Constitution of 1974 and some of the
Croatian demands actually came to pass. Generally, ethnic
rights improved. According to A, Ross Johnson, "...since 1971
the rights of national self-affirmation in Yugoslavia have
expanded providing that they are exercised within the framework
of a larger Yugoslav community and not in direct opposition to
other national groups. "55 it would appear that Tito felt limited
in dealing with nationalism on a large scale, but fully capable
of dealing with it in the Party.
3. The Federation Today
Yugoslavia today is organized and theoretically based
upon the Constitution of 197^. According to the Constitution,
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is ",. 3 a federal
state organized as a community of voluntarily united nations
and their socialist republics. . . "5° The equality of nations
and nationalities is guaranteed, as are the rights of cultural
expression, linguistic freedom, sovereignty, independence, and
self-determination. The republics are equally represented in
all government bodies including the two chambers of the Federal
Assembly and the nine-man Presidency of the Republic. The
provinces receive equal representation in the Presidency, but
a lower (about two thirds) representation in other government
bodies. A requirement for mandatory inter-republican agreement
on key issues prior to enactment of legislation results in
harmonizing divergent positions. Thus according to A. Ross
Johnson, the members strive "...for compromise policies through
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negotiations among shifting coalitions of republican represen-
tatives, not unity enforced from above. "57
There is little in Yugoslavia that is not touched or
affected in some way by the ethnic diversity of the people.
In addition to the government, the Party itself recognizes each
nation, and each republic has its own League of Communists.
As will be demonstrated, problems in the economy are both a
cause and an effect of national problems. The Yugoslav Peoples
Army, often called the only all-Yugoslav organization in the
country, is at least slightly suspect due to disproportionate
Serbian representation in its officer ranks. Finally it must
be pointed out that ethnic mixing does not stop neatly at
Yugoslavia's external borders. There is, as a result, a multi-
tude of disputes between this country and its neighbors regarding
reciprocal treatment of minorities and contradicting claims to
certain territories and peoples.
As A. Ross Johnson very accurately states, the national
groups are intermingled "...without assimilation, like oil and
water, throughout most of the constituent units... "^a The
problem this intermingling causes is perhaps the basis for many
national animosities. One group of people simply cannot express
its own nationalism and demand ethnic rights without threatening
the rights, and in some cases the very existence, of at least
one other group. Thus, increases in national feelings tend to
spread in waves.
The three groups that are today most prone to nation-
alist feelings are the Serbs, the Croats, and the Albanians.
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Though Croats are not likely to admit it, however, it would
seem that Serbian hegemony and centralism have been dealt a
significant blow by the passage of time, the Rankovic purge,
and the purges of 1971-1972. At any rate, Serbs seem to be
more content than the other two with the present federation
and distribution of power. Thus it is probably only Croatian
and Albanian nationalism that pose a threat to the unity of
the Yugoslav state, and they are both examples of how one
nationalism can touch off another. Croatian emigre groups in
the United States, Canada, and Western Europe regularly call
for the establishment of an independent Croatia. But the state
they would like to see created would include all of what is
presently Croatia, much of Bosnia -Herzegovina, and parts of
Serbia. And it would include millions of Serbs who clearly
would not accept Croatian dominance.
The Albanians' demands are a similar threat to the -Serbs.
Statistically speaking, there are about 1.4 million Albanians
in Yugoslavia, one million of whom live in Kosovo. There are
only 2.2 million Albanians in Albania itself. Thus one encounters
evidence of two sorts of Kosovo Albanian demands. One is the
demand for "republic" status within Yugoslavia. The second is
the demand for union with Albania instead of Yugoslavia .59
While the first is the most common, both pose an interesting
threat to Serbia. Dusko Doder points out that:
...Kosovo has a special meaning (to Serbs). It was
the sight of a medieval Serb kingdom which was des-
troyed in 1389 by the Turks, but legends and folk songs
have kept the glories of the vanished kingdom alive.
For five centuries every Serbian child has been reared
on the legends and folk songs of Kosovo. ^
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As Albanians nationalism rises then, it can be expected that
there will be a corresponding rise in nationalist feeling among
Serbs living in and near Kosovo.
The official policy regarding expressions of nationalism
is ambivalent, for one can find instances of repression as well
as examples of complete freedom. Tad' Szulc, in a 1976 article,
cites three cases which were typical of the regime's occasional
repressive policies: A lawyer was imprisoned for defending a
political dissident who was regarded as a Serbian nationalist;
a district judge in Slovenia was convicted and sentenced for
treason for allegedly advocating Slovenian separatism; and
numerous incidents of arrests for publicly singing nationalist
songs had also been recorded. *• What one sees as a reaction to
such repression is nationalist behavior by crowds at sporting
events which are an apparently acceptable outlet for such
displays. Dusko Doder cites several instances of name calling,
fights aboard trains, and automobiles being tossed into the
Adriatic, all following or related to soccer games between Serbs
and Croats. c The importance of such examples is that the
government has given its tacit approval to such actions. Thus,
despite the evidence of repression, official recognition and
handling of the national problem seems quite tolerant compara-
tively, and has prompted at least one author to assert that
Yugoslavia "...is the first multinational state in the history




Tito's own attitude is rather interesting and probably
explains the government's unpredictable policies. He seems to
fully accept the permanent multinational character of Yugoslavia
and has actually encouraged the trends toward decentralization
and greater republican autonomy. On the other hand, he does not
tolerate nationalism among those who are responsible for the
management and security of the Yugoslav state. In reference
to the Party, he has stated "...that although nationalism is
dangerous, worse yet are Communists who are nationallstically
minded.""^ And in speaking to his generals he has referred to
nationalism as a "cancer" which can destroy the entire socialist
state. It seems that nationalism is permissable among the
masses but not among the leadership.
C. IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY AND SELF-MANAGEMENT
The Communists did not Invent ideology. It has been a tool
of politicians and diplomats for centuries, for it has consis-
tently proven to be a useful means of justifying demands or
explaining actions. Despite its historical usage, however, the
persistent ideological barrage originated by Communist leaders
and theoreticians leads to the feeling that they did, in fact,
invent it and now maintain a monopoly on its employment. The
reason is relatively straight forward: The formal teaching and
spreading of Communist Ideology is of the utmost importance to
each Individual Communist regime and to the movement as a whole.
To each ruling Communist Party, the ideology provides the
legitimacy for its continued rule. It justifies one party
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domination because other parties would only endanger the
"socialist achievement" and threaten the dictatorship of the
proletariat. It explains away the repression of news media,
dissent, and closed frontiers because outside influence and
contact threaten the socialist moral fiber of the people. And
it justifies tight central control of economies and continuous
"Spartan" living by promising equality for all once imperialism
and capitalism are defeated. In short, the ideology, and the
dream that accompanies it, are used extensively to justify
dictatorial rule and repression of the masses. Naturally the
level varies amongst Communist states, but each regime's contin-
ued place in power is to a large degree based upon a dependence
on ideological concepts.
On the international level the dependence on ideology is
at least as important as at the internal state level. Here the
Communists strive to display unity, for unity provides the
greatest potential for a Socialist victory over Capitalism.
Thus, the ideology is utilized as a rallying point, a theoreti-
cal unifier providing a banner which all Communist states can
follow. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union attempts to
assume leadership of the movement at this level. In fact, for
many years it was the undisputed leader of socialism since it
was the only Communist state in existence from 1917 until 19^+5.
Today Moscow still proclaims itself the ideological leader of




Ideology provides internal legitimacy for ruling Communist
parties, it provides a theoretical framework for an anti-
Capitalist alliance of socialist states, and it defines rela-
tionships of Communist states with other states on the inter-
national scene. Its importance can hardly be exaggerated.
Perhaps, in truth, ideology has become a little too important
to the Communists. While it still performs the above functions,
problems within the Communist world would seem to indicate that
ideology can be a heavy burden at times.
The beneficial aspects of Communist ideology apply to all
Communist states but none have felt its burdensome side as much
as the Soviet Union. The ideology of Soviet Communism has proven
too rigid and inflexible to allow for variations amongst Communist
states. Its relations with Yugoslavia have characterized this
rigidity for not only was it necessary to excommunicate the
Yugoslavs, but the ideological transformations that have taken
place since 19^8 have made it nigh impossible for Communists to
agree on even the most basic questions of strategy. Ideological
conflicts have been seldom solved and have if anything caused
greater rigidity due to an ironic corresponding increase in the
threat to internal legitimacy.
Due to Yugoslavia's early ideological challenge to Moscow-
led Communism, it has always played a special role in relations
among Communist states and parties. Since 19^8 there has been
very little agreement between the Communists in Yugoslavia and
those in the Soviet Union regarding the proper internal structure
of a socialist state, the role of the Communist Party in society
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and government, and the relationship between Communist states
and parties. The ideological conflict between the two may be
the strongest barrier to a true Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement.
The roots and the importance of their ideological differences
therefore require closer investigation.
Excommunication posed a serious problem for Yugoslavia's
leaders in 1948. Of course there was the military and economic
threat of the Soviet bloc. But worse in the long run was the
threat to the legitimacy of the Communist regime. The question
of two or more communisms had never arisen. Since the Bolshevik
Revolution there had been but one center of Communist thought
and practice and it had not been located in Belgrade. The
Yugoslavs had never questioned this fact. Yet on June 28, 1948,
they were accused of following deviationist foreign and domestic
policies, faulty agricultural practices, and pursuing a non-
Marxist-Leninist conception of the role of the Party, among
other things. 5 The entire Cominform censured the Yugoslav
Communists, accused their leaders of heresy, and appealed to
the rank and file to oust Tito and his associates.
The regime's continued tenure was threatened at two levels.
First, its own Party was forced to question itself in order to
determine who was correct, the CPY or the CPSU. They were not
in the habit of questioning the CPSU. Secondly, they owed an
explanation of some sort to the Yugoslav population at large.
Policies between 1945 and 1948, not to mention the Constitution,
were based upon Soviet Communism, and an avowed allegiance to
the "socialist fatherland". If Moscow was correct, then Tito
47

would have little to stand on ideologically. Fortunately,
whatever threat there was to Tito's regime was largely overcome
by the Yugoslav nationalism created by Stalin's threats. Whether
they were ideologically correct or not, the Yugoslavs were
determined to withstand the bullying tactics of the Kremlin.
Political and security problems thus deflected interests
temporarily away from the ideological inconsistencies facing the
CPY. The Party leaders utilized the time well. After with-
standing the initial shock of their excommunication they began
to accuse the CPSU itself of not properly adhering to Marxism.
They pointed to the degree of overcentrallza tion in the Soviet
Union and the power of the state bureaucracy. The Yugoslavs
claimed that the Soviet system had become a form of state
capitalism and was far from withering away.^D As the debate
continued, the Yugoslavs looked increasingly closer at Marxist
ideology in an attempt to reestablish their own credibility,
for it was hardly enough to merely criticize the CPSU. An
alternative had to be formulated.
Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj were two of Tito's chief
lieutenants and the most intellectually capable of inventing a
non-Soviet Communist ideology that would still be based upon
Marxist theory. °7 They discovered that Marx had written of free
association of producers, of workers in control of their own
lives, and of differing material conditions in various countries. °
Furthermore, Tito added to the research by recalling a civil
war slogan used by Lenin: "Factories to the Workers. °
According to M. George Zaninovich, such Marxist philosophy and
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theoretical concepts when "...coupled with the doctrine of
socialism in one country, could be used to justify an inde-
pendent road. "7^ It was in a way fortunate for the Yugoslavs
that the Leninist model of Communism in the USSR, especially
as practiced by Stalin, was itself a significant departure from
Marx's visions. This departure provided much of the latitude
necessary to establish a new road to socialism.
Self-management was presented to the Yugoslav Party in
June of 1950. Immediate efforts were begun to reindoctrinate
the Party members who had to be sold on the new ideas. Simul-
taneously the people were promised that self-management would
enable them to exercise greater freedom and increased partici-
pation in social decision-making. The entire concept was made
more palatable by its advertised superiority over Soviet
Communism and its applicability to conditions unique to Yugoslavia
Interestingly, self-management was little more than a propaganda
device for at least ten years after its initial billing, for
the state remained in control of both economic and political
decision-making.
Nevertheless, as a propaganda device self-management was
extremely successful. While other methods were utilized to
fend off political and security threats, Yugoslavia's new
Communism successfully withstood the onslaught of ideological
criticism from the rest of the Communist world. Even more
importantly, it provided a basis for internal legitimacy for
Tito and his associates. The people certainly felt self-
management was worth a try and that "...the uncertainty of
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social experimentation was more palatable than the tyranny of
a fixed model. "^1 Thus, by establishing a new Communism which
was fundamentally different from that practiced in the Soviet
Union, not to mention more "correct", the Yugoslav Communists
were able to transfer what began as a serious threat into a
source of Yugoslav national pride and unity.
Yugoslavia's survival as a Communist state outside of the
Soviet bloc was much more dangerous to the Kremlin than self-
management itself. It was not so much that this particular
alternative to Soviet Communism existed, but that any alternative
existed at all. The form of socialism originated by the Yugoslavs
eventually became known as Titoism, and its greatest significance
was that it necessitated a change in the relationships between
Communist states and parties. According to Vernon Aspaturian:
What was ultimately significant about Titoism was not its
doctrinal substance, but its form - the idea of a plural-
istic Communist universe of autonomous nation and states,
starting from a common point of departure, but charting
different roads to socialism or Communism.
.
.72
This was not an original goal of the Yugoslav Communists. It
came about solely because they were successful in their efforts
to survive as a state and remain in power within that state.
It was to be a very contributory factor in maintaining their
political legitimacy since it would elevate their leader to
international fame.
D. THE CHALLENGES OF MARKET SOCIALISM
Yugoslavia's independent posture has precluded full member-
ship in the Communist economic community, while at the same time,
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political-economic orientation has barred full integration
into the Western system. As a result, it has assumed a position
on the periphery of both communities. This unique status has
allowed, if not necessitated, extensive experimentation with
economic reforms designed to make the Yugoslav economy and
foreign trade system compatible with both the market and
centrally planned economies. It has not been an easy task and
has required constant management and frequent alteration to
make it work.
Yugoslavia emerged from World War II an economically poor
and devastated country. The major economic goal of the post-War
leadership was the rapid industrialization of the economy within
a socialist framework. It was hoped that a self-sufficient
economy could be created by severing all relations between
domestic and foreign firms, by placing a barrier between the
economy and the capitalist world, and by keeping trade to a
minimum. 73 Economic planners realized, however, that rapid
industrialization would initially require extensive importation
of the machinery and associated equipment necessary for industrial
production. They hoped to offset these distasteful imports with
agricultural exports and with technical assistance from the
Soviet Union.
The new Communist government took immediate steps to con-
solidate its control and to socialize its economy It had an
exceptionally easy time in its nationalization because, first
there was no political or economic resistance, second the
Germans had already confiscated most foreign owned enterprises,
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and third the bourgeois power base had been wiped out by the
economic devastation of the war.? 2* By the end of 1948 the new
government had nationalized almost all large manufacturing,
mining, and power companies, as well as all banks, transporta-
tion companies, foreign trade firms, and wholesale and retail
trade firms. '* The nationalization was not total, however, in
that artisan shops were left to private ownership and large
land holdings were confiscated and redistributed to the peasants.
Extensive nationalization was actually just one aspect of total
economic centralization during this period, since all major
decisions regarding the operation of Yugoslavia's commercial
sector were made by the federal government.
The economy would probably have remained totally centralized
had not the economic boycott of the Soviet bloc caused Yugoslav
planners to reevaluate their goals. Yugoslavia simply was not
self-sufficient enough to achieve industrialization completely
on its own. For the next few years the government tried various
reforms, including massive seizure and collectivization of
agriculture, in an attempt to make its system even more tradi-
tionally socialist. But the boycott and other uncontrollable
forces, such as severe droughts, caused the leaders to contem-
plate more liberal reforms and force them to look to the West
for assistance. The general direction of reform moved toward
decentralization of economic planning and control. The early
changes, which were first implemented in 1950, involved a
decrease in the degree of government activity at the local
level and the inauguration of the concept of workers'
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self-management. Workers' councils became responsible for the
operation of their enterprises and the market mechanism was
instituted on a limited basis. The central government, however,
continued to maintain almost full control of investment funds,
foreign trade, and through economic plans, still directed the
economy as a whole. Assistance from the West included massive
amounts of American aid and foreign trade with the capitalist
bloc. In 195^ economic association and trade with the Communist
bloc was also resumed. The reforms, the trade, the aid, and
the government's continued emphasis on industrialization combined
to cause Yugoslavia's economy to grow at a phenomenal rate.
During the 1950's its rate of growth was second only to that of
Japan. ' °
Despite reform and rapid growth, Yugoslavia's economy still
remained highly centralized and faced various problems. The
Communists controlled the economic sector since they held the
only political power in the country.' ' Their members held key
economic positions and exercised enough power to limit the
amount of self-management the workers really had. But their
control could not keep imports from far outbalancing exports,
and their trade deficit was being embarrassingly corrected only
by large amounts of American aid. Disparity in growth and
development continued to exist between sectors of the economy
and regions of the country. Prices and the value of the dinar
were variable and confusing since government control set
different rates of exchange for internal and external trans-
actions. Finally, by the late 1950's, American aid was beginning
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to dry up and the trade barriers imposed by the newly formed
European Economic Community were causing problems in non-member
European countries such as Yugoslavia.
Reforms during the early and mid-l^O's were designed to
integrate the Yugoslav economy into the world market system.
The desire, as Fred Singleton points out, was to "...induce
efficiency through the discipline of the market."'" Integration
was extremely difficult due primarily to the disparity that
existed between domestic prices and world market prices. These
differences were the result of the previous domestic insulation
from foreign markets. Through foreign loans the Yugoslav banks
secured the foreign currency necessary to help pay for imports.
By 1966, these loans, in addition to devaluation of the Yugoslav
dinar, had made domestic prices roughly compatible with those
on the world market.
Government control of internal economic transactions at the
local level became almost non-existent. Rudolf Bicanic, in
Economic Policy in Socialist Yugoslavia , suggests that federal
planning was reduced to "...only a suggestion for action for
the enterprises. "' 9 While this was true of internal transactions,
there was still state control over foreign trade practices.
Import restrictions were maintained in order to keep imports
down, and taxation of export proceeds continued in order to
build foreign exchange reserves.
Today Yugoslavia is in fact part of both the centrally
planned economic system (which itself is becoming increasingly
integrated with the West) and the market system of the Western
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economies; thus "Market Socialism". Workers' self-management
continues to be the theoretical foundation of the system, and
compared to other Communist states, there is a minimal amount
of federal control. Though there is a small amount of federally
controlled agricultural production, independent peasant pro-
prietors now account for about 85 per cent of all agricultural
80land. State subsidies have been eliminated and only profitable
enterprises can survive. Finally, while there is considerably
less government control of investment, redistribution of govern-
ment investment funds continues to favor the poorer, southern
republics.
After three decades of experimentation, solutions such as
worker self-management, market socialism, and rapid industrial-
ization have not solved all of the problems and have actually
created some new ones that are alien to other Eastern European
Communist states. Several are rather embarrassing to the
Yugoslav Communists for they are problems that are theoretically
nonexistent in Communist states. For example, unemployment is
an evil of capitalism. Or so most Communist regimes would assert.
But unemployment is very much a part of Yugoslav society and
economic conditions. The unemployment problem became widespread
as a result of the reforms of the early 1960's because integra-
tion with the world market mechanism implied simultaneous
integration with the international division of labor. When
government subsidies were lifted, many inefficient firms could
not compete and were driven out of business. The workers that
these inefficient enterprises had previously hoarded now found
themselves out of work.
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The Yugoslav Communists, in responding to this very
un-socialist problem, took a correspondingly un-socialist step
in order to affect a solution. Gradually the visa policy was
liberalized, the frontiers were opened, and Yugoslav workers
were allowed to leave the country to find work in Western
Europe. Today it is commonly estimated that in excess of one
million Yugoslavs are employed in Western Europe, most of them
in West Germany. These gastarbeiter, as they are known in
Europe, partially solve the Yugoslav unemployment problem and
furthermore return roughly $1 billion to Yugoslavia annually. "^
The money they return plays a major role in balancing the
constant trade deficit. Federal officials are in fact anxious
to get more funds sent home since about 60 per cent of gastar-
Qp
beiter earnings are spent or tucked away in foreign banks. ^
The Yugoslavs abroad are a mixed blessing, however. To
begin with, their experiences with Western European societies
and democracies are also being carried back to Yugoslavia.
Andrew Borowiec estimates that since visa policies were liberal
ized, in excess of three million Yugoslavs have come in direct
contact with Western political practices and rights. 3 And as
Dusko Doder points out, most of them return home after three to
five years when they have earned enough to build homes and
Qh
purchase the trappings of middle class life. The political
values and knowledge of the West is thus being imported into
Yugoslavia at a significant rate and might one day become a
political force limiting the repressive tendencies of some of
the more traditional Communist leaders,,
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Another aspect of the gastarbeiter situation is linked to
the possibility of a recession in Western Europe. The effects
could be disastrous for Yugoslavia if hundreds of thousands of
its migrant workers suddenly returned home en masse. Not only
would they be out of work, but their families which are
presently well fed would be very hungry. Market socialism and
the export of labor has made Yugoslavia vulnerable to instability
in the world economic system. Finally, export of labor has not
entirely solved the unemployment at home where about 500,000
Yugoslavs are still out of work. ^
Openness, a term not normally associated with Communist
states, has been a proverbial two-edged sword. On the one hand,
it has had 3ome of the desired economic effects. In addition
to the money returned by workers, tourism has also proved to be
a major source of foreign currency and a significant tool in
reducing the trade deficit. It is estimated that tourists
bring in $800 million per year. But openness also causes
social problems that could easily be translated into social
instability. Western political contact has already been
discussed. A related and equally unsettling problem is the
cultural effect of the consumerism that has resulted from
economic development, tourism, and migrant workers' remittances.
They have all caused the creation of a new middle class in
Yugoslavia. The society has even been called "il socialisrao
86borghese" or middle-class socialism. While the Communists
do not like to admit such an abhorrent concept such as this,
there is little they can do about it. The problem is that
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middle-class socialism has evolved too quickly in Yugoslavia.
The people are still culturally eastern and prone to their old
ways. Yet they are attempting to live with the symbols of
Western culture. The result is that the people are torn between
East and West, fearful of losing the old ways in which they are
secure, but anxious to attain more and more of the physical
comforts available to them. ' Superimposed on the ethnic and
cultural diversity already characteristic of Yugoslavia, this
problem is especially hard to deal with since it is a direct
result of one of the government's most successful policies.
Workers' self-management has attracted the attention of
economists in the West, the East, and in the Third World, for
economic as well as ideological reasons. Some aspects of it
have been adopted in Romania, Poland and Hungary and are being
considered elsewhere. But its economic viability continues to
be debated extensively. Since Yugoslavia is thus far the only
long-terra testing ground it is impossible to reach a final
judgement. The rate of economic development there has surpassed
that of most other Communist states, and this seems to support
Yugoslav claims to self-management's success. Their claims have
been convincing enough to generate the interest of the People's
Republic of China, an interest which has given the image of the
concept a significant boost. There is, however, an inherent
fallacy in attributing too much of Yugoslavia's success to
self-management principles. The economy differs from all others
so greatly that it is impossible to measure which aspects are
responsible for the economic success. In reality there is
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debate even in Yugoslavia regarding the efficiency and success
of workers' self-management.
In his book, Yugoslavia After Tito , Andrew Borowiec pro-
vides some enlightening statistics concerning the actual
practice of self-management. The 5*000 workers of a certain
shipyard are represented by 672 self-management and socio-
political councils which hold 11,525 meetings per year. The
31,911 hours involved translates into 26.8 working days per
worker per year. This further translates into the equivalent
of one small tanker that was not built due to meetings.
Borowiec goes on to point out that this example represents the
rest of Yugoslav Industry and that there is apparently little
that can be done to change it since Yugoslav workers have grown
accustomed to this inefficient mode of operation. Hence,
Yugoslav leaders seem destined to live with low productivity
compared to other industrial nations.
Judgement of self-management cannot be limited solely to
economic figures which measure productivity or growth. Where
the system seems to have failed in efficiency, it has succeeded
in allowing, even encouraging, initiative and private enterprise
and Investment. ° Dusko Doder even attributes some degree of
Yugoslavia's overall stability to self-management. In his
opinion:
The main accomplishment of self-management lies in the
fact that Yugoslavia has managed a smoother transition
to industrialization than any other Eastern European
country. There have been no food-price riots and bloody
clashes between workers and police, as in Poland, and no
famines and widespread misery as in the Soviet Union,
Romania, and other countries. 90
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Furthermore, self-management, as seen in Yugoslavia is a
symbol of the liberalization and decentralization of the
Yugoslav system as a whole. It is the symbol of changes that
began in the 1950' s and that are equated with greater freedom
and better living standards. It must be considered at least
somewhat successful since most Yugoslavs support the system.
Doder quotes a Yugoslav journalist who seemingly represents the
typical attitude of the citizenry: "'It is not important
whether it works or not. What is important is that whatever
personal freedoms we enjoy rest on self-management. What is
the alternative? A return to Eastern-type centralism. ' "91
Finally it should be reempha sized that all returns are not
in regarding self-management. Though on paper it has existed
since 1950, it has in truth been implemented very slowly. The
Yugoslav leaders themselves are quick to admit that it is still
not fully operational. Some of the short-term criticisms
therefore bear qualification. Doder, for example, points out
that though productivity may be low, it is actually higher than
it was prior to self-management. Duncan Wilson, in an article
devoted to this system, cites impressive figures showing that
inflation has dropped, industrial and agricultural production
have increased, and there has been improvement in the balance
of trade. His statistics apply to the early and mid-1970 's,
during which there has been an increasing emphasis on and
participation in self-management. 92 it may be that an accurate
measurement of self-management's success is not possible.
However, for the present it does seem to be serving the goals
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of both the regime and the workers. That is a measure of
success of any system in any country.
One of the more persistent problems facing the central
government is the difference in standards of living and
industrial development- that exists between the northern and
southern republics. Figure 2 clearly illustrates the dispar-
ities in regional development. Obviously the situation has
Regional Economic Disparities in Yugoslavia, 1975
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FIGURE 2
changed very little since 1971 when it served as the root of
the problems in Croatia. The Federal Development Fund is
designed to alleviate the differences by collecting contributions
61

for development and distributing the funds according to the





Slovenia and Croatia are still the principal contributors,
thus those two republics continue to subsidize development
elsewhere in the federation. 93 That may seem proper to ideal-
istic Communists, but it is still hard to swallow amongst
nationalistic Croats and Slovenes who would rather see their
money spent within their own republics. The problem is not
likely to disappear since the southern, poorer republics are
not likely to give up their demands for development funds.
There are two other aspects of Yugoslavia that distinguish
its economy from those of other Communist states. First, since
1967, the Yugoslavs have permitted foreign investment, and
though the government imposes restrictions on ownership and the
use and distribution of proceeds, fourteen joint ventures had
been established by 197^. By January 1977 this number had risen
to twenty, and the Dow Chemical Company was building a joint
$750 million petro-chemical complex there. ^ The actual amount
of foreign investment is thusfar minimal, but it is significant
that it is even permitted. Secondly, Yugoslavia trades with
the West far more than her Communist neighbors. This has been
true since the tumultuous early 1950' s, and though the percent-
ages sometimes vary according to politics, Western Europe con-




It should be emphasized that Yugoslavia is far from totally
divorced from the economies of the Soviet bloc. The Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which was established
in 19^9 in part as the instrument of the Soviet economic boy-
cott of Yugoslavia, ironically has granted special status to the
Yugoslavs since 196^. As a result, Yugoslavia is permitted
to participate when it is beneficial to its own economy. After
the original blockade was lifted COMECON quickly became Yugo-
slavia ' s second largest region of trade. The primary trading
partner is the USSR, which in 1975 accounted for over fifteen
per cent of Yugoslavia's total trade.
Yugoslav trade with COMECON differs significantly from its
trade with the West, for while it normally faces a deficit on
the capitalist side, it achieves a surplus with the Communist
nations. The Communist bloc accounts for about one third of
Yugoslavia's exports, but only one quarter of its imports.
Interestingly, it has often achieved a surplus of trade with
the USSR while running a deficit with Eastern Europe. The
deficit results from Yugoslavia's historical tendency to import,
and her inability to find a market in Eastern Europe for her
exports. The surplus on the Soviet side is due to the high
price that Yugoslav goods demand in Russia, the strict Soviet
trade policies, and the poor quality of Soviet goods. °"
Interestingly, the high demand for Yugoslav goods in the Soviet
Union may be a direct result of the improved quality of these
goods that has resulted from competition in Western markets.
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Trading extensively with both the West and with COMECON
makes trade management and accounting a bit confusing for the
Yugoslavs. Trade with COMECON is conducted on a bilateral
clearing house basis in which commodities are merely exchanged
for other commodities. To accomodate this system, Yugoslavia,
at least partially, has had to retain its pre-reforra centrally
controlled trade structure. Furthermore, this dual system of
trade can lead to inefficiency in production since Yugoslav
businessmen often prefer the COMECON trade because it is simpler
and not as demanding or risky as trade on the world market."'
Whatever may be said about the Yugoslav economy, most authors
and visitors agree that Yugoslavia's people live better today
than they did 30 years ago, and more importantly Yugoslavs live
better than their neighbors in Eastern Europe. The regime
predictably attributes the economic success to its hybrid
system. Borowiec offers four very different reasons:
(l) massive Western (mainly U.S.) help to Yugoslavia during
the difficult years which followed the break with the
Cominform; (2) intensive trade with the West and Western
investment in Yugoslavia; (3) the flow of Western tourists;
(4) the one million Yugoslav guest workers in Western
Europe, with their hard-currency remittances and support
for relatives in Yugoslavia .9°
Probably both the regime and its opponents are partially correct.
But more importantly, the Yugoslavs have in fact achieved a
significant degree of economic success and development utilizing
a system that is, in Borowiec ' s words, "neither fish nor fowl".
Continued success is certainly very possible. But in viewing
the various challenges that market socialism poses, one over-
riding factor seems to stand out; that of great economic
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dependence and linkage with Western economies. In 1965* John
C. Campbell wrote, "The great bugbear haunting the Yugoslavs
is... the European Common Market and what its mere existence
will mean to Yugoslavia ."99 Campbell was speaking principally
of the effects of preferential tariffs. Ironically, thirteen
years later, it is the Western European economy that still
poses the greatest challenge to Yugoslav economic stability.
Foreign trade, tourism, workers abroad, and foreign Investment
have done more to link Yugoslavia to the West than any political
or ideological policy practice of the past thirty years. On
the other hand, the linkage has positive aspects which will
make it the interest of Yugoslavia's leaders to maintain the
contact that now exists with the West. In short, Yugoslavia's
stability is very greatly dependent on economic stability and
policies of Western Europe.
E. POWER: STRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
Much has been written concerning succession in Communist
states. Successors, generally the winners of power struggles,
whether they rule individually or collectively, have a way of
defying the predictions of Western observers. Furthermore, it
seems that despite succession arrangements or designations,
there is little that even the departing leaders can do to
orchestrate the process.
Another, yet different, succession process is that which
follows the passing or retirement of a dictator or ruler who
has possessed a majority of power and has ruled for a relatively
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long period of time. Often such a leader is seen as the embod-
iment of the country's internal and external policies. In this
case also it has proven difficult to predict the source of
power and the type of rule that will follow. Such a leader
tends to dwarf those around him and after a while it begins to
appear as though there is no one qualified to succeed him.
It is probably a misfortune for Yugoslavia that Tito's
succession will fit into both of the above categories. It
would be much easier for all concerned and stability would be
much more probable if there existed an unquestioned succession
process that would produce a leader acceptable to all Yugoslavs
But what man or system could possibly replace Josip Tito? The
following quotations exemplify the diversity of opinion and
the difficulty of determining the answer to that question.
The problem is much more than that of identifying individuals.
It is a problem of identifying the sources and institutions of
power and their linkages within the framework of Yugoslavia's
political structure.
...whoever replaces Tito cannot hope to enjoy his pres-
tige or authority and is liable to be more of a broker
than an authoritarian leader. In the final analysis,
therefore, it will be the manner in which the institu-
tional structure, centered largely around the State
Presidency, functions that will be the deciding factor,






One thing is certain: The burden of trying to preserve
Titoism without Tito will rest on the LCY. The Party,
. .., will be the main guarantor of Titoist continuity.
Andrew Borowiec
Yugoslavia After Tito
...the army's political role has evolved to the point
where military support is central to the preservation
and extension of authority; the political influence
which has been gained by the military institutions is




With the exception of the ailing Kardelj, all ranking
Yugoslav politicians suffer one enormous disadvantage;
they do not have a national constituency and so their




...we should anticipate a political process that includes




Power, for over thirty years, has resided principally in
Tito's hands. But most observers would agree that another Tito
is not in the offing for Yugoslavia because no individual even
remotely approaches his stature. There are now laws that
govern the succession process. But due to the nature of Com-
munism it is still not likely that they will provide the entire
answer. They may provide a basis, or structure of rule and
decision-making, but no more. The Army and the Party are natural
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allies and will most probably be the greatest guiding influ-
ences, but even they cannot necessarily get along without other
sources of power and certainly not without each other. Finally,
while it is true that no single individual wields the power
necessary to rule alone, personalities will obviously play a
major role and must be therefore considered when envisioning
a post-Tito Yugoslavia.
1. Government Structure
The institutional structure of the Yugoslav state pro-
vides considerable insight into the thinking of Yugoslavia's
leadership and the limits within which it must work. It pro-
vides balance between the member republics and provinces,
respecting their desires for autonomy, and between opposing
blocs of Communists who want either greater decentralization
or increased centralization. It prepares, via written regula-
tions and specific political bodies, for Tito's succession.
It allows the Yugoslav people a say in their government by
providing a delegate system of representation. And finally,
and in spite of all this balance, it maintains the principle
of democratic centralism and controls over decision-making.
The diagram on page 69 reflects the basic structure of
the federal government in Belgrade and its linkage with the
individual republics and provinces. The upper portion of the
diagram depicts the major federal bodies, including the SFRY
Assembly, its associated Federal Executive Council, and the
State Presidency. The lower half of the diagram depicts the
organizations which provide the Republican, Provincial, and
68






































































































Communal delegates to the central bodies. The system is de-
signed first to guarantee representation to all major national
groups. Secondly, it provides political or social representa-
tion to the six major sectors of Yugoslav society. Theoreti-
cally, each individual fits into one group or another.
The SFRY Assembly is, constitutionally, "the supreme
organ of power operating within the framework of federal rights
and duties." It has the authority to amend the Constitution,
determine internal and foreign policy, adopt the annual social
plan and budget, decide on alterations to Yugoslavia's borders,
decide on war and peace, and elect the President of the Repub-
lic and members of the Federal Executive Council. These broad
powers are acted out according to a rather vague division of
labor between the two Chambers. The Federal Chamber appears
to have the broader "state" responsibilities while the Chamber
of Republics and Provinces acts on legislation which requires
consensus of the republics. Obviously all of this is very
theoretical since it is doubtful that the Assembly has ever
seriously bucked Tito's decisions on foreign policy, or on pro-
motion of individuals to higher government posts. The Federal
Executive Council is constituted in accordance with equal repub-
lican representation, and is the executive body of the SFRY
Assembly.
As the diagram indicates, there are two inputs into the
Assembly. The Federal Chamber is comprised of delegates from
the Assemblies of Communes. The Communes are organized region-
ally and operate semi-independently from their respective
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Republican governments. They are designed to organize the
people in socio-political groups based upon their social lives,
work, needs, and interests. Their delegates are nominated by
the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY),
a peoples' front-type political ally of the LCY, designed to
gather broad mass political support. The Federal Chamber is
therefore a political-ideological body rather than an ethnic
body. The other half of the SFRY Assembly, the Chamber of
Republics and Provinces, is comprised of representatives from
respective Republican and Provincial Assemblies. These dele-
gates are more clearly representatives of ethnic groups or
nations than their counterparts in the Federal Chamber.
At the lowest level within their republics the people
are represented through socio-political organizations, party
units, military and territorial units, and economic organiza-
tions at their places of work. The Law of Associated Labor
sets forth the rules by which organizations of this latter
group are established. These work units are the basis of the
concept of self-management and self-management pluralism, for
they provide workers a say in the management of their economic
organization and a method of delegate representation in their
local political bodies. Through this broad system of represen-
tation it is estimated that as many as 700,000 citizens serve
on some sort of delegation at any given time. 1^
The Yugoslavs claim that this system of direct represen-
tation is an improvement over Western democratic practice since
it directly involves so much more of the electorate. It
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does that certainly, because delegates serve for four years
and no one can represent the same organization for more than
two terms. The above figure can thus be seen to multiply over
time. As a result, the population does become highly politi-
cized and conscious and active, at least in the general business
of local government. Whether they have much say. in the actual
decision-making remains an important question.
What the diagram does not show is that the lowest level
of representation is in reality the only level at which direct
election of delegates is practiced. Thereafter, moving up the
ladder from republican or provincial assemblies to federal
102bodies, indirect elections are utilized. Thus the represen-
tatives are less directly linked to the electorate than advertised.
It still appears, however, that consensus should play a
major role in policy making due to the representation of both
ethnic and social groups. A. Ross Johnson stresses that this
is the case and feels Yugoslavia is "more a federal than a
unitary state. "103 He bases this assertion on the fact that
during the 1970' s much of the decision-making regarding internal
policies and economic interests has been done within the govern-
mental structure, free of Party or Leninist type dictates. It
can further be argued that representatives to the 3FRY Assembly
remain loyal to their regional or communal interests. Their
election is still dependent on their republican support so very
few can afford to be totally Independent or "Yugoslav" in their
actions. While this does not necessarily imply antagonistic
relationships among representatives, it does Imply that a certain
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amount of consensus must be achieved in Yugoslavia's decision-
making process.
The Constitution of 1974 decreased the size of the
State Presidency from 23 to 9 men. It is composed of a repre-
sentative from each republic and each province, in addition to
the President of the LCY. The nine men are elected for five
year terms. During that five year period, the post of President
is to rotate among them on a yearly basis. For the present,
however, Tito, who maintains the President of the LCY slot, acts
as President of the Republic. He has been elected to that
position for life or for an "unlimited term of office." Upon
completion of his term, the system of rotation is to go into
effect with the vice-president assuming duties as President.
It is difficult to ascertain how much power the Presidency will
have since it is clearly still dominated by Tito's presence.
It thusfar has met primarily to discuss and approve foreign
policy issues, though it is also responsible for social,
economic, and defense policy decisions. Many of the latter
three are handled by the Assembly, though the Presidency has
ultimate authority in the event of disagreement.
The structure of the present Yugoslav government is
relatively new. While it is the result of evolution, it has
in fact been in effect only since 197^. It is clearly designed
to provide balanced and representative government to the
diverse groups of Yugoslav society now, but more importantly
in the future. What makes analysis of its actual effectiveness
difficult, however, is the fact that during the period of its
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birth and initial testing there has existed a simultaneous
recentralization of decision-making and increased emphasis on
the role of the LCY within all aspects of government and
society. Thus it is not uncommon nor surprising to find dis-
agreement among Western observers over which trend has the
greatest momentum
.
2. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia
The modern day LCY traces its origins to April of 1919
when a Socialist Worker's Party of Yugoslavia was founded. In
June of 1920 it became the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY).
Prior to World War II the party was best characterized by weak-
ness and fractious disagreement regarding a consistent policy
toward nationalism. 10 During World War II and through 19^8,
it distinguished itself by its partisan victory and its almost
unparalleled loyalty and allegiance to the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. 105 Since 1948, it has been known for its
independence and its decentralized and liberal leadership of
the Yugoslav state. Naturally, it has been overshadowed by the
dominance of Tito.
As an internal actor, the Party followed the general
trends of government and society throughout the 1950' s and 1960's
In 1952 it changed its name to the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia in order to symbolize its changing role in political
life. Henceforward it was supposed to play a leading role in
politics and ideological education, while leaving room for
increasing use of the system of self-management. 10 Economic
reforms and greater recognition of republican powers corresponded
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to, if not a withering away of the Party' 3 control, then
certainly to a decentralization of Party functions.
The events in Croatia in 1971 brought an end to Party
decentralization and Communist political control was reasserted.
Tito accomplished this in a classical Tito manner. Decentral-
ization had clearly gone too far and the centralists in the
Party were clammering for more control from Belgrade and less
power in the Republics. Tito reestablished Party emphasis
while continuing with the formal decentralization provided by
Constitutional amendments. He thus showed once and for all
that, despite what is guaranteed or provided for in writing,
it is still Tito that holds the power in Yugoslavia. Since
1971 he has tried to transfer some of his power back into the
LCY.
In late 1971 and well into 1972 Tito conducted a purge
of Party leadership that was not limited to Croatia, but spread
into Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia as well. It was clear
what he desired. According to Robin Remington, prior to these
events "...Yugoslavia had not one political party... but eight.
. .
n10^
Tito's desire was to recentralize the Party and strengthen it
by ensuring that it was once again united. The best way to
unite the Party quickly was to ensure that the top leadership
of the Republics' Leagues of Communists were dedicated to a
strong central party. And the best way to accomplish that was
to purge those individuals who were not. Tito began the recen-
tralizaticn process by adopting an "Action Program" which called
for greater ideological and organizational unity, greater
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attention to ideological education, and an increased role in
the formulation and administration of all government policy. loy
In September 1972 he issued a letter addressed to the entire
Party membership calling for greater unity and a revival of
the basic principles of democratic centralism. This letter
warned that members who did not comply would be expelled, as
indeed they soon were. ^9 The time between December 1971 and
1974 has been referred to as Tito's "crackdown" and as a return
to Leninist doctrine.
Other concrete steps were taken to further strengthen
the Party's role. Prior to the 1974 Constitution, it had been
illegal for a person to occupy top posts in both the Party and
the state. This must have proved too great an obstacle to
democratic centralism and unity, for it was changed by the new
Constitution. 110 The absense of such a law thus allows for the
consolidation of power into fewer hands. Similarly, there has
been contraction in the size of Party bodies. Prior to 1974 the
trend had been toward enlargement of even the top units. The
10th Congress (May 1974) and the 11th Congress (June 1978) both
decreased the size of the Central Committee Presidium from the
1969 level of 52 members to 39 in 1974 and 24 more recently. 111
Seen in conjunction with the corresponding contraction of such
bodies as the federal Presidency, it is clear that a smaller,
more elite group is being placed in the position of making
decisions.
Meanwhile, the size of the Party has increased at a




slightly over 1 million to 1.6 million. In comparison the
membership increased by only about 100,000 during the previous
14 years. 1:L ^ It seems that as the Party made its leadership
more elite, its ranks became less so. The increase is most
probably a result of the LCY attempts to reassume a dominant
role in society. Ideological education and increased recruit-
ment has swelled Party ranks. While greater numbers tend to
imply less hard core Marxism, it is possible that this still
serves the Party's purpose since it has become a greater part
of society at the lower levels of the decision-making pyramid.
These larger numbers also assure the Party that there is member
participation in many of the self-management units, which is a
goal that Tito himself has stressed. 11
The organization of the Party is much like that of the
federal government in that the central organization is repeated
at the Republican and Provincial levels. Furthermore, the
Central Committee and the Presidium are both structured according
to the ethnic "key" which dominates Yugoslav politics. At the
11th Party Congress, the Central Committee that was elected was
composed of 20 individuals from each Republic and 15 from each
of the Provinces and the Yugoslav Peoples Army. The Presidium
of 24 members includes 3 from the Republics, 2 from the
Provinces, 1 from the Army, and of course Tito, ^ Despite
past problems, use of the ethnic key will probably continue since
it is one method of keeping the various nations loyal to the
Party and the state.
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Another indication of the Party's expanding role is
seen in the number of its cells or basic organizations. Tito
placed the number of these ground-level units at 47,212 by the
end of 1977. "*" Most of those had fewer than 50 members. The
purpose of maintaining such a large number of small units cannot
be better explained than by Tito's own words: "Communists need
a daily dialog and accord with other working people directly at
their work place, at a meeting, at a trade union gathering, in
the workers council and so forth." 11 '
Political balancing acts, by their very nature, are open
to pressure and criticism from a variety of different directions.
Such is certainly the case with the LCY. From the day it first
took a step in the direction of decentralization, the Party has
faced pressure to grant even more independence to the Republics.
Self-management and its broader implications tends to run wild
now and again. On the other hand, the more the Party has decen-
tralized, the larger has become the detractors on the left who
favor greater central control of political and economic decision-
118
making and a return to a more orthodox Communist style of rule.
There is little doubt that the LCY wields more power
today than it did a decade ago. Tito has gone to great lengths
to make the Party once again the "connective tissue" which binds
multinational Yugoslavia together. Typically, it is difficult
to determine how successful he has been. Dusko Doder, after
having interviewed hundreds of Party members "...never found
one who, when speaking privately, was a true believer." 11 ^ Yet
William Zimmerman, in an ongoing debate with A. Ross Johnson, is
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convinced that the Party will still play a preeminent role in
the succession. 120 It is true that non-believers, that is,
non-believers in Marxism in its more classical form, can still
be loyal enough to the LCY to make it strong enough to play a
preeminent role. But such a supposition is rather suspect and
so too is the power the Party allegedly maintains. Again
according to Doder, "The extraordinary thing about the Yugoslav
Party is its complete submission to one man. The apparatus of
power is the office of the president - in short, Tito himself." 121
Thus Tito may speak of the LCY as the "Leading and Guiding
Ideopolitical Force of Society," 122 but not until he is gone
will it have an opportunity to lead or guide.
3. The Yugoslav Peoples Army
The Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) is fast becoming a major
factor in Yugoslavia's future, and not only from the standpoint
of national defense. In recent years an increasing amount of
attention has been directed toward the YPA because it is one
possible source of cohesion amongst the array of multi-directional
forces existing in the country. It has often been referred to
as the most "Yugoslav" institution in existence. It is also
considered to be the most centrally controlled and therefore
the most unified organization of those that guide Yugoslavia.
An even greater emphasis has been placed on the military due to
its apparently changing role in the internal security of the
state. Today, array officers have much more political power and
responsibility for domestic security than ever before.
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Most writing traces the army's expanded political role
to the 1971 events in Croatia. Certainly that period marked
the beginning of an increase of military involvement in politi-
cal affairs. It can be argued, however, that this involvement
symbolizes a revival of an historical precedent, for Yugoslavia's
military establishment played a very important role in the
consolidation of power in the country at the end of World War
II. The importance of this role lies in the fact that both the
YPA and the LCY elite share common roots in the partisan struggle
for national liberation. It is not so surprising then to see
the Army considered as a factor in Yugoslavia's internal
stability.
The army's post-war role was manifested in the use of
the National Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (KNOJ) which was the
military member of the security forces. The KNOJ has been
described as "...a uniformed elite troop separate from the
regular army and from the secret police (UDB)...its main tasks
were to smash any attempts to overthrow Tito; to destroy all
remnants of political opposition; ...
"
123 its strength during
the post-War period was estimated at about 75,000 men and it
was clearly strong enough to put down any internal uprising.
Thus in 1946 Tito had no qualms about using military means to
maintain domestic stability, or to maintain his position in
power.
After 19^8 Tito faced little, If any, internal threat.
His security forces had rid the country of most opposition and
the Russian threat served to unify the Yugoslavs. By late 1952
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Tito felt secure enough to eliminate the KNOJ and in December
of that year Col. Gen. Ivan Gosnjak stated that "The political
consolidation of our country enables us to leave matters of
internal order and protection of property to the peoples'
s
militia." 12 The KNOJ was converted to an elite border guard
of 25,000 men. It would not be until the early 1970 's that
Tito would consider it necessary to speak of a military role
in the maintenance of domestic stability.
It was in December 1971 that Tito looked once again
toward the army as a domestic tool. On the 11th of that month
he met with top army and territorial defense force leaders and
apparently received their support regarding his plans for
Croatia. In a speech ten days later, he stated, "The task of
our array is not merely to defend the territorial integrity of
our country, but also to defend our socialism when we see that
it is in danger and that it cannot be defended by other means." ^
This was not to be the last such reference to the army's renewed
responsibility for internal order and it certainly had its effect
in ending that particular crisis.
These events are generally considered a turning point
for the YPA. There had been steps toward a decentralization of
the military along republican lines. Tito's realization that
the army was his most reliable instrument apparently caused him
to reconsider such moves. As Johnson states, the Croatian
crisis gave "...the YPA ample ammunition to ward off any renewed




Not only did decentralization of the army cease but
measures to strengthen its political role were soon under-
taken. In 1974 an active duty general was named to the LCY's
twelve member Executive Committee, two generals retained posi-
tions on the LCY Presidium, and fifteen military representatives
were elected to the Central Committee in addition to five other
army representatives from the republics. As Robert W. Dean
points out, army representation in the Central Committee
accounted for 12$ of the total membership and had thus assumed
"...a status within the Party formally somewhat akin to a
province." 1^" In government the most noteworthy changes were
the appointments of army generals to the posts of Minister of
Internal Affairs (which controls the security apparatus) and
Public Prosecutor.
Thus today, there are two aspects of the army's politi-
cal role that bear looking into. First is its increased repre-
sentation at high levels of the LCY and government. Most
important here is its relationship with the Party and its
ability to affect decisions,, The second area is its potential
as a weapon of force either in putting down domestic distur-
bances or in reacting to the outbreak of an actual civil war.
At the outset, it Is important to remember that the
array's changing role vis-a-vis Yugoslav politics is only one
aspect of the much wider reform to recentralize political
power. Tito had learned that the Party was not only incapable
of acting as a "connective tissue" but was actually part of the
cause of crisis in Croatia. Where the Party failed, however,
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the army was successful. As Robert Dean suggests, Tito was.
most probably very hesitant to actually use the array directly
"...for fear of forfeiting a measure of his political control
over both it and the situation." ° The idea of depending on
the army after the crisis was probably equally distasteful.
But it was a logical step to include the army in the shoring
up of the power base, for it ensured not only the loyalty of
the army, but also served to strengthen the LCY itself.
The military has not become politicized to the extent
that there is potential for a military coup. In fact it appears
that the military representation has been successfully coopted
into the Party leadership. This is not really very surprising
considering their common roots. They have a common ideological
orientation that makes existing institutional boundaries more
permeable. 3° In reality, only the increased representative
function of the array since 1971 is truly new. Until more time
has passed, the array and the Party will probably both be driven
by the same basic values. Foremost among those values is the
preservation of the state that they mutually created thrity
years ago.
Robin Remington describes the army as a "...righteous
defender of the correct and proper Party line. 3 Th e army
can therefore be depended upon to back the Party's decisions.
But direct military influence on actual decision making will
probably be minimal. Even its "righteous defender" role may be
minimal if the Party remains strong enough to effectively
maintain domestic control. This the Party must do, however,
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because according to Dean, the army's voluntary subordination
is "conditional" and "Should. . . (Party) leadership or its
resolve be seriously weakened, the Array could assume a more
direct political role as arbiter, factional ally, or challen-
ger. "132 it seems probable that the Army will simply remain
in the shadows ready to support the Party when necessary.
What level of support the army may be called upon to
provide is unknown and naturally would depend upon the nature
of the threat to the regime. There would undoubtedly first be
a warning of potential YPA intervention on the side of the LCY
and issued in the manner Tito used in 1971. If such threats
failed to serve the purpose, it is certainly very possible that
the army might be called upon to restore order and to "mop up"
opposition as it did following World War II. Furthermore, Tito
has granted the army a rather clear mandate as the protector
of Yugoslav socialist society. In December of 1977, he received
eleven of the top military leaders on the island of Brioni at
which time he reiterated the array's responsibility for domestic
stability:
We still have enemies: There are still internal ene-
mies who would like the situation of former times to
return. We must not allow this. Our army must not
merely watch vigilantly over our borders but also be
present inside the country.
.
.You must not allow any-
body to undermine the achievements of our revolution
to undermine brotherhood and unity. ^33
With such a sanction from Tito himself neither the Party nor




Short of overt military force, there may be other
methods of control available to the army. The appointment in
1974 of active duty General Franjo Hrljevic as Minister of
Internal Affairs, and a year later as head of the State
Security Service (UDB), is an extremely significant action.
It means that for the first time since 1946 the civilian
security service is under the control of the military. It not
only gives the army control of the UDB, but also provides a
direct link between internal security operations and YPA troops.
While it is doubtful that the YPA will become an internal
police force, it is clear that its future responsibilities
could include roles in internal security.
There is one characteristic of the YPA that tends to
cast a shadow over its potential as an internal stabilizer.
It has not entirely escaped the ethnic problem. Serbs and
Montenegrins are highly over-represented In the officer corps.
Together they account for approximately 67»7 per cent of all
officers and 66 per cent of the generals, but only 42.2 per
cent of the total population. On the other hand, while Croats
are adequately represented at the highest levels of command,
they comprise only 14.7 per cent of the total officer corps. ^
These imbalances are traditional in the Yugoslav army and are
due primarily to differing ethnic attitudes regarding military
careers. 35 Since such attitudes are deeply ingrained, it is
doubtful that the Imbalances can be redressed in the near future
The apparent pro-Serbian slant of the army could be
significant in a crisis. For one thing, it shows that the army
85

may not be as all "Yugoslav" as has often been suggested. Its
reaction to a crisis involving Serbia and Croatia for example,
may be unpredictable and might be based more on nationalistic
tendencies than on dedication to socialism or the Yugoslav
state. Much is being done to avoid such an outlook. At
Brioni, Tito made clear his views on nationalism in the
military:
...the army must be united, regardless of its nation-
alities; .. .Nationalism is an ugly disease which,...
treacherously eats away at the organism, not merely
of an individual but entire organizations and sectors.
We must be very vigilant to prevent such a thing
happening in the armyo-^o
What Tito hopes is that a truly Yugoslav army linked to an
ideologically united Party can overcome the centrifugal
tendencies of nationalism.
There is also a certain amount of political opposition
to the army's internal role. Vladimir Bakaric, a very high
ranking official of Party and government, and one who has
managed to maintain his identity as a Croat and a Yugoslav,
outlined some typical objections to the army in politics. They
center around the fact that it is unpredictable in a crisis,
could eventually cause political troubles by desiring too great
a role, and that any attempt by the army to seize power might
itself unleash a civil war. ^' Bakaric would clearly prefer
to see the military remain clear of Yugoslav politics.
The YPA will most probably not remain clear of Yugoslav
politics. Instead, according to Robin Remington, "...represen-





'leading role 1 within the LCY itself ... n1^ Short of that,
the YPA will be clearly present in all that happens after Tito
dies. It may never be needed but its mere presence will be
influential in major decision-making and its influence will be
felt by the members of the regime as well as its opponents.
4. The Successors
It is obvious that no individual can succeed Tito and
rule as he has for the last three and a half decades. Not only
are all pretenders to the throne lacking in power, but it is
furthermore difficult to imagine any of them possessing the
talent necessary to manage Tito's system of checks and balances
internally and externally. Tito himself has long been aware
of the detrimental influence his rule will have on those that
follow him. It is for that reason that he has endeavored to
engineer his succession by means of institutions such as the
State Presidency.
What of the men who will actually inherit the structure
thusfar described? It is not difficult to identify the group
of individuals who will be responsible for continuing Tito's
policies. In fact it is relatively simple to narrow the future
powerholders to a group of about eighteen men. The leaders
shown on page 88 held the highest Party and government positions
as of the 11th Party Congress of June 1978. The information
presented was gleaned from a variety of sources. It is useful
in identifying the nature of power in Yugoslavia's future.
One of the first items of importance is the fact that
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ninth is Tito) were all elected to the LCY Central Committee
Presidium by the 11th Congress. While this is not a new con-
cept in Communism or in Yugoslavia , it is noteworthy because
prior to the 11th Congress none of the Presidency members were
on the Party's old Executive Committee of the Presidium. The
fact that all eight are now members of the new, smaller Presi-
dium is a clear example of recentralization of power.
Consolidation of power is made very evident by the
table. The eighteen individuals listed hold the following
positions
:
l) 13 of 24 positions on Central Committee Presidium
2 8 of 9 positions on State Presidency
3) President plus 4 Vice-Presidents of Federal Executive
Council
4) The three most important Federal Ministries
5) Presidency of the Federal Assembly
Furthermore most of these same individuals have dominated
Yugoslav politics for some time. Fifteen of the eighteen have
held high office within the Party or government prior to their
present terra, and laws have been adjusted such that positions
can be rotated amongst this group in the future.
Another important characteristic of present Yugoslav
leadership is the dominance of the veterans of the Partisan
struggle. Thirteen of the eighteen individuals listed took up
arras as early as 1941. The so-called "Club of 41", while it
may be aging and shrinking, continues to dominate Yugoslav
politics. This same group has ruled Yugoslavia since 1945 and
is clearly hesitant to turn the reins over to the younger men.
Naturally there are a few exceptions, but even a larger sample
89

of Yugoslav leadership produced similar results. Twenty-two
of thrity-one high Party and government officials fought from
1941 in the liberation struggle. Thirty of fourty-three such
officials were born prior to 1923 and were thus old enough to
have fought beginning in 1941. While Tito is about twenty
years older than this group of men, actuarial tables would
indicate that the Yugoslav leadership is headed for another
succession crisis even after that of the old Marshal. They are
not yet in the situation of the CPSU, but if they continue to
ignore the younger generation, there will be no one with the
requisite experience to run the country in the 1980' s and 1990' s.
It can logically be assumed that at least a few of the
men from this group will predominate and achieve greater power
than the others. To do so they will have to meet a number of
requirements. Andrew Borowiec provides what appears to be an
accurate formula for picking post-Tito leaders:
He must have the array solidly behind him, must have
the support of the Serbs - the dominant national
group - and at the same time must be acceptable to
the Croats, .. .Preferably, he should have a record
of World War II resistance of "revolutionary"
activity in the initial post-war period. L39
Additionally he must have significant backing amongst the other
members of the elite.
Edvard Kardelj is normally considered to be the obvious
choice. After Tito, Kardelj will be the only "surviving" member
of the team that formed the core of Yugoslavia's post-War
political leaders. 1 ^ He is a Slovene who has served in the
central government long enough to be considered a Yugoslav. He
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is the Party's leading ideologue, having invented self-
management and more recently self-management "pluralism".
According to Borowiec, Kardelj "...towers over the men who are
to become Tito's collective heirs.
"
1 ^1 But Kardelj lacks
assertiveness and is not considered a leader. He has always
proven a perfect lieutenant but is too much an introvert to
assume the sole leadership of the Party and government. Dusko
Doder describes him as "...a small, bespectacled white-haired
man, absolutely without magnetism, looking as insignificant as
a man can look." 2 Certainly not the type to follow Josip
Broz Tito J Furthermore, Kardelj, at 68 is known to be in poor
health. ^3 s he will not lead alone. His support, however,
will be an important source of legitimacy for anyone else who
intends to assume a major role.
Stane Dolanc has received a great deal of attention in
recent years. He has made what must be called a meteoric rise
to the top. A Slovene, and only 53 years old, it is difficult
even to trace his career. It would appear that Tito has taken
a liking to him and has provided the major boost to his career.
But as a result, he lacks a political following at both the
national level and the republican level. He is a very effective
organization man, capable of achieving order and discipline. 1
At the 11th Party Congress he was again elected to the Presidium
and has assumed the new position of "executive secretary", a




Two other men appear to play potentially important
roles. Nikola Ljubicic, a Serb, a Partisan, Minister of
National Defense, and a member of the Presidium will have a
great deal of power by virtue of his dual role in the Party
and as head of the army. Aleksandar Grlickov has played a
major role in Yugoslavia's relations with other Communist
parties. He has been responsible for inter-Party relation-
ships throughout a period of great ideological importance
considering the emergence of Eurocommunism and the rapproche-
ment between Yugoslavia and the Peoples Republic of China. A
Macedonian, and another of the younger men, Grlickov can be
expected to continue in his ascendency.
What is clear is that none of these men can rule inde-
pendently. Kardelj and Dolanc are often given a good chance
of ruling in tandem with each other. Dolanc would serve as
the "prime mover" in such a relationship while Kardelj would
provide the necessary continuity and legitimacy. Additionally
the two have the added advantage of being neither Serbs or
Croats. Even these two will depend on others for support,
however. Others normally included are Ljubicic, due to his
combination Serb-army orientation, and Bakaric due to his
relatively strong statewide and Croatian prestige.
All of these men have the ability to at least partially
determine whether Tito's succession is a solution to other
domestic problems or whether it becomes a cause of even greater
instability. A power struggle might spread elsewhere in the
federation and could easily become uncontrollable. On the other
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hand, a united effort by all of the principals in the
succession could result in a degree of stability far beyond
that predicted by many observers of the Yugoslav scene. Their
own dedication to unity might prove the example for all of the
diverse elements in Yugoslavia.
The source of order and stability in the post-Tito
Yugoslav state will be based upon the accumulation and main-
tenance of the political power necessary to control nationalist
forces, economic pressures, a variety of political and ideolo-
gical challenges, and foreign pressures designed to pull or
push the country out of nonalignment. Political power, if it
is to be sufficient, if it is to meet these challenges, will
be based upon the Yugoslav institutional and constitutional
system, the ideological power and unity of the LCY, the latent
armed force of the politicized YPA, and the individuals who
control these various organizations of Yugoslav politics and
society. It is possible that they will all come together and
Tito will prove correct when he says "I can leave at any time
and nothing will change." 1 5 Despite Tito's confidence,
however, that seems a bit optimistic.
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III. THE BALANCE OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS:
THE SUPERPOWERS
Yugoslav diplomats and writers often note that a country's
foreign policy is a reflection of its internal policy. While
that may be debatable as an international rule, it is most
certainly true of the modern Yugoslav state. As Chapter II
demonstrated, contemporary Yugoslavia is in a state of transi-
tion, poised between old and new, East and West, and Communist
and capitalist. It is similarly situated on the European scene,
balanced between the blocs, while it almost religiously main-
tains Its dedication to nonalignment and the rights of small,
independent nations. These policies cause Yugoslavia to play
a rather unlaue role in European politics and in the regional
balance of power. Hence It is an important, and possibly vital,
aspect of the European policies of the Soviet Union and the
United States.
The European security system, since World War II, has been
based primarily on bloc politics. In terms of the alignment
of specific nations, very little has changed since the late
19^0's. Nations have been classified as Western or Eastern,
depending upon their allegiance to, or dependence on, the
United States or the Soviet Union respectively. Additionally,
several nations have practiced policies of neutrality or non-
alignment. Though recent trends and events such as Eurocom-
munism, expanding East-West trade and cultural exchange, the
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Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, arms limita-
tion talks, and force reduction meetings are believed to be
capable of reorienting European politics, superpower competi-
tion and East-West alignments still predominate today. The
Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), composed today of six nations
of East Central Europe and the Soviet Union, is felt to serve
mainly as an instrument of Soviet policy. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, composed of the United States and Canada,
in addition to most of the Western European nations and Greece
and Turkey, has existed primarily as a defense against those
nations' mutually perceived threat of Soviet/Communist aggres-
sion in Europe and the North Atlantic. Yugoslavia has remained
clear of both these pacts since its nonalignment precludes
entry into military agreements with any country.
Yugoslavia's uniaue combination of nonalignment, Communist
orientation, and geo-stra tegic value, make it significantly
more critical to European security than the other extra-bloc
nations of the region. The consensus is that Yugoslavia is at
least one key to stability in the entirety of Europe. Paul
Lendval, in an article on sources of instability in Eastern
Europe, sees "...Yugoslavia as the pivotal area both in terras
of social upheavals, and future security in Europe.' And
according to F. Stephen Larrabee in Balkan Security , any changes
in Yugoslavia's policies "...would affect the security of all
the Balkan countries and shift the balance of power in the
entire area."^ Such statements are understandable since
Yugoslavia borders on two NATO countries (Greece and Italy),
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three Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary),
one neutral nation (Austria), and one nation until recently
aligned with the PRC (Albania).
Belgrade's principal goal has been to retain its socialist
orientation while maintaining independence in its internal and
external policies. This implicitly means freedom from Soviet
dominance. But it also means keeping a proper distance from
the United States and the Western bloc. That Yugoslavia has
done so with considerable success is a function of Tito's
global foreign policy and the mutually conflicting interests
and policies of the Soviet Union and the United States regard-
ing Yugoslavia's alignment. The two superpowers, along with
their respective allies, continue to have important stakes in
Yugoslavia's role in European politics. The extent of their
conflicting interests is likely to be very influential in
shaping that role in the future.
A. SOVIET INTERESTS AND RELATIONS
1. Soviet Interests
Soviet interests in Yugoslavia are best understood in
terms of Moscow's historic policy toward all of Eastern Europe
and the Balkans. At the end of World War II, Joseph Stalin
moved quickly to establish dominance over the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe. By installing pro-Soviet Communist
leaders in power in these countries, he was able to build a
system of buffer states that served several purposes. First,
it provided the Soviet Union with a defensive perimeter that
isolated the USSR from any direct contact with Western Europe.
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Second, it enabled the Soviets to place and maintain direct
military pressure on several Western European states. Finally,
it enabled Moscow to orchestrate political and ideological
control over the nations of Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Treaty
Organization is generally felt to have been an evolutionary
by-product of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. Instituted
chiefly in response to West Germany's entry into NATO, the
Warsaw Pact has since been recognized as a legal justification
for the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe.^ Thus
while Stalin himself has been denounced by Soviet leadership,
his policy of controlling Eastern Europe has been consistently
upheld.
Prior to June of 19^8 it was expected by all concerned
that Yugoslavia would assume its proper place in the Moscow-led
Communist movement. Tito and the Yugoslav Communists had, for
sometime, been among Stalin's most loyal followers. Yet they
were unwilling to subject themselves to his dictates. The
result was a rare political defeat for Joseph Stalin and the
creation of a severe ideological fissure in the Soviet bloc.
Soviet interests in Yugoslavia since that time have
been based upon one major goal; the correction of the political
and ideological damage inflicted by the existence of the
Yugoslav model. Moscow's principal desire has been the return
of Yugoslavia to full membership in the socialist community.
Implicit in such membership is Soviet dominance of Yugoslavia's
internal and external affairs. Realization of this goal would
neutralize much of the negative effect Yugoslavia's defection
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has had on Moscow's control of Eastern Europe, and its leader-
ship of world Communism. Short of full control, Moscow has,
at times, attempted to reduce Yugoslavia's influence by brand-
ing Tito and his associates as heretics and revisionists and
by excluding them from participation in Communist affairs.
Recently, a growing interest in Yugoslavis'a geo-strategic
value has made the Soviets even more interested in regaining
Yugoslavia's allegiance.
As the Communist state that got away from Stalin,
Yugoslavia provided a dangerous precedent for other nations of
the region. Its effects have been seen time and again. In
1955 Poland, in spite of pressure from Khrushchev, achieved
considerably more internal autonomy than previously thought
possible. In that same year, the USSR felt compelled to inter-
vene in Hungary in order to reassert control there. In the
1960's Albania shifted its allegiance to Communist China, while
Romania acquired significant independence. Then in 1968,
Moscow felt it was necessary to intervene in Czechoslovakia in
order to halt liberal trends in that country. While all liber-
alization in Eastern Europe cannot be attributed to Yugoslavia's
defection, there is little doubt that its example has been
closely watched by all of the countries and peoples of Eastern
Europe. Furthermore, Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia has
shifted from the outright denunciation of the late 1940 ' s to
the occasional complete forgiveness and rapprochement of the
mid-1950
' s. This has been particularly costly since it has
made it even more difficult for Moscow to keep explaining its
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stand regarding Tito. As Vernon Aspaturian states, "We can
date the beginnings of the subversion of Soviet primacy in the
Communist world to Khrushchev's opportunistic maneuvers in
using China and Yugoslavia against his factional rivals.'
Finally, the Yugoslav example can now be seen to be hurting
Moscow's influence among Western European Communist parties.
Thus politically and ideologically, Yugoslavia's separate road
has weakened the Soviet Union's international image.
Recently, Moscow's interests in Yugoslavia have included
a distinctly strategic dimension. While Yugoslavia's nonalign-
ment does not cause any physical threat to the Soviet security
system, it does symbolize lost strategic opportunities. With
the advent of Soviet sea power in the Mediterranean, Moscow
has created a grave challenge to America's historical prepon-
derance of power in the region. That challenge is weakened,
however, by Russia's lack of port facilities outside of the
Black Sea. Until 1973. the Soviet Navy had use of extensive
port facilities at Alexandria, Egypt. Soviet relations with
Egypt deteriorated during the 1973 Middle East War and have not
improved since. Having lost the use of Egyptian naval instal-
lations, the Russians have once again gone searching for support
facilities, because it is extremely difficult to maintain and
provision a deployed naval force without nearby bases. A
further aggravation is the Montreaux Convention which imposes
various limitations on warship passage through the Turkish
controlled Dardanelles. With these factors in mind it is easy
to understand Russian interest in Yugoslavia's 400 miles of
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Adriatic coastline and its well protected harbors. As recently
as January of 1977* Leonid Brezhnev was reported by Yugoslav
officials to have pressed for the use of the Yugoslav port of
Kotor as a site for naval repairs and supplies. The request
Q
was flatly denied.
Tito's rigid policies regarding military alliances can
also be seen to limit the Soviet Union on the ground and air
theaters. Southeastern Europe has become the weakest section
of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact security system. As John C. Campbell
states in his article, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans" , "...
Soviet political influence in the area had reached an extra-
ordinarily low point by the end of the 1960's...The consolida-
tion of Soviet power in Central Europe, .. .contrasted with the
situation in the Balkans, where there were no Soviet forces
at all."" Little has changed to strengthen the Soviet position
in the area. Inclusion of Yugoslavia in the Warsaw Pact would
significantly strengthen Soviet military and political influence
throughout the entire region. Yugoslavia controls valuable air
space as well. Larrabee reports that both the USSR and the
United States had to obtain permission to overfly Yugoslavia
and other Balkan countries in order to provision their respective
allies during the 1973 War. 10 At the Brezhnev-Tito meeting in
January 1977* the Russian leader also requested permanent over-
flight rights and the assignment of a ranking Yugoslav military
official to the Warsaw Pact Council, obviously in hopes of
attaining use of Yugoslav territory and air space. These




Soviet-Yugoslav relations since 1948 are best under-
stood in light of two basic concepts. One, irreconciliable
differences exist between the two countries that are based
entirely on the Stalin-Tito disagreement of 1948. Two, Moscow-
Belgrade relations are intricately entangled with both nations'
affairs with the Eastern European countries. The years between
1948 and 1978 have been characterized by a repeating cycle of
affairs between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Each cycle
has begun with a period of Russian wooing of Tito and an im-
provement of both diplomatic and economic relations until a
rapprochement is reached. These periods have generally paral-
leled liberalizing trends in Eastern Europe. Each cycle ends
with a severe breakdown in relations based either on Soviet
ideological denunciation of Tito's policies, or upon Yugoslav
denunciation of Moscow's policies toward Eastern Europe. Two
themes dominate: (l) Soviet desire to reinstitute the long-
lost unity of the Communist movement in Europe; (2) Yugoslav
desire to maintain its sovereignty and openly follow its own
road to socialism.
The first period began in June of 1948. Until his
death in 1953* Stalin utilized political and economic pressure,
and the threat of military attack in trying to force Yugoslavia
back into its orbit around Moscow. In the face of a strong
Yugoslav-American commitment, his efforts failed. Once he was
gone, his successors began immediately to feel the effects of
his failure to overcome the Yugoslavs' defection. It was
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difficult and embarrassing to explain Tito's success. Further-
more, under Stalin Soviet Communism had evolved into a system
of totalitarian and repressive domination by one man. Those
who undertook to lead the USSR and the Communist world could
not expect to rule in the same manner as their predecessor.
Changes in relationships were required at all levels.
With nationalism growing in Eastern Europe and a power
struggle taking place in the Kremlin, most Soviet leaders set
out to create a new atmosphere within the bloc. As Robert Lee
Wolff states, it soon became "...clear that Malenkov and his
colleagues were making strenuous efforts to erase the incredible
blunders of Stalin. They were wooing Tito assiduously,...'
Though he did so hesitantly at first, Nikita Khrushchev was one
of those who began to associate their interests with those of
Tito. Such tactics would prove useful to Khrushchev in attaining
power, but ultimately they were to prove extremely damaging to
Soviet-led Communism. In his attempts to win control of the
Communist world and cement relations in Eastern Europe,
Khrushchev implemented a pattern of relations with Yugoslavia
that would, instead of stabilizing the bloc, contribute to the
further erosion of Soviet dominance.
Between 1953 and 1955 Khrushchev ascended to power in
Moscow and Tito gained influence in the Balkans and in Eastern
Europe. Simultaneously, Yugoslav-Soviet relations warmed
considerably. By May of 1955 Belgrade and Moscow were ready
to make their growing regard for each other public and Khrushchev
astonished the entire world by visiting Yugoslavia. With this
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move he set in motion the process by which he hoped to reassert
full Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe. He planned to under-
mine Tito's influential position as leader of the revisionist
movement by establishing himself in that role. By weakening
Tito, Khrushchev felt he would strengthen his own hand at home,
1^
as well as in Eastern Europe. J
That Khrushchev's visit occurred at all was significant.
But as though the visit was not eventful enough, he commented
on the period of poor Soviet-Yugoslav relations by saying:
We sincerely regret what happened and resolutely reject
the things that occurred, one after another, during that
period. On our part, we ascribe without hesitation the
aggravations to the provocative role that Beria,
Abakumov and others ... played in the relations between
Yugoslavia and the USSR. 1 ^
He went on to say that Stalin's accusations against Tito and
Yugoslavia had been false. One week later, in a Joint Yugoslav-
Soviet declaration, Khrushchev publicly acknowledged the
"...principle of mutual respect for, and noninterference in,
internal affairs..., because auestions of internal organization,
or difference in social systems and of different forms of
Socialist development, are solely the concern of individual
countries.' ^ Thus heralded Tito's eventual victory over
Khrushchev. One year later, at the Twentieth Party Congress of
the CPSU, Khrushchev denounced Stalin and his policies. Thus
was complete Tito's victory over Stalin.
The other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe watched
with awe as Khrushchev admitted Stalin's responsibility for the
mistakes of 19^8. Many Eastern European leaders had "hung their
hats" on Stalinism and the excommunication of Tito. Now times
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were changing and they were forced to justify the ideological
zig-zag. Furthermore they began facing increasing demands for
liberalization and independence within their own countries.
Eventually, they themselves began to exercise greater freedom
of action than had previously been allowed by Moscow.
These countries and their leaders were not, however,
rushing to embrace the principles of Yugoslav independent
Communism. On the contrary, they were experimenting with their
own ways while moving further from Moscow in their outlook and
structure. Within one year these trends caused the Soviets to
revert to stricter methods of control. In October 1956, a
Soviet delegation, led by Khrushchev himself, landed in Warsaw
to attempt to reimpose Soviet dominance of Poland. Later that
month, he used military intervention in Hungary to stem the
tide of liberalization in that country. Khrushchev thus made
it clear that what applied to Yugoslavia did not necessarily
apply to members of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet actions in
Hungary repulsed Tito and he blamed the Soviets for forcing the
Hungarian revolution to take on anti-socialist tendencies. 1 ^
On the other hand, the Soviets accused Tito of encouraging the
destructive movements in Hungary. '
This debate continued through 1958. Meanwhile, Khrushchev,
seeing his Eastern European community in disarray, began to re-
establish an ideological platform. In its draft for the Moscow
"declaration of principles," the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union emphasized the need for a united Socialist Community and




be assumed by the USSR. Tito, if he were to maintain his
credibility as an independent leader, could not possibly accept
the implications of the Soviet draft. Therefore, in prepara-
tion for the Seventh Congress of the LCY, the Yugoslavs pub-
lished and circulated their own statement of political and
ideological beliefs. In it they criticized both imperialistic
Western diplomacy and tendencies toward monopolism within the
Socialist community. 1 ° The rapprochement thus came to an abrupt
halt. Khrushchev, speaking at the Seventh Party Congress of the
Bulgarian Communist Party, accused Yugoslav leaders of deviation
from Marxism-Leninism, allowing imperialism to subvert Socialism
by accepting American aid, and of being a Trojan Horse in the
or)
Socialist camp. Tito responded in kind.
The events of the mid-1950' s formed the basis of Soviet-
Yugoslav relations for the next twenty years. While the two
countries intermittently moved politically closer together and
then further apart from each other, the Yugoslavs never let
the relationship be based on anything less than the principles
of the 1955 Joint Declaration. They at times engaged in
ideological polemics vis-a-vis proper socialist practices and
correct foreign policies. They almost continuously debated
over the proper relationships between members of the Communist
world movement, for while Yugoslavia may have enjoyed indepen-
dence and the respect of the USSR, other Communist states
obviously did not.
Relations improved slightly between 1958 and 1964,
because for the most part, both leaders were too involved with
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other difficulties to spend much time denouncing each other.
Khrushchev was busy challenging the United States in Berlin and
Cuba, while trying to deal with China, the newest competitor
for leadership of the Communist world. Tito was faced with
severe economic problems due in part to the effects of the
highly successful Common Market, and in part to the disparity
of economic growth between Yugoslavia's republics. By 1964,
however, Khrushchev was once again facing severe problems in
Eastern Europe. Albania had defected to the Peoples Republic
of China and Romania was clearly striving for greater indepen-
dence. To reconcile the growing ideological differences,
Khrushchev called for a meeting of 26 Communist parties, but
he did not invite Yugoslavia. Khrushchev was dismissed prior
to the meeting, but it was clear that he was once again attempt-
ing to establish unity behind Moscow's leadership and at
Belgrade's expense.
Following Khrushchev's ouster, relations between Moscow
and Belgrade slowly but progressively improved. The new leader-
ship in the Soviet Union neither actively supported nor strictly
opposed revisionism in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. What was
thought to be tacit approval of Yugoslavia's legitimacy resulted
in growing liberal trends in other Eastern European countries.
Trade and diplomatic exchange between Yugoslavia and the Warsaw
Pact states increased significantly. This growing relationship




The effects of the invasion on Soviet-Yugoslav affairs
were predictable. Once again the irreconciliable differences
of the two states were resurrected. Obviously the Soviet
action did not fit Belgrade's understanding of the 1955
declaration guaranteeing noninterference. Tito responded
quickly on August 21, saying, "By this step the sovereignty
of a socialist country has been violated and trampled upon,
and a serious blow inflicted on socialist and progressive
forces all over the world.' The Yugoslavs were so verbally
brutal in the weeks following the invasion that they elicited
one of the most encompassing attacks by the Soviets since 1958
and 1948.
The Soviets scoffed at Yugoslav nonalignment and
asserted that in this case the Belgrade stand was more a simple
"...one taken against the Soviet Union and against the socialist
countries. ^ They accused the Yugoslavs of supporting the
West's policy of "softening socialism," and alleged that Yugoslav
sovereignty was a virtual slide toward dependence on imperialism.
Furthermore, in reference to Yugoslavia's calls for the disso-
lution of military blocs, the article put forward that Yugoslavia's
security was actually dependent on the Warsaw Pact. Finally,
the Soviet attack included criticism of internal economic
policies, suggesting that the Yugoslavs were attempting to
divert attention away from its internal problems by creating
a security threat in the Soviet actions. Seldom have the
Soviets gone to such length in their criticism of the Yugoslavs.
It can be assumed that they did so in this case in order to
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further justify their action in Czechoslovakia and nullify
any ideological influence the Yugoslavs may have had on other
Communist countries.
Soviet-Yugoslav relations began to improve in 1971*
and once again the accord was manifested in the visit of a
Soviet leader to Belgrade. Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia
marked another battle victory for Tito. The joint declaration
of the two nations emphasized that relations between the two
were based on the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, the 1956 Moscow
Statement and Declaration, and the 1965 Joint Soviet-Yugoslav
Statement, all of which are public endorsements of the concepts
of different roads to socialism and mutual respect for each
other's sovereign rights. 2^ Relations during the mid-1970 's
were characterized by greater dialogue between Tito and
Brezhnev. The two leaders exchanged numerous visits, each
visiting the other country three times between 1968 and 1978.
Trade increased enormously. Though due in part to Yugoslavia's
difficulties in trading with the economically unstable West,
it also indicated a mutual desire to give Moscow-Belgrade
relations a stronger foundation. Additionally, the Soviets
promised credits of as much as $1,300 million to Yugoslavia.
While very little of this money had been delivered by 1978,
the promise was still an indication of warming relations.
Throughout the ups and downs of Soviet-Yugoslav rela-
tions, one important source of conflict has remained dominant
and has never been fully reconciled. It is doubtful, while
Tito is in power, that the two countries will be able to
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resolve their disagreement regarding the loyalty of nations
within the socialist community. Tito, obviously believes
strongly in national Communism. Moscow, on the other hand,
has preached and has consistently worked to unify Communism
behind the leadership of the CPSU. Khrushchev attempted this
with his "declaration of principles" in 1957, and his proposed
meeting in 1964. Brezhnev rather clearly demonstrated this
principle with the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which
illustrated a doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist
countries in Moscow's system. The Kremlin once again tried to
force acceptance of its dominant role in the 1976 East Berlin
Pan-European Congress of Communist Parties. When Yugoslavia
joined with the Communist parties of Western Europe in keeping
the phrase "proletarian internationalism" out of the Final
27Document, they helped deal a blow to Moscow's supremacy. '
This Soviet-Yugoslav debate has existed since 19^8 and is at
the heart of the Soviet desire to return the Yugoslav Communists
to the fold.
After the East Berlin Conference of 1976, relations
between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union cooled considerably.
The Conference itself touched off debate throughout European
Communist Parties that tended to divide them into two groups.
The LCY's continued support of the Eurocommunists did little
to endear it to Moscow, which perceived the entire trend as
an anti-Soviet movement. As though this were not enough, 1978
saw further drifting apart due to Soviet-Cuban actions in
Africa and an improvement in Yugoslav-American relations. The
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Soviet Union struck at Yugoslavia by supporting Bulgaria's
claims to certain sections of Macedonia., while the Yugoslavs
continued to accuse the Soviets of neo-colonialism and hege-
monistic tendencies. Hua Kuo-feng's 1978 visit to the SFRY
tended to exacerbate, yet symbolize, the growing differences
between Moscow and Belgrade. He also visited Romania and there
is little doubt that the Soviet leaders were extremely displeased
with such trends in the Balkans.
In summary, Soviet policies toward Yugoslavia since
1948 have failed to achieve the desired goal. Yugoslavia's
nonaligned road to socialism continues to exert negative influ-
ence on Moscow's dominance of Eastern Europe and its leadership
of the Communist world. While the Russians have learned to
live with Tito's Yugoslavia, it is doubtful that they have
altered their ultimate goals to any significant degree. Accord-
ing to K. F. Cviic, "...Russian acceptance of Yugoslavia's
right to pursue an Independent foreign policy and, at home, her
own road to socialism has always been qualified.' The desired
shift in Belgrade's position to a closer relationship with
Moscow simply will not occur while Tito is in power. Thus,
Soviet leadership is probably content to, in the words of F.
Stephen Larrabee, "...pursue a policy of watchful waiting..."
until a change in Yugoslavia's leadership occurs. 9
B. AMERICAN-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
1. United States Interests
At the end of World War II and during the immediate
post-War years, Tito's form of government and his apparent
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devotion to Moscow placed him squarely in opposition to the
United States. Exemplary were such issues as the dispute
between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste and the Communist
rebellion in Greece, in which Washington's interests could only
be served at the detriment of those of Belgrade. Not surpris-
ingly, the United States perceived Yugoslavia to be "...the
most intransigent of all the Soviet bloc countries."^ The
Yugoslavs, in turn, saw the United States as their principal
external threat and Tito utilized American involvement in Italy
and Greece as rationalization for his own rearmament and high
military budgets. J In spite of these apparently insurmountable
differences, the United States came to Yugoslavia's aid in 19^9
and has supported its sovereignty to varying degrees since that
time.
The American-Yugoslav relationship has been an inter-
esting one. The two countries are not allies since they have
never established a formal alliance in the traditional sense.
There have been no statements asserting that an attack on one
would be perceived as an attack on the other. Yugoslavia has
not been a party to a military alliance since 195^. There have
been no agreements between the two nations regarding policies
toward other nations, blocs or international crises. Though
they have sometimes agreed, they have more often disagreed and
they have seldom, if ever, consulted with each other. There
have been no agreements pertaining to preferred governmental
structure in the world. On the contrary, their systems have
been, by definition opposed, to each other since the beginning
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of the Cold War. They have not agreed on the general orienta-
tion of the world order. The United States has been the leader
of the Western bloc since World War II, while Yugoslavia has
been staunchly anti-bloc in its foreign relations. It would
seem then that the two countries had little, if any reason, to
establish any kind of a friendly relationship.
However, since 19^9 the United States and Yugoslavia
have shared one mutual interest of profound importance; that
of keeping Yugoslavia separate from the Soviet Union's alliance
system. As a result of this single mutual goal, America's
relations with Yugoslavia have followed an entirely different
pattern than its relations with any other Communist country.
Between 19^9 and i960 the United States provided Yugoslavia
with over $3 billion in grants, food, raw materials, industrial
equipment and military supplies. While imposing stiff restric-
tions on foreign trade with other Communist nations, Yugoslavia
has consistently been granted most-favored-nation status. Even
more significant is that for almost three decades the United
States has openly expressed support for Yugoslav sovereignty.
No other Communist state has received such special treatment
from the United States.
American interests in Yugoslavia today are based entirely
on the continuation of Yugoslav independence. Achievement of
this goal is fundamental to four basic aspects of America's
European and global policy. First, the United States has tradi-
tionally been a champion of national sovereignty the world over,
and it is felt that Yugoslavia, Communist or not, has the right
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to exist free of outside domination. Secondly, Yugoslavia
plays an extremely important role in the balance of power in
Southern Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, the maintenance of
which is critical to United States interests in Europe.
Thirdly, Yugoslavia's independent posture indirectly contri-
butes to American worldwide influence by detracting from the
Soviet Union's leadership of international Communism. Finally,
solid American-Yugoslav relations can benefit the United States
by improving its own image among the nonaligned nations of the
world. These four points define the basis for America's interest
in Yugoslavia
.
The United States has traditionally and idealistically
assumed the responsibility of securing the independence of
nations throughout the world. In the case of Yugoslavia, there
is much to be gained by this policy. Most significant is that
it shows a willingness to secure sovereignty in a Communist
state, thereby precluding allegations that the United States
is staunchly pro-democratic in its support. Though the bloc
system is still predominant in international affairs, coexist-
ence of various governmental orientations is at least a short-
term fact of life, and a pragmatic policy which recognizes that
fact could be very productive in the long run.
While this particular ideal has not been the principal
determining factor in America's policy, it has been the most
commonly espoused explanation of American support of Yugoslavia
for the last 30 years. The first expression of American
interest in Yugoslavia came in 1949, when Tito and his fellow
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Yugoslavs turned to the West for assistance In saving their
floundering economy. In December 1949, United States policy
had become clear and was publicly verbalized by George V.
Allen, the newly appointed American ambassador, who when
speaking for President Truman stated, "As regards Yugoslavia,
we are just as opposed to aggression against that country as
any other, and just as favorable to the retention of Yugoslavia's
sovereignty..."^ This may have seemed a surprising stance for
the United States considering its attitude toward Communism at
the time, especially since the West had done little to stop
Stalin in Eastern Europe. Yet seen in light of the Truman
Doctrine, first expressed in 19^7, It is not at all surprising.
The United States had already committed Itself to stopping
Soviet expansion Into the Eastern Mediterranean region. The
only real difference, albeit a significant one, was that
Yugoslavia was a Communist state.
Today, though the American image has been tarnished
somewhat, she remains the leader and champion of the Western
World. President Carter's emphasis on human rights is clearly
designed to improve that image, but is also just as clearly a
reaffirmation of America's desire to achieve freedom for all
nations on a worldwide basis. Yugoslavia still fits into this
mold and the United States still supports its sovereignty.
When Tito visited the United States in March 1978, President
Carter reaffirmed American support and said that Tito and his
country symbolized "...the eagerness for freedom, independence
and liberty that exists in Eastern Europe and indeed throughout
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the world. "^3 Thus, supporting the independent aspirations of
Yugoslavia is still consistent with American moral and ideolo-
gical concepts.
With the imminent possibility of crisis in the Middle
East and the numerous struggles presently ongoing in Africa,
the Balkans have, in recent years, been all but ignored as a
potential arena of conflict. While this is understandable
given the "shorter fuses" elsewhere, instability in South-
eastern Europe is still characteristic of the region and the
possible implications of crisis there are as far-reaching as
ever. The diverse nature of the Balkan states' foreign policies
and alliances make the regional balance of power precarious at
best. Furthermore, Yugoslavia can be seen as either a passage
or an obstacle to the Soviet Union's desires to expand its
growing naval power and influence into the Adriatic and the
Mediterranean. The United States policy of contributing to
Yugoslavia's buoyancy is a direct manifestation of the desire
to ensure that the country remains an obstacle rather than
becoming a passage. While Yugoslavia is not Western, neither
is it Soviet and therein lies American strategic interest in
that country.
With the advent of Soviet sea power in the Mediterranean
and the decreasing size of the United States Navy, American
control of the Mediterranean Sea has become increasingly more
difficult to achieve. Major factors in America's favor,
however, are the Soviet Union's lack of port facilities and its
difficulties with unimpeded access to the Mediterranean Sea from
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the Black Sea. Though the United States has similar access
problems and has no port facilities in Yugoslavia itself, Tito's
policy vis-a-vis the Russians serves United States interests by
limiting the flexibility of the Russian fleet. The restrictions
on Soviet troop deployments and overflight rights are likewise
seen to limit the movement of Soviet troops in the region more
than the movement of American forces.
Certainly, Moscow would very much like to strengthen
its hand in the Balkans and shore up the Warsaw Pact's southern
flank. This could not be taken lightly by Washington, however,
for Southern Europe has likewise been the weakest section of
NATO, if for no other reason than Yugoslavia and Albania cut
Greece and Turkey off from the other NATO nations. Due to
Yugoslavia's and Albania's independence of thought, this
situation has not yet been extremely detrimental to the alli-
ance. If, however, these countries were to become members of
the Warsaw Pact and even worse, instruments of Soviet foreign
policy, It can be assumed that the NATO Alliance would come
under great strain. This is not to say that a Soviet dominated
Yugoslavia would spell the end of NATO in Southeastern Europe,
but it would certainly warrant a stiffer NATO defense posture
in the area.
According to Stephen Larrabee, " . „ the Balkan situation
is probably more unstable today than it has been since the end
of World War II. At a time when the old tensions in Central
Europe are receding, those In Southern Europe, and particularly
in the Balkans are increasing."^ With this in mind, American
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interests in Yugoslavia become clear. The domino principle
is far from a dated theory and could easily be applied to
Southern Europe. A shift in the regional balance of power,
such as that already described would have such widespread
Implications that it is doubtful that it could come about
peaceably. As a result, the traditional instability in the
area takes on even greater importance and while it may not be
in American interests to interfere in historical rivalries
there, it is certainly in the American interest to unambiguously
support the status quo and Yugoslav freedom from Soviet influence
Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet camp has been
a thorn in the Russians' side since 19^8. Two Russian leaders,
Khrushchev in 1955 and Brezhnev in 1971* have journeyed to
Belgrade and publicly endorsed Tito's "separate road" to
socialism. The inability of the Kremlin to oversee the inter-
national Communist movement can be at least partially attributed
to Tito's success. As American policy has shifted over the
years from that of containing Communism to that of containing
Soviet expansion, Yugoslavia's existence outside of the Communist
bloc has assumed even greater importance. Here then is another
reason for American support of Yugoslav sovereignty, for the
weakening, or at least inhibiting, of unified growth of Soviet-
led world Communism is tantamount to helping the West contain
both Communism and Soviet expansion.
Yugoslavia's non-allegiance to Moscow has been seen as
a distinct political advantage to the West. It early on
symbolized a crack in the monolithic structure of Soviet-led
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Communism. As early as 1958, John Foster Dulles linked
Yugoslavia's success "...to the desires and aspirations of
other countries of the area to achieve their, independence. "35
The West has endeavored to encourage Yugoslav independence,
for it is perceived to be an impetus to other East European
nations as well as a divisive factor in the world Communist
movement. Washington, at least, is convinced that the Soviets
see it that way. According to a Carter Administration spokes-
man, "There is no question the Soviets would like both to
extend their own political-military influence in the region
and to nullify Titoism's ideological attractions."^ Thus,
Moscow's loss is the West's gain, and therein lies Yugoslavia's
primary political importance to the United States and NATO.
Whether Soviet foreign policy is perceived to be the
manifestation of the international Communist movement or simply
Russian imperialism is academic. The Kremlin has used ideolo-
gical policy justification in so many different ways that it
has become almost impossible to determine what in Soviet eyes,
actually constitutes an acceptable Socialist orientation. This
fact makes containment all the more difficult for the United
States in that it is no longer very clear just what it is that
needs to be contained. As long as "thorns" such as Tito's
Yugoslavia exist in the Soviet side, it will be difficult for
the USSR to mount any major expansion in the name of Communism.




The fourth American interest in Yugoslavia is based
upon Tito's role as the leader of the nonaligned world. While
nonalignment may not be as strong a movement as it once was,
it is still a major political force and Tito is still its
leader. American support of Tito does not necessarily imply
support of the United States by the rest of the nonaligned
world. But it does not hurt, for it demonstrates an American
willingness to endorse nations with policy orientations that
are decidedly not pro-Western. However, extreme care must be
exercised in attempting to nurture Yugoslav or nonaligned
nations' wholesale support of United States policies. Inherent
in their ideology is opposition to superpower politics. By
making positive efforts in the direction of peace, nuclear arms
limitations, economic assistance to developing countries, and
intelligent recognition of legitimate claims to national
sovereignty, America can gain extensive support of nonaligned
nations. These goals are not contrary to American policy and
could conceivably be pursued in a manner that would gain greater
worldwide support. This would best be done in the form of
exemplary action and not in the form of overt endeavors to
become an ally of the neutralist countries. The Warsaw Pact
and the Soviet Union have already made that mistake by verbally
claiming to be the allies of the nonaligned. They were cate-
gorically denounced for trying to align the nonaligned. The
United States' support of Yugoslavia is sufficient support of
nonalignment for the present, but it can and should be used as
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a stepping-off point for regaining recognition as the leading
proponent of worldwide freedom of choice.
In the final assessment America's interests in Yugo-
slavia are the direct result of the simple fact that Yugoslavia's
posture equals a distinct political and strategic advantage to
the United States and NATO. Certainly both Western Europe and
the United States might desire a more westward leaning Belgrade,
but Tito has never allowed that to be very seriously considered.
As K. F, Cviic states, "In an ideal world, Nato would prefer
to see a liberalizing, reform-minded Yugoslavia; but it would
settle for a non-liberalizing one...,"^ Therefore, American
policy toward Yugoslavia has been characterized by a willingness
to accept, and at times, contribute to the maintenance of the
status quo in Yugoslavia.
2. U. S. Policy
America's relations with Yugoslavia have been charac-
terized by ups and downs that have roughly depended upon the
state of affairs between iMoscow and Belgrade. Support of a
Communist regime is, at times, a very unpopular policy in the
West, regardless of any political or strategic advantages
derived from such a policy. Thus whenever Tito has reached a
rapprochement with Soviet leadership, his support in the United
States has suffered. On the other hand, both NATO and the U.S.
have been willing to exploit the intermittant Moscow-Belgrade
dissociations. The United States has utilized four forms of
assistance to secure Yugoslav sovereignty and to convince Tito
to maintain good relations with the West. The policy has
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consisted of direct economic assistance, extensive foreign
trade, military assistance and public political support.
Western Europe has assisted Yugoslavia with extensive foreign
trade and with occasional political support. The combined
efforts of the United States and Western Europe have contributed
to Yugoslavia's success in overcoming the economic difficulties
and political pressures that might otherwise have forced her
to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union.
Initial American assistance was delivered in the form
of economic aid designed to bail Yugoslavia out of its post-War
economic crisis. This aid began with two loans, totaling $40
million, that were arranged solely through the United States
Executive Branch. In 1950 Congress passed the Yugoslav Emer-
gency Relief Act which authorized a grant of $50 million. This
bill legitimized the policy of keeping this Communist state
viable outside the Soviet bloc. As John C. Campbell states in
Tito's Separate Read , "Aid to Yugoslavia had gained a new
respectability. Hence forward the administration felt able to
go ahead with the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the regular appro-
priations of the Economic Cooperation Administration (SCA)..."-'^
Direct economic aid continued until 1966, primarily under the
auspices of the Food for Peace Program and Public Law 480.
Today, though the United States provides no aid in the tradi-
tional sense, American government-owned dinars are often used
to finance joint technological and scientific projects.
Economic assistance was also provided in the form of
special trade favors. Early on, Yugoslavia was granted
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most-fa vored-nation status while trade with other Communist
states was either restricted or outlawed. Today the United
States is Yugoslavia's fourth largest trading partner. Yugo-
slavia's trade relations with Western Europe have been even
more beneficial. As Yugoslav leaders have relaxed restrictions
and allowed more world market influence, the European Economic
Community has exhibited greater willingness to grant Belgrade
special status. In 1968, Yugoslavia became the first Communist
country to enter into a bilateral agreement with the EEC and
in 1973 the EEC accorded it most-favored-nation status. Today,
West Germany and Italy are Yugoslavia's second and third greatest
trading partners, exceeded only by the Soviet Union.
Military aid to Yugoslavia was understandably a contro-
versial subject in the late 1940' s. But both the United States
and Tito were willing to bend just enough to enable Yugoslavia
to qualify under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. As a
result they were able to convince the Soviets that the Americans
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were in fact committed to Yugoslavia's defense. This military
aid continued until 1957. It was so extensive, that by 1958
according to Stephen A. Garrstt, "Of the twenty-four Yugoslav
divisions, eight had been entirely supplied with American
material and the remainder were heavily dependent en such
equipment. The Yugoslav air force was almost entirely an
American creation." 42 In 1977 and 1978 the United States
concluded agreements to resume arm sales to Yugoslavia and
there are indications of increased contacts between military
officials of both countries ,*3
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Statements of American support for Yugoslav sovereignty
have continued throughout the years since 1949 and have served
to underscore the strategic importance of this small Balkan
nation. Following in the footsteps of Truman and Dulles, Dean
Rusk, in a speech delivered in 1964, emphasized the importance
of the Yugoslav example among the nonaligned nations and again
linked Yugoslav independence to the aspirations of Eastern
Europe. Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968, Rusk, in a clear warning to Moscow linked Yugoslavia's
independence to the security interests of NATO, and Implied
that the Western Alliance would not allow Moscow to have a free
hand in the Balkans. ^ In September 1970, President Nixon
became the first American President to visit Yugoslavia and
thus clearly established the American commitment to Tito's
policies of nonalignment. In the fall of 1974, when Yugoslavia
was again receiving various types of pressure from Russia,
Secretary of State Kissinger made a symbolic visit to Tito,
discussed possible arms sales with him, and reaffirmed American
46interests in the region as a whole. He was followed by
President Ford in August 1975. In May 1977 Vice President
Mondale paid a visit to Belgrade, and in October, Defense
Secretary Brown became the first American defense chief to
visit there. In March 1978 President Carter stated that "The
independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia is one of
the basic foundations of world peace now and in the future. '
Later, a White House spokesman said, "We have a commitment to
support Yugoslavia's independence and integrity." Ambiguous
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as such statements may be, they have been a consistent aspect
of the United States policy toward Yugoslavia for three decades.
The four methods of support practiced by the United
States have not been utilized on an uninterrupted basis for
there are inherent problems in the Yugoslav-American relation-
ship. The mutual interests of the two countries could never
go beyond the level of a defacto alliance. Early on Yugoslavia
benefited greatly from the assistance in that it achieved a
relatively stable economy and received a general assurance of
military protection. The United States, while not acquiring
an ally, was guaranteed that, at least for a time, Yugoslavia
would not be a member of the opposing bloc. It was a rather
nebulous arrangement.
3. Limitations on American-Yugoslav Relations
The inherent difficulties of managing such a relation-
ship have derived principally £rora the ideological incompati-
bility of the two nations. From the cutset, there was a degree
4Q
of opposition in America toward supporting a Communist state. 7
The principal anti-Communist opposition has existed in Congress,
where constituency pressures often make support of Yugoslavia
a rather untenable position. The policy has normally enjoyed
strong support in the Executive and State Departments where the
positive aspects of Yugoslavia's freedom are generally considered
to outweigh the negative aspects of supporting a Communist
country. Additionally, Yugoslavia has not been overly anxious
to close the ideological gap. Despite their needs, the Yugo-
slavs were never willing to sacrifice the system that they had
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fought so courageously to achieve. As Tito has said numerous
times, "I am a Communist and nothing but a Communist."^ This
obviously has precluded any formal alliance. Eventually, the
formalization of nonalignment further prevented the evolution
of an actual alliance. These ideological differences have
caused the relationship to retain the original format of trade,
aid and vague pronouncements of mutual opposition to aggression
in Yugoslavia
.
Two acute problems resulted from this lack: of formality.
First, while it was obvious from the beginning what Yugoslavia
hoped to gain, there was no clear definition of what the United
States expected in return for its aid and assistance. This
fact made it increasingly more difficult for American Presidents
to recruit Congressional support for aid appropriations. Congress
wanted to see concrete results in Yugoslavia's outward orienta-
tion. Arguments that the Yugoslavs were still not members of
the Soviet bloc began to lose their strength after Khrushchev
openly apologized to Tito in 1955. As Tito's policies became
more independent and as he became less fearful of Soviet
aggression, he began to be more vocal in his criticism of the
West. So while Congress had been looking for a 'Westward
leaning Tito, it appeared that just the opposite had evolved.
Secondly, the lack of formality left the relationship
lacking in commitment from either party. The United States
provided aid, pronounced itself in support of Yugoslav sover-
eignty and opposed to intervention there. No formal guarantees
were made. Yugoslavia merely proclaimed its independence and
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its- right to follow a separate path to socialism. Tito cer-
tainly did not express support of the United States, though he
occasionally indicated his desire to maintain good relations
with the West. The United States Congress was undoubtedly
accustomed to greater allegiance from those countries receiving
American aid.
By the early 1960's, two trends served to undermine
this tenuous relationship. The opposition in Congress had
grown more inquisitive and equally more demanding of the
administration to produce some tangible results, such as pro-
Western policies in Belgrade. However, by that time, Tito was
zealously preaching nonalignment, one aspect of which, was an
almost militant denunciation of the great powers' policies.
The problems of managing this alliance began to be painfully
clear to the Kennedy administration. Tito's policies, despite
his nonalignment, were taking a decidedly Eastern slant. Con-
gress responded by making it more difficult to grant assistance
to Yugoslavia. Actions by the two countries exacerbated each
other until 1966 when American aid to Yugoslavia was finally
cut off completely. The 1961-1966 period will be treated in
greater detail than other periods of Yugoslav-American relations
due to the fact that it illustrates the inherent problems in
American policy toward Yugoslavia and hence explains the limi-
tations that still exist today.
'The beginning of the breakdown in relations can be
traced to the latter months of 1961. At that time, the United
States and the USSR were embroiled in such issues as the Berlin
126

crisis, Castro's Cuba, unification of Germany and nuclear
prolification. Tito, on the other hand, was preparing for the
first Conference of Nonaligned Nations, which was to be held
in Belgrade in September. On August 30, Khrushchev announced
Moscow's decision to end the informal moratorium on nuclear
testing, a decision which obviously served to increase tension
between East and West. Then, Tito, speaking at the Belgrade
conference, made several remarks which were distinctly pro-
Soviet. Regarding nuclear disarmament, he criticized "...the
tendency of those who continue to make a fetish of controls
for a nuclear test ban treaty. J This was a direct criticism
of American policy. Furthermore, Tito called the Russian
decision to resume nuclear testing understandable. Regarding
Berlin, he asserted that it was necessary to negotiate a
settlement, but he did not publicly recognize the West's right
for continued access to West Berlin. These remarks, timed as
they were, sparked considerable reaction in the United States
for Tito was not only leaning toward Moscow, but he was doing
so in a manner that influenced the nonaligned nations of the
world.
The Kennedy administration responded by dragging its
feet on a Yugoslav request for agricultural aid and by tempor-
arily shelving a pending proposal for a visit to the United
States by Tito. The official announcement stated that the
administration was conducting an in-depth review of all aspects
of American relations with Yugoslavia. Then in October, the
situation grew worse when an Air National Guard pilot discovered
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and reported to Texas Senator John Tower, that the United
States was selling obsolete military aircraft to Yugoslavia
and training Yugoslav airmen in Texas. This procedure was
entirely legal and had not been concealed. In fact, in 1957
when military aid to Yugoslavia ceased, "...it was made clear
that Marshal Tito's Communist regime would be eligible to
purchase military equipment here in view of its continued inde-
pendence from the Soviet Union. " JJ The deal in question, which
consisted of 130 jet fighter aircraft totalling $1,300,000, had
been arranged under Eisenhower and confirmed early on by Kennedy
Senator Tower, who was supported in his attack of the deal by
Senators Henry Jackson and Otto Passman, claimed it was "...
foolish to sell arras to the enemy. " The Kennedy administra-
tion stated Yugoslavia's sovereignty made it eligible for the
purchases, but in light of Tito's Belgrade statements, the
argument was not very convincing to Senator Tower.
The Yugoslavs, suffering from the effects of a drought,
badly needed economic aid and correctly perceived American
assistance to be in jeopardy. They were reportedly bewildered
by all the to-do in the United States, for in their opinion,
Marshal Tito's policy statements were nothing new. This was,
in fact, true, but in light of events on the international
scene, Tito's remarks had been taken more seriously than in
the past. The American administration, meanwhile, continued
to review relations but gave definite indications that its
policy had not changed. At a news conference on October 13,
Dean Rusk reemphasized Yugoslavia's independent posture,
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asserted that American aid had helped the Yugoslavs maintain
their freedom, and noted that while the administration was
disappointed over Tito's remarks, the United States had never
granted aid in order to "purchase agreement" from other
nations. -^
To make things even more difficult for Kennedy and Tito,
however, the Senate, on November 11, released a report which
claimed that Yugoslavia was channeling American aid to other
countries to gain their support for the Eastern bloc. The
report also rejected the possibility of winning Tito to the
West, stating that in the event of war, Tito would choose the
Communist side. Senator James Eastland, in referring to the
report, was quoted in the New York Times as saying, "He (Tito)
is doing his part in a world-wide red campaign toward these
countries (neutrals) and recent events at the. . ..Belgrade
conference show how that campaign has paid off for the Communist
movement."-^ While Eastland's view had not yet become a majority
view on Capitol Hill, opposition to the Yugoslavs was growing.
With the release of the Eastland report, Tito could
remain silent no longer. His response was typical of his
actions when his policies are under fire in the United States.
On November 13, he accused the United States of using economic
pressure to force Yugoslavia to change its policies. In a
speech given on that date, he was even more pro-Soviet than
normal. He attacked the West for rearming West Germany and
supported various Khrushchev proposals on Berlin. He went on
to express his gratitude for America's previous aid, but
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regarding his policies, he stated, "...we will not yield
whether they give us aid or not. "5' On November 13* the
Kennedy administration disclaimed any such use of economic
pressure.
Ten days later the administration reported to Tito that
it was ready to negotiate the sale of the requested surplus
food. On December 15* the sale was concluded. The terms were
similar to those of previous years. Under Public Law 480, the
purchaser paid for the goods in hi3 own currency, the majority
of which was loaned back for development projects. The remain-
der was used to defray the costs of operating the American
embassy in the purchasing country. While Congressional dis-
approval had apparently died down, the combination of its
pressure and Tito's poorly timed remarks had had some effect,
for Tito only received about one half of what he had requested.
Thus ended the first round of "Congress versus Tito".
The next round proved to be much more costly to Yugo-
slavia. Congressional opposition had not died at all, it had
merely submerged temporarily. It surfaced again in June 1962,
On June 6, the Senate voted to attach an amendment to the
foreign aid bill which prohibited aid to any country having a
Communist or Marxist form of government. The amendment was
aimed directly at Yugoslavia and at Poland, which had also been
receiving some American aid. Criticism of Tito ran high on the
Senate floor. Senators Proxmire, Thurmond and Lausche led the
attack which predicted Tito would side with Khrushchev in war,
accused him of moving closer to Moscow, and alleged that the
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Yugoslavs were giving some of their American aid to Cuba.^
Again they questioned the administration's assertions that the
aid was keeping Tito away from Moscow.
The next day the decision was, to a certain extent,
reversed. Behind the strong leadership of Senators Mansfield
and Dirksen, the majority and minority leaders, another amend-
ment was added to the bill. This new amendment restored the
President's authority to ship surplus foodstuffs to certain
Communist countries. But it required him to first make a find-
ing that the recipient government was not involved in any policy
cr program advocating Communist world conquest, was not domin-
ated by another country advocating such conquest and that the
aid was in the interest of the national security of the United
States. Additionally, a $10,000,000 loan to Yugoslavia for
economic development remained negated by the original June 6
amendment. The compromise solution appeared to satisfy the
White House while it enabled the Senate to express its hardening
attitude toward Communism.
Belgrade's reaction to the Senate amendments was re-
strained, as Tito probably preferred not to exacerbate the
situation if he could avoid doing so. But surely American
policy was taking on a rather confused appearance. On June 9,
the Yugoslavs did make what the New York Times called a "care-
fully worded statement" regarding the events in the Senate. A
Yugoslav spokesman expressed regret that the Senate action was
jeopardizing American-Yugoslav relations and that while the
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reversal was appreciated, "...it did not eliminate the nega-
tive features of the Senate's original move. "5°
The next blow to relations was struck by the House of
Representatives on June 12. An amendment to the pending Export
Control Act withdrew most-favored-nation status from Yugoslavia
and Poland as soon as the President felt it to be practicable.
The bill was further interpreted to indicate that the United
States would not be allowed to send anything of economic value
to Communist countries. It was felt at the time that this
legislation, in conjunction with the Senate action of the pre-
vious week, would so significantly tie the President's hand3
that he would be unable to continue the policy of helping
Yugoslavia maintain its independence.
The administration began to fight back. George F„
Kennan, then Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was bitter in his own
attack on Congress, He called its actions "...the greatest
windfall Soviet diplomacy could encounter in this area."
He indicated that great irrevocable damage had been done to
Yugoslav-American relations and he pleaded to be called home
to try to correct Congress's "appalling ignorance". Other
members of the administration protested that the Congressional
actions would frustrate the Soviet-aimed fragmentation policy.
President Kennedy ascribed the problems to Congressional impa-
tience with the fact that American aid had not produced a new
world. In late June, Kennan was summoned to Washington to
testify on the necessity of aid to Yugoslavia. The President's
offensive proved to be successful, for he received the support
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of the House in its own version of the foreign aid bill. In
October the final bill was passed. It recognized Presidential
discretionary powers regarding aid to Communist states, but
only in the form of food surpluses as provided for by Public
Law 480. The Presidential finding was also still required.
Withdrawal of most-favored-nation status stood, however, and
required the administration to notify Yugoslavia of its termi-
nation within a reasonable time frame. Eventually, White House
persuasion reversed this, and in fact, Yugoslavia has never
actually lost its most-favored-naticn status.
Once the basis for future aid was reestablished, Belgrade
expressed relief and appreciation. The Yugoslavs were still
concerned, however, about the trend in the United States. One
spokesman was quoted as saying, "Aid is here today and gone
tomorrow. 3 Truly, it must have appeared that way. They were
even more concerned in the Autumn of 1961 over the loss of mcst-
favored-nation status. Trade was an important aspect of their
relations with the United States in that it reduced their
trade with the Soviet bloc. Tito had been a typically silent
throughout this period. Apparently he desired to maintain his
independent policies, but wisely chose to do so more quietly.
He was not completely idle, however, for while the President
was battling Congress, Tito was improving economic relations
with the Soviet Union, probably in an effort to negate the
impact of the impending American policies.
On the surface it would appear that Tito and the United
States Congress had reached a mutually acceptable compromise,
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but such was not the case. In 1964, the act renewing Public
Law 480 forbade the sale of surplus food to Communist nations
for their own currencies. Then in 1966, the Food For Peace
Act forbade even dollar credits to any nations sending supplies
to North Vietnam or trading with Cuba. Yugoslavia was guilty,
on a small 3cale, on both counts. Thus ended American aid to
Yugoslavia. Apparently Congressional attitudes had not been
significantly softened in 1962. Also, according to John C.
Campbell, the administration was "...by this time (1966) tired




The debate on aid to Yugoslavia during I96I-I962 exem-
plifies the difficulties of managing an informal alliance with
a nonaligned Communist government. According to Campbell, the
outcome was due to a failure of the American government to
successfully sell the policy to the public and a failure of the
6s
White House to convince Congress to support it. J While this
is true, it does not go deep enough. The major obstacle
appears to have been the lack of definitive expectations
mutually understood by both Congress and the White House.
Congress desired to see Tito become progressively more Western
leaning. Kennedy's own remarks regarding the impatience of
Congress were indicative of this. The administration, however,
was willing to accept continued nonalignment as proof of success
and as Yugoslav allegiance to the relationship. Given this




In Alliances and the Third World , George Liska provides
excellent theories regarding the normal origins and arrange-
ments of alliances. In discussing great power motives in
allying with lesser powers, Liska cites the following as one
of three possible goals:
To divert a smaller state from an alternative alignment
may be especially important for powers outside a region
in a contest over primacy in regional orbits, .. .even a
burdensome alliance of an extraregional great power with
a small state will be a worthwhile objective and gain
if the small state was previously within the orbit of
an adversary great power.
The American-Yugoslav-Soviet triangle could not be better
described from an American point of view. For clearly, it has
been America's goal to keep Yugoslavia free of the alignment
that it once had with the USSR.
Liska also offers an excellent description of the major
principal of nonalignment; " . . .nonalignment consisted of re-
fusal to enter into formal and permanent alliance or alignment
with either party to the East-West conflict. Its .. .expression
was marked by a systematic effort to exploit the conflict
between the two superpowers." ' A better understanding or
recognition of this principle might have led Congress to accept
Tito's nonaligned Communist approach. Tito himself admitted
that he was first and always a Communist. He could not have
become pro-Western, and by definition, should have been expected
to often support Moscow. As his policies evolved into non-
alignment, he had to be critical of both superpowers, for how
else could he claim to be nonaligned? Further, how could he
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attract other nations to the movement if he appeared to be
aligned? The White House was willing to tolerate an Eastward
leaning neutral. Congress was not.
During the 1970' s political and ideological differences
have continued to obstruct the establishment of a more concrete
relationship between the United States and Yugoslavia. Tito
has opposed American interests and policies on such issues as
Vietnam, the Middle East, and Angola. American declarations
such as the notorious Sonnenfeldt "doctrine" have not helped.
The Yugoslavs perceived Sonnenfeldt ' s "organic" approach to
Eastern Europe as the equivalent of establishing regions of
influence - in this case Russian influence. President Carter's
pre-election statement that he would oppose the introduction of
U.S. troops into Yugoslavia if it were attacked by the Soviet
Union was probably more candor than the Yugoslavs preferred.
While they may have suspected for many years that U.S. military
commitment was doubtful, they had continued to rely on the
ambiguity of American policy.
More recently there has been a conflict between America
and Yugoslavia regarding President Carter's human rights campaign.
Despite its openness, Yugoslavia is still repressive by Western
standards and has been criticized openly by the Carter adminis-
tration. ^ Tito considers such criticism inaccurate and unwar-
ranted. He made this apparent on the occasion of Vice President
Mondale's visit when he stated, "We have expressed our concern
about a campaign that has been led in some countries about
democracy and human rights. And I have said that I consider
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that no reproach can be addressed to Yugoslavia in this con-
nection."' Tito simply does not consider domestic politics
in Yugoslavia the business of American Presidents or an aspect
of Yugoslav-American relations.
Despite the differences that exist, relations between
Belgrade and Washington today appear to be better than they
have been at any time since the early 1960's. As usual the
improvement corresponds to poor relations between the USSR and
Yugoslavia, and as usual the informal American-Yugoslav alli-
ance has temporarily grown stronger. It is not as strong as it
was during the 1950' s. Tito's March 1978 visit to the U.S.
notwithstanding, arms sales are still relatively minor and
American commitment is questionable. The ideological differ-
ences between the United States and Yugoslavia will continue
to exist. So too, will their mutual interest in Yugoslavia's
freedom from Soviet domination. 3ut a formal alliance simply
cannot come about within the framework of the present relation-
ship. The strength of the informal alliance will be greatly
dependent upon what is most dominant in American attitudes at
any given time, whether it be strategic interests or ideolo-
gical differences.
In summary, American policies toward Yugoslavia since
1949, as compared to Soviet policy, have been fairly success-
ful. The proof of this success lies In the fact that Yugoslavia
is still independent of Moscow's dictates. Internally and
externally, militarily, politically, and economically, Belgrade
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determines and follows its own independent policies. The
United States and Western Europe can be expected to continue
their support of the status quo in the Balkans. Any negative
effects of Yugoslav nonalignment are far outweighed by the
advantages. Thus the United States and Western Europe are also
watchfully waiting for the departure of Tito, for their commit-
ment to the status quo may soon face its strongest test since
19^9-
C. IMPLICATIONS OF A YUGOSLAV ALIGNMENT
It has been shown that both the Soviet Union and the United
States and their respective allies have extensive political and
geostrategic interests in Yugoslavia's alignment. The Soviet
Union would prefer to see an Eastward leaning Belgrade since
continued Yugoslav estrangement can only continue to have dele-
terious effects on the Soviet bloc. Eastern Europe, depending
on the specific nation, can be seen to favor Yugoslav nonalign-
ment, yet can hardly actively endorse it. The United States
and Western Europe support Belgrade's posture based on their
historical goal of liberalizing and dissolving the Soviet bloc
in Eastern Europe. With these interests in mind, it is valuable
to investigate the implications of a shift in Yugoslavia's
policy away from nonalignment. While a total shift to align-
ment with Moscow or Washington may seem doubtful, it is the




1. Alliance With the East
An alliance with the Soviet bloc represents the Krem-
lin's greatest hopes for the future of Yugoslavia. It also
represents the greatest fears of Western and Eastern Europe,
not to mention those of the Yugoslav people. Certainly there
are intermediate steps of semi-alignment that might be possible,
Greater political, economic and ideological accord between
Moscow and Belgrade, with continued Yugoslav non-membership in
the Warsaw Pact is obviously a realistic scenario. However, it
is the total shift that is of greatest concern and has the most
potential for causing reaction in other parts of Europe.
Yugoslav allegiance to Moscow would represent an ideo-
logical victory of dramatic proportions for the Kremlin. First
of all, it would prove that Moscow had been right all along,
and that Tito's policies had in fact been unacceptable revision-
ism. Moreover, all of the "battles" that Tito had won would be
overshadowed by the Soviet final victory of the "war". Outside
of Yugoslavia, the most immediate consequences would be felt in
Eastern Europe where Yugoslavia's alignment would be seen as a
severe blow to any trends toward greater sovereignty and liber-
alization. Such was the effect of Soviet interventions in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A shift of Yugoslav loyalty to
Moscow could be expected to have this result whether it were
precipitated by intervention or not.
The "rehabilitation of the Yugoslav heretics" would
most probably be a boost for "proletarian internationalism".
Moscow would be rid of one of its most active opponents to the
139

institutionalization of the Communist world. The CPSU might
find it considerably easier to achieve unity amongst the
European Communist parties. It would certainly be a setback
for Eurocommunism. The loss of the oldest and the best example
of independent, national Communism would cause great concern in
the Communist parties of Italy, France and Spain. Finally, if
Moscow were able to create unity in the wake of a Yugoslav
shift, it would be able to lead a concert of ideological policy
opposed to the People's Republic of China. There are, today,
numerous other trends that lend to polycentrism in the Communist
world and Yugoslavia's independence is just one of them. As
a result, stronger Moscow-Belgrade relations would not solve
all of the Kremlin's ideological problems. But it would be a
step in that direction.
Reorientation of Yugoslavia's policies toward the Soviet
Union would represent a Russian political victory in a wider,
non-ideological sense as well. Larrabee, in discussing the
effects of this event on the rest of Europe, states:
While many European countries would not be directly
threatened, the psychological impact would be consid-
erable: many countries, both in the Balkans and
outside, would see such a shift as further proof that
the 'correlation of forces' was indeed changing in
Moscow's favor.' 1
Due to Yugoslavia's image as a leader of the nonaligned, Larra-
bee ' s statement can be seen to apply outside of Europe as well.
In light of recent opinion that the nonaligned movement has
weakened, loss of Yugoslavia from its ranks would certainly
accelerate its dissolution. This is not to suggest that there
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would be a scramble amongst the neutral and nonaligned nations
to align themselves with the superpowers. Yugoslavia is not
that important. But its alignment with the Soviet Union would,
at the least, serve as a blow to the independence and equality
of the globe's smaller states.
Strategically, Moscow's defensive perimeter would be
greatly strengthened and her offensive power would be greatly
extended. If Yugoslavia allowed Warsaw Pact and Soviet troops
to be stationed within her borders, the Soviet Union would
exercise control of a line extending from the Baltic to the
Adriatic. Furthermore, it would increase the power of the
Russian Mediterranean naval force to an extent never before
encountered. The implications of this shift in the military
balance of Europe are staggering, for the two alliances and
for numerous individual nations as well.
The effects this shift would have on NATO are quite
clear. Greece especially would feel increased pressure for she
would face the Warsaw Pact ground threat across her entire
northern border. Turkey would be further isolated from the
bulk of NATO's power, and would probably feel more pressure for
combined Soviet-Turkish control of the Dardanelles. Russia
would be in an excellent position to interdict NATO's maritime
support lines to both these countries. Italy would, for the
first time, face Warsaw Pact troops directly across her border.
Russian warships, possibly including amphibious assault capa-
bility, would create a threat to Italy along her Adriatic
coastline. Increased pressure would be felt at the Central
141

European front, since only Austria would stand between Soviet
troops staged in Yugoslavia and NATO forces in southern Germany.
Finally, while the Soviet fleet already challenges American
naval power in the Mediterranean, use of Yugoslav harbor facil-
ities for improved maintenance and logistic support would
greatly enhance the flexibility and threat of the Soviet Navy
in the entire area. In short, what has traditionally been a
region of weakness for both blocs would be transformed into a
stronghold of the Soviet Union.
Several non-NATO states would also be threatened.
Romania especially, would see its sovereignty severely reduced
by an easterly reorientation of Yugoslavia. According to John
C. Campbell, "The importance of Romania and Yugoslavia to each
other is self-evident. Each is convinced that a Soviet inter-
vention in the other would soon be followed by the end of its
own independence."' This relationship is probably valid under
any variety of circumstances, and would not necessarily depend
on a Soviet military intervention. Austria would also be seri-
ously threatened, for it would be surrounded on three sides by
Warsaw Pact troops. Albania would lose its own valuable buffer
state, and might find it necessary to shift its allegiance back
to Russia. The Balkans as a whole would be in danger of
becoming a Soviet sphere of influence.
Clearly the Soviet Union has little or nothing to lose
by attaining Yugoslavia's loyalty. Not only would its power
in Europe increase, but it would be better able to support its
expanding interests in Africa and the Middle East. All of these
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Soviet gains,, however, imply that the United States and NATO
have a great deal to lose by such an evolution. Possibly too
much, or in other words, very possibly more than they are
willing to lose. A 1971 panel study entitled NATO After
Czechoslovakia , reflected this concern:
It is essential to the preservation of world peace that
the Soviet Union should not misunderstand the profound
U.S. concern for the maintenance of Yugoslavia's inde-
pendence between the blocs. Any Soviet move against
this nonaligned state, Washington should warn, would
have to be regarded as a definite rejection of the course
of coexistence and detente. '3
Such warnings have apparently played a part in deterring Moscow
in the past. But with Yugoslavia's growing value, its expected
post-Tito vulnerability, and questionable resolve in Washington,
such statements may not be sufficient in the future.
Obviously the situation described above assumes the
worst possible case, that of a total shift in Yugoslavia's
foreign policy. It is that case, whether it were to take place
slowly or be due to direct Soviet intervention, which most
clearly illustrates the pivotal role that Yugoslavia could play
in the security of Europe.
2. Alliance With the West
The possibility of an alliance with NATO Is considered
even more unlikely than the first. In fact, it is seldom even
considered. Yet it may not be as impossible as it at first
seems. Eurocommunism may soon force the United States into a
new type of relationship with some of Europe's Communist
parties. Yugoslavia is open to extensive Western influence
through foreign trade, foreign news and the Yugoslavs working
143

abroad in Western Europe. It is as economically integrated
with the West as it is with Comecon. And finally, and most
importantly, the Yugoslavs do fear Soviet dominance. So how-
ever unlikely an alignment with the West might be, it is
valuable to at least briefly investigate the consequences of
such a shift.
A Yugoslav alignment with the West would clearly
represent the crowning blow to Moscow's ambitions in the Balkans,
Tito would not only have won the battles, but his successors
74
would have won the war. 1 Such an event would spell the end of
any Soviet dreams of slow, peaceful wooing of the Yugoslavs.
Moscow's reaction might be expected to resemble its policies
following the 1948 Tito-Stalin break. For example, an economic
blockade could certainly be expected. Furthermore, a tight-
ening of control in Eastern Europe would certainly be a logical
result. Thus greater distance between Moscow and Belgrade might
well mean less freedom for others in Eastern Europe.
NATO, though it would not have to be a signatory, would
be greatly strengthened by a U.S. -Yugoslav pact. The American-
Western alliance system would be secure across the entire
European Mediterranean coastline (with the exception of little
Albania). Greece and Turkey would be much less isolated. The
Soviet fleet would be dealt a crushing blow, for the United
States and its allies would control almost all of the European
Mediterranean naval bases. The United States would clearly
have an upperhand in the Middle East, since problems in Greece
and Turkey would have somewhat less significance than they
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have at present. In all, American capabilities in Europe and
the Mediterranean would be expanded and Soviet capabilities
would be correspondingly reduced.
If there is a chance the West might attempt to stop a
Yugoslav shift toward Moscow, there is an even greater chance
that the Soviet Union would endeavor to stop a similar shift
toward the West. It would be too great a political blow and,
in the long run, exert too much pressure on Eastern Europe for
the Soviets to accept such a change. The chances of such an
alignment are truly remote, for a major internal change would
have to occur first. Yugoslavia's leadership, even after Tito,
will still be Communist and it is unlikely that it will be any
more prone to alliances with the West than Tito has been.
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IV. THE ABSENCE OF BALANCE: THE SOVIET THREAT
A. YUGOSLAV NATIONAL DEFENSE
It has never been an easy task: for a small, independent
nation to ensure its security and its territorial integrity.
Contemporary times in Europe are no different, especially in
light of the existence of two opposing military blocs that are
based upon two opposing superpowers. The majority of Europe's
states have chosen membership in the two alliances as a method
of securing their defense. Yugoslavia has chosen to remain
clear of military alliances. But since nonalignment is not
neutrality, Yugoslavia has still needed to guarantee its
security in some manner. Its defense policy has gone through
several alterations since 19^5* generally reflecting the per-
ceived threat and the manner in which it could best be opposed.
Today Yugoslavia's armed forces and its defense policies
reflect the country's internal multinational basis and its
external nonaligned posture.
Since Yugoslavia cannot, by its own definition, join in any
military defense pacts, it has taken extensive steps to bolster
its own security forces. Its defense is based primarily on
two organizations. First, the Yugoslav People's Army is a
force in being of approximately 260,000 men and is considered
to be the "...single most united organ of state or party
organization in Yugoslavia, the one wholely Yugoslav body in
which Serbs and Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians, Bosnians and
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Montenegrins, have subordinated their ancient ethnic rival-
ries." 1 Secondly, the Territorial Defense Force (TDF), a
reserve citizen army, is organized on a republican basis and
is designed to assist the YPA by fighting a guerrilla -type war
against any external aggressor. The sura of the two forces is
Total National Defense or General Peoples Defense, and is
designed to first deter aggression and secondly to inflict high
costs on any invasion force. While the present organization
has often been attributed to a Yugoslav threat reevaluation
following the USSR's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it
is actually a function of modern realities of threat and weapons
costs and historical experience.
The Yugoslav People's Array, which organizationally includes
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, evolved directly out of
the Yugoslav partisan detachments of World War II. First
formed in 19^1, these detachments were comprised of volunteer
citizens and were officially characterized as "...the combat
forces of the Yugoslav peoples." They were purposely disas-
sociated with any political party. Each unit was attached to
the territory on which it was formed and managed by a Commanding
Officer and a political Commissar. Tito assumed command of all
Partisan forces.
By November 19^-2, the number of detachments had grown
significantly and the success of partisan warfare was sufficient
to allow for a shift toward greater centralization. Large
sections of partisan units were organized into Proletarian
Brigades of the People's Liberation Army. No longer territorially
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based, these brigades began participating in a combination of
open and partisan warfare against the German occupation forces
and occasionally against the Chetniks. Additionally, many
partisan units were retained in order to mobilize more people
and to serve as nuclei for more brigades.-5 As the end of the
war approached, fighting shifted to a predominance of open
warfare along traditional-type fronts. Thus on 1 March 19^5*
the Yugoslav Army was established, further centralizing command
and coordinating operations. The People's Liberation War ended
May 15, 19^5. At the time the Yugoslav Army, including Air
Force, Navy, and other units, numbered about 800,000 soldiers.
In the post-World War II years Tito was very clearly
aligned with the Soviet Union, and perceived the American
presense in Italy, Greece, and Europe in general, as his prin-
cipal threat. Defense strategy during this period was charac-
terized by a traditional or conventional approach to warfare.
According to Lt-Col-General Milojica Pantelic, the Yugoslav
People's Army had exclusive responsibility for national defense
Army, Navy and Air Force were all intended for "open warfare".
Partisan units remained in existence, but for the time being
received second billing to the organized army. The military
budget was high and Increased throughout this period as the
Yugoslavs attempted to modernize their array.
The Yugoslavs expected significant military support from
the Soviet Union and this expectation played a major role in
some of Tito's early strategy decisions. Noteworthy was the
decision to deemphasize the armaments industry, thus allowing
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more expenditure in other facets of the war torn Yugoslav
economy. The arms that Moscow sent were not, however, what
the Yugoslavs expected. In a 1950 speech, Tito referred to
the "brotherly aid" received prior to 1948; "Of 220 guns... 85
were obsolete but repainted; some of the tanks were worn out;
and 30 mobile tank-repair shops were incomplete." This fairly
typical support drove Tito to reassess his approach to armaments,
and soon after the split with Stalin in 1948, he began to re-
build his armament industry. Robert Asprey states that between
1948 and 1952, $250 million per year were poured into the arma-
ment industry.' The Yugoslavs worked hard to become self-reliant
in their acquisition of arms and by the early 1950' s they were
claiming self-sufficiency in production of ammunition, explo-
sives, small arms, tanks, anti-aircraft guns, and certain naval
vessels
.
After the 1948 split, Yugoslavia felt threatened from all
sides. It was ill-prepared to successfully ward off a Russian
attack if it were to come, yet it initially had no allies to
come to its aid. Finally, however, its previous intransigence
was forgotten and the United States provided the equipment and
the commitment necessary to deter Stalin.
Interestingly, even before the United States began its
military aid, Yugoslavia was considered relatively well
defended. This assessment was based primarily on its large
conventional army (as opposed to partisan forces). Though
figures vary, the Soviet satellites bordering Yugoslavia were
estimated to have between 400,000 and 500,000 troops, yet they
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were considered no serious match for Tito's 350,000 man army.°
Only in the event of a combined attack by the Soviet Union and
its allies was Yugoslavia's security considered to be seriously
threatened. Even under those circumstances Western observers
felt Yugoslavia would not be an easy mark for Moscow. Accord-
ing to Dana Schmidt, "It is the expert opinion here (in the
West) that if the Russians themselves go into action in the
Balkans it will mean that they are ready for a new world war."
The probable high costs of an invasion were thus considered a
major deterrent.
The Yugoslav budget and its military manpower levels also
reflected the grave threat that existed until Stalin's death
in 1953. Military spending reached a peak in 1952 when the
over $600 million spent on arms accounted for 20$ of the
country's net material product. Thereafter, the budget began
to decrease, significantly so in 1953 when Tito suggested that
defense budget cuts were necessary to keep the people from
starving as a result of severe droughts. Estimates on man-
power levels vary greatly throughout this period ranging from
300,000 men to 800,000 men. It is doubtful that the army
dropped significantly below 400,000 prior to Stalin's death,
and it was certainly large in comparison to other individual
Balkan and European forces.
Despite the apparent dependence on a large army, discussion
of partisan units and partisan tactics once again became an
important aspect of Yugoslav defense policy in the early 1950' s.
In May of 1952 Tito claimed to be able to muster two million
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me n in the event of war and was obviously referring to the
12
mobilization potential of his partisan forces. Such esti-
mations led Western observers to speak of Yugoslav strategy as
once again being based on a retreat into the mountains in the
event of a Russian invasion. The best indication of a shift
in Yugoslav strategy in the direction of a partisan orientation
was the appearance In the October 1953 issue of Foreign Affairs
of an article entitled "Territorial War". Written by Yugoslav
Lieutenant General Dushan Kvedar, the article pointed out the
valuable lessons of the World War II Partisan struggle and
argued their future applications for small country defense. He
argued that it is suicidal for small states to undertake frontal
defense. Rather they should prepare for withdrawal behind pre-
designated zones where territorial war (war that is waged over
the whole territory of the country) can be undertaken. Other
high points of Kvedar' s article were his reference to the
necessity of psychological preparation of the entire population,
his condemnation of surrender, and the value of T;hese tactics
as a deterrence to would-be aggressors. ^ The article undoubt-
edly reflected some aspects of Tito's plans in 1953.
A number of the policies that evolved during the late 19^0 's
and early 1950 's can still be seen in current Yugoslav defense
strategy. Self-reliance In arras manufacture remains a high
priority. The return to a partisan-territorial war concept
began during that period and today many of General Kvedar '
s
ideas can be seen in the army's organization and tactical plans.
The use cf high costs to any potential invader has been
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consistently employed as a deterrent,, Another deterrent was
Tito's open use of the implied guarantee of American assistance.
In 1951 he said:
In the West there are voices which say that Yugoslavia
is in danger and that an attack against Yugoslavia would
imply a grave threat of a wider conflict. This does us
no harm, on the contrary, since it is a question of our
security and since it diminishes the possibility of any-
one's deciding to attack. 1 ^"
Another interesting evolution during this period was the
establishment of Yugoslavia's last official military alliance.
In addition to its American ties, the Yugoslav government
entered into the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey. Formed
in 1954, this military pact is still in effect, but as Adam
Roberts suggests, probably only because the three countries
have forgotten its existence. -> Certainly it is of little
military value today considering the relationships and the
foreign policies of the three countries. At the time, however,
the Balkan Pact contributed to the Yugoslav security arrange-
ments since it tacitly linked the Yugoslavs even more closely
to the United States which had underwritten Greek and Turkish
security.
The thirteen years between May of 1955 and August of 1968
were characterized by a slow but steady shift in Yugoslavia's
nonalignment. The Moscow-Belgrade rapprochement of 1955 spelled
the end to Yugoslavia's alienation from the Communist world and
also fore ordained the end to its special military relationship
with the West. In 1958 when direct American military aid was
ended, the U.S. had already supplied in excess of $750,000,000
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in military equipment. But because Congress began trying to
tie "strings" to its aid, Tito turned to the Russians who were
ready to fill the vacuum. After 1959 most Yugoslav armament
imports were in the form of Soviet jet aircraft, tanks, and
anti-aircraft missiles. By 1967 Yugoslavia's forces were
equipped with a mixture of Russian, American, and Yugoslav
weapons in both the Army and the Air Force, while the Navy was
equipped primarily with Yugoslav and Russian weapons.
Despite the occasional political differences between
Belgrade and Moscow, relations between the two no longer deter-
iorated to the point of a military threat. This lack of an
external threat was dramatically illustrated in the pattern of
defense expenditures and the manning levels of the Yugoslav
armed forces. In 1956 defense spending accounted for 9.8 per
cent of Yugoslavia's net material product. By i960 it had
dropped to 6.2 per cent, and by 1967 to 5.2 per cent. ' Man-
power also decreased considerably. According to Asprey, by
in.
19
1957 the YPA was down to 300,000 men ld By 1967 this figure
had decreased to about 220,000 men.
From 1958 onward, a few hesitant steps were taken in the
general direction of territorial and people's defense. Milo-
jica Pantelic uses 1958 as a dividing year, during and after
which changes were introduced in the armed forces which roughly
corresponded to the institutionalization of the system of self-
management. According to Pantelic "...the principle of com-
bined open-partisan warfare was adopted." 20 This change was
manifested by a restructuring of the armed forces along the
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following organizational lines: there was to be l) a force in
being, well equipped and prepared to prevent a surprise attack
and deep penetration, 2) a reserve force designed to be quickly
mobilized when necessary, and 3) an increase in the number of
partisan/territorial units assigned to the YPA and to be deployed
21throughout the country. Still missing was the emphasis on
"peoples defense" that was to evolve later.
The first real indication of an official adoption of all
peoples defense was seen in the revised 19^3 Constitution. It
stated that "The defense of the country is both the right and
the duty of citizens, work and other organizations, the Feder-
ation, Republics, Communes and other socio-political coramuni-
ties." Despite this apparent shift toward a decentralized
defense policy, the Yugoslavs did little more than shuffle
toward a reorganization of forces or any real change in strategy.
Because there was little threat during this period there was
little concern over, or interest in, novel defense concepts.
If anything, defense policy began to follow the pattern of
decentralization characteristic of Yugoslav society as a whole.
By 1967j according to Adam Roberts, "Military decentralization,
in which the republics would for the first time have a signifi-
cant degree of control over questions of national defense, was
seen in many republican capitals as a necessary part of the
reorganization of Yugoslav society." ^ For the time, however,
no official change occurred and the army remained centralized.
The next official indication of changing policy was
expressed by Col. Gen. Nikola Ljubicic in late 1967. The then
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new State Secretary for National Defense advanced a variety of
plans to be included in a pending alteration to the defense
law. Most important were such concepts as l) "general people's"
defense in which all of society's resources are used, 2) the
unity and high preparedness of both the army and the people
in peacetime, and 3) the necessity of maintaining a strong army
for rapid defense in order to prevent an aggressor from achieving
oh
quick decisive victories. It is difficult to say how long it
would have been before these concepts were actually enacted if
the threat to Yugoslavia had remained low. What is known is
that little had been accomplished by August of 1968, when the
Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia.
Immediately after the invasion, Tito mobilized his defenses,
such as they were in 1968, and looked once again to the West.
Western assistance came in the form of vague promises of support
which were nonetheless considered an adequate deterrent to the
Soviet Union. It is highly questionable whether Moscow even
considered an invasion of Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslavs were
convinced that they were not as secure as they had previously
felt.
The Soviet intervention shook Yugoslavia out of its military
complacency. Territorial war and all people's defense, concepts
which had been bantered about for years, took shape very quickly,
and by February 1969 had been incorporated into a new National
Defense Law. The new law was a sweeping reform of the country's
defense. The reform was instituted for several reasons. First,
in 1968, Yugoslavia was not prepared to defend itself against a
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Soviet blitz attack if it came. Secondly, Yugoslav military
planners felt a defense based on territorial war and people's
defense was the only way they could effectively counter such a
mass attack. And finally, a build up like that of the early
1950's was not possible. According to A. Ross Johnson in
Total National Defense in Yugoslavia , "Current economic diffi-
culties, the unavailability of outside assistance and the
decentralized political system of the late 1960's all precluded
the revival of a large scale standing army. J JThus concepts
which had been discussed for over fifteen years were finally
officially embraced.
The entire concept of Total National Defense is based upon
a defacto admission that the regular army may not, in certain
circumstances, be capable of repelling an attack at Yugoslavia's
borders. The system of total national defense thus calls for
a combination of territorial war (as Kvedar saw it) and total
mobilization of the population. According to Pantelic, it is
the "...right and duty - Of every working man and citizen to
fight for the preservation of his freedom and self -management
rights and to defend the sovereignty, independence and integrity
of the country,..."^ The "duty" aspect was spelled cut in no
uncertain terms; "No one has the right tc recognize or sign the
capitulation of the country or the capitulation of the armed
forces. No one has the right to accept or to recognize the
occupation of the country or any of its parts."'
Another major aspect of Total National Defense is the
coequallty of the two forces of national defense, the Territorial
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Defense Force and the YPA. The new defense law in 1969 laid
down what was to be a complex and confusing organization. The
YPA was still to be the national army and was to be equipped
and organized by the central government. According to Adam
Roberts though:
Article 14 stated that units of territorial defense, by
contrast, 'are established by the commune, province and
republic'. Articles 51 and 52 laid down that even in
wartime territorial defense was the responsibility of
the local civilian authorities, who were to 'direct the
general people's resistance on their territory'. °
Further elaborate details of the law described what commands,
territorial or YPA, would be supreme in various situations of
warfare. In 1974 a new Constitution and a new National Defense
Law were adopted. As a result of the latter, according to
Robert W. Dean, ;'The comprehensive grant of authority to lower
echelcn command.
.
.has been withdrawn; .. .the YPA has emerged in
a strengthened and preeminent position..." " Command relation-
ships were further defined with the YPA as the core of the
National Defense system. Local command authority appears now
to be restricted mainly to the instance of attack. Thereafter
the YPA chain of command will control and coordinate operations.-5
Certainly there is still considerable freedom of action at lower
levels. The entire theory of all peoples' defense necessitates
the ability for local political and social defense units to act
as they feel necessary to defend their territory. Otherwise
total involvement of the population would be impossible to
achieve.
The method of training and preparation of the TDF is another
indicator of the army's important role. All military training
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is administered by YPA officers. Furthermore, the pre-military
training in the schools and universities is organized and
supervised by YPA personnel. -^ Finally, exercises are organized
and planned by the army and all recent exercises have been
designed to coordinate operations between YPA and TDF units.
The YPA ' s own training is extensive. A major post-War
emphasis on training successfully corrected gross deficiencies
in education and professionalism that characterized the Army
at that time and established a system of training that still
exists. Officers attend a succession of secondary schools and
academies which are designed to develop "all-round socialist
personalities," as well as capable military officers. Instruc-
tion includes extensive classroom work in military theory,
Marxist philosophy, and technical subjects, as well as practical
training in the field. ^ Enlisted men are drafted for fifteen
months (l8 for the Navy) during which time they receive exten-
sive training in frontal as well as guerrilla warfare and also
undergo a program of political training. After their initial
service, about 20^ of the conscripts enter the YPA reserve
while the remainder become part of the TDF.
Despite arguments that the YPA lost a degree of its pres-
tige and responsibility for the nation's defense, it remains
Yugoslavia's first line and plays a major role in repelling
whatever type of attack may occur in the future. It is
expected to be capable of resisting a "limited incursion" or
an attack by a neighbor, entirely on its own. ^ On the other
hand, it is in the event of a massive attack by a superpower
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that the concept of general or all peoples defense becomes
operative, and in that case YPA operations become coordinated
with those of territorial defense units. YPA initial actions
would be designed to meet the attack headon and slow it as
much as possible. This opening phase of the war would allow
time for the mobilization of territorial forces.
The YPA is not expected to incur heavy casualties in slowing
the attack. The Yugoslavs have claimed the ability to mobilize
half of the TDF within 3-6 hours, with full national mobiliza-
tion possible in 48 hours. D As this mobilization occurred,
the YPA would undergo a "descending transformation" from fron-
tal warfare to partisan/guerrilla warfare and coordination
with units of the TDF. Yugoslavs stress that the war thereafter
would not be fought solely by many uncoordinated guerrilla
groups. The territorial war would, on the contrary, be cen-
trally commanded and organized, and while "It would have some
characteristics of guerrilla warfare, (that) would not exclude




The Yugoslavs are convinced that they would engage in ter-
ritorial warfare for a considerable period of time. The war
would eventually wear down the aggressor. As it did so, the
YPA would undergo an "ascending transformation" (as the National
Liberation Array did in World War II), shifting more and more to
frontal warfare until the aggressor was defeated.^ Theoreti-
cally Yugoslav losses would have been minimal and they would be
back in control of their territory as well.
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Today the Yugoslav People's Army consists of about 260,000
men. The army is by far the largest force with 193,000, followed
by the air force with 40,000 and the navy with 27,000. These
strengths have been fairly consistent over the last decade.
Estimates regarding the size of the Territorial Defense
Force vary considerably. The eventual goal is to be able to
place a total of three million people in the field, after the
initial 1.5 million have been mobilized during the first 48
hours. According to Andrew Borowiec these are to be backed up
by 1.3 million civil defense workers. 3' The total theoretical
force, including YPA, totals between 4.5 and 5 million people,
almost 25 per cent of the total population. With this number
of defenders it is estimated that the occupation force would
require 8.5 soldiers per square kilometer, or two million men,
to completely subdue the country.-^
If the YPA is considered all-Yugoslav the TDF is very much
the opposite. It is organized, trained and armed on local and
regional levels. According to A. Ross Johnson, the TDF is
"...politically responsive to local and republican political
authorities, who continue to nominate candidates for TDF command
posts and whose right to organize and direct national defense
in their territories has been legitimized in the new Yugoslav
constitution of 1974. J* The regionally based units are expected
Initially to defend only their own republics, though that cannot
be a very rigid rule considering overall expectations for the
conduct of a long war.
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Yugoslav leaders often refer to their strategy as that of
a "hedge hog" comprised of hundreds of units throughout the
country. Every commune, town, factory, sociopolitical organi-
zation and organization of associated labor is expected to have
a plan for defense and to practice its implementation. Since
all citizens are obligated to receive training in defense,
hundreds of thousands of men and women have some knowledge of
weapons. In recent years all peoples defense has been
broadened to include what is termed "social self-protection",
which is both a right and a responsibility of all citizens.
Clearly the purpose of the training and organization has been
to establish a device which will ensure the mobilization of the
maximum number of Yugoslavs in the event of an attack. The
leadership is very well aware that they cannot expect manpower
assistance from any direction, East or West.
The Yugoslavs have become increasingly independent in their
arras acquisition for the same reason. According to General
Stane Potocar, Yugoslavia at the end of 1911, was 90 per cent
self-sufficient in the arming of its people. It still lacked
the ability to build highly sophisticated weapons but actually
needs very few of that type to carry out territorial war.
Emphasis has been placed on an armament industry that can produce
the simple, durable, easily serviced weaponry required for a
highly mobile, partisan warfare. Though its forces still use
American and Russian tanks and aircraft, Yugoslavia now builds
some of its own aircraft and most of its naval vessels, including
submarines. It claims complete self-reliance in production of
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smaller weapons such as automatic and semiautomatic rifles,
hand grenades, antitank weapons, antiaircraft guns and missiles,
armored personnel carriers and other equipment of this type.
Yugoslavia's desire to become the prime producer of its
arms has become an important feature of both its defense
policy and its independent foreign policy. Since they cannot
be sure who may be their enemy and who may be their ally, they
will endeavor to become even more independent of Soviet and
U.S. arms in the future. Despite this goal, however, and
despite Yugoslav figures such as that above, the present
Yugoslav arsenal is still a mishmash of mainly Soviet, American,
and domestically manufactured arms. The TDF units are not as
well equipped as the YPA, and in some cases, actually use World
War II German and Italian weapons and Yugoslav reproductions
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of the same. Figure 5 provides a list of weaponry which has
been compiled from various unclassified sources.
Although there have been Soviet and Yugoslav statements to
the contrary, the Yugoslavs still see the main threat to their
security as coming from the Soviet Union. Exercises "Freedora-
71" and "Autumn-7^" were both rehearsed defenses against a
massive attack from the northeast. Contributing to Yugoslavia's
"seige mentality" was the disclosure in 197^ of a Soviet contin-
gency plan called "Polarka". The plan called for a massive
invasion of Austria by Czech, and later, Soviet troops. The
ultimate goal would be an invasion of Yugoslavia. The entire
plan supposedly was set to go into action on the occasion of




Army Tanks - 1500 T-34, T-5V55 and M~47
650 M-4 and some PT-76
APC's - M-3, M-8, BTR-50P/60P/152, M-60
MICV - M-98O
Antitank Weapons - M-36 tank destroyers, 82mm recoilless
rifles, 75mm RCL, 57mm, AT 75am At, 100mm AT
Snapper and Sagger ATGW
Surface - Air Guided Missiles and AA Guns
SA-6, SA-7, SA-3, SA-2 missiles; ZSU-57-2 self-
propelled AA guns; 20mm, 30mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm,
85mm, 88mm
Artillery - 76mm, 105mm, 122mra, 152mm, and 155mm guns/
howitzers
Self-Propelled guns M-18 (76ram), M-36 (90mm), SU-100,
105mm, and howitzers
Rocket Launchers - 130mm multiple
Navy 5 patrol submarines (Yugoslav built, Soviet equipped)
1 destroyer (Yugoslav built - obsolete)
10 Osa patrol boats with Styx missiles (Soviet)
34 torpedo boats (14 Shershen - Soviet)













fighter /ground attack (Yugoslav)
fighter and ground attack (Yugoslav)





Additionally there are about 60 transports; C-47's,
11-18, Yak-40, Caravelle, AN-12, AN-26, Li-2, Boeing
727-200
120 trainers
Mi-4, Mi-1, Mi-8, Gazelle, Alouette, Ka-25 helos




Jan Sejna who defected in 1968. 5 While the credibility of
Sejna and Polarka have been questioned, they did little to make
the Yugoslavs feel secure.
Regardless of what country or military bloc the Yugoslav's
consider their greatest threat, it can be assumed that they
would prefer not to fight them at all. Tito's entire policy
is based upon the fact that small countries never gain and
always lose when they are involved in bloc politics and wars.
As a result, deterrence has grown to be a major factor in
Yugoslavia's defense. Foremost is the guarantee to all possible
aggressors that the Yugoslavs will fight. They have done much
to advertise their law against capitulation for they want to
ensure that Moscow knows that a "Czechoslovak style road march
into Yugoslavia is not possible; that an invasion would have
unpredictable consequences; that an attempt at occupation would
be bloody, prolonged, and expensive in terms of manpower and
material;" Even their estimation of 8.5 soldiers per square
mile is a deterrent factor, for the USSR could not presently
mass two million troops in Yugoslavia without weakening its
own defenses elsewhere.
Another "deterring" strategy is Tito's own use of his country
as a hostage for the balance of power. In January of 1977 he
tied security in the Balkans to security in Europe and the
entire world. He had done the same thing after the Czech
invasion in 1968 when he was so bold as to suggest that if the
Soviets tried the same thing in his country, the U,S. would
probably intervene, with or without his invitation. ? Though
164

Tito is quick these days to deny any dependence on America, he
undoubtedly enjoys the continued possibility of a U.S. response
to Soviet actions in Yugoslavia.
Two other aspects of policy contribute to the deterrent.
Yugoslavia enjoys enormous support as one of the leaders of the
nonaligned. A Soviet invasion would thus cost Russia dearly in
influence in the Third World. Finally, in the last few years,
Yugoslavia has hinted at an interest in atomic weapons. While
it is doubtful that they have one, they have claimed the capa-
bility to develop one.
The Yugoslavs have an international image as rugged, capable,
and determined fighters. The image goes back far beyond the
warfare of World War II. For this reason few tend to disbelieve
them when they say they will fight. Their defense policy today
reflects an interesting mix of the old and the new. It is based
on the partisan, guerrilla traditions. It recognizes the multi-
national quality of the society. It pays heed to the real threat
to Yugoslav security and takes a practical approach in dealing
with that threat. It is constrained by its lack of wealth and
its lack of allies. And finally it employs a sophisticated
system of political and military deterrence in hopes that It
can avoid the horrors it experienced in World War II and
throughout Balkan history. Whether or not the Yugoslavs can
truly defend themselves successfully is another question.
B. WILL THE SOVIET UNION INVADE?
One of the most frequently mentioned scenarios for post-
Tito Yugoslavia is that of a Soviet military intervention of
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some sort. Moscow is presumably desirous of some degree of
control over the Yugoslavs and their territory and the Yugoslavs
are convinced that the Soviet Union is their principal potential
military threat. Thus the possibilities seem to exist for a
Soviet move of this type. The purpose of investigating the
Soviet threat here is twofold. First, since the scenario is
a common concern it is proper that it should be addressed in
order to discern its factual basis if one exists and to inves-
tigate what might follow from a Soviet military move in Yugo-
slavia. Secondly, it provides an opportunity to analyze the
ability of the Yugoslavs to successfully carry out their defense
policy, and to point out any weaknesses that might exist in
their present posture.
In looking at the possibilities of a Soviet invasion, one
must first attempt to determine what Moscow would have to win
or lose as a result of such an involvement. Military involve-
ments in foreign countries tend to carry mixed blessings for
the "intervener", and a Russian invasion of Yugoslavia is no
exception to the rule. The gains of a Soviet attack and
victory over Yugoslavia have already been discussed at length.
The strategic benefits are obvious: naval bases for the
Mediterranean Eskadra, overflight rights on the routes to the
Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and ground bases resulting
in an expansion of the Soviet outer defense perimeter. In
addition to acquiring an important and strong ally in the
Mediterranean, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact would drive
a significant wedge into the already weak southern flank of
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NATO. Finally, the intervention, if it led to the eventual
domination of Yugoslavia, would prove to be a significant
ideological victory over Yugoslav Communism.
There are naturally a number of risks involved in a Soviet
military venture in Yugoslavia (beyond military and personnel
losses). The level of risk, in most cases, is inversely pro-
portional to the degree that Moscow can justify its actions.
That is, if the justification seems credible to other nations
and parties, the political risks and costs will be low. But
if the Soviets cannot convince others that their action is
necessary and legal, they would stand to lose a great deal,
4Q
even if they were militarily successful. * In the latter case,
the Soviet Union would certainly hasten the decay of detente,
lose much of its influence among the nations of the Third World,
and suffer grave damages to its image within the Communist
world.
The Soviet decision to intervene in Yugoslavia would obviously
be based on a careful measurement and balancing of costs and
benefits. Generally speaking, the strategic benefits would have
to outweigh the ideological and political losses that would
almost surely follow. The international situation at the time
of the decision will play a major role and might tip the scales
one way or another. Certainly the decision will be effected by
the internal situation in the Soviet Union as well. If the
benefits appear high and the costs low, then Moscow might deter-
mine that the time was ripe for achieving its political and
strategic goals in Yugoslavia via military means.
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The Soviet Union cannot expect to achieve its ultimate
desires in Yugoslavia peacefully. It is not likely that a
post-Tito Yugoslavia will move slowly or steadily toward a
strong relationship with the Soviet Union. It might move
closer, but it cannot be expected to move closely enough to
satisfy the Soviet desires for warm water ports, permanent ship
repair facilities, overflight rights, etc. This is mainly
because to do so would require a major change in Yugoslavia's
attitudes regarding its domestic structure and its role in the
Communist world and on the international scene.
Since Moscow cannot hope to achieve its desires in Yugo-
slavia as a result of peaceful evolution, it is possible that
it might attempt to gain them militarily. However, some major
change would be necessary in order to prompt a Russian military
attack on Yugoslavia. The change would need to encompass dual
implications for Moscow. First, it would have to provide the
justification necessary. Secondly, and closely related, it
would have to be in a form that would cause Moscow to perceive
a threat to its own security. Naturally as the level of the
perceived threat increases, the requirement for justification
decreases. There are three very plausible changes that could
occur in Yugoslavia that would encompass these two characteristics
First, and least likely, is the possibility of a political
and military shift by Yugolsavia toward the West and NATO. Such
a shift might be precipitated by economic problems that pull
the Yugolsavs further West. It might also be caused by an
increase In Sino-Soviet polemics or Soviet-Eurocommunist
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arguments. In other words, If Yugoslavia itself perceives
increasing threat from the Warsaw Pact or the USSR it might
then begin to drift westward. However, some of the same justi-
fications precluding a slow shift eastward apply to the reverse
also. Additionally, there are even greater cultural and ideo-
logical barriers between Yugoslavia and the West. Nevertheless
any barrier can be overcome in International politics. A Yugo-
slavia aligned with the United States would be unacceptable to
the Soviet Union strategically, politically and ideologically.
A military response designed to cut short such an alignment
might easily be understood or should at least come as no surprise
A second evolution in the Yugoslav situation that might
solicit a Soviet military response would be a civil disturbance
or civil war In the post-Tito era. A succession struggle or a
strong challenge from national groups might threaten the very
unity of the Yugoslav state. While many authors have recently
downplayed the chances of such civil instability, outside inter-
ests and maneuvering might exacerbate problems to the flashpoint.
In other words, this is a scenario the Soviets might themselves
attempt to stage manage. In any case, a civil war in Yugoslavia
is not likely to be contained within that country's borders.
Opposing factions would be very likely to call for outside
assistance. Moscow would probably be ready and willing to
provide such assistance if for no other reason than it would be
unable to afford not to be in on the division of Yugoslavia.
Even if "fraternal assistance" were not requested, the Soviets
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would be tempted to intervene due to the instability and spill-
over effects a Yugoslav civil war could create throughout Europe.
The third scenario to be discussed here is that of a con-
flagration between Yugoslavia and one of its neighbors. The
most potential lies in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over
Macedonia. In late 1978, polemics between Sofia and Belgrade
once again proved that the Macedonian issue was far from dead.
As was mentioned earlier, Bulgarian attacks often coincide with
bad relations between Moscow and Belgrade. Such was certainly
the case in the late 1970 ' s with the disagreements over Euro-
communism, Yugoslavia's improving relations with the Peoples'
Republic of China, and Yugoslavia's criticism of Soviet and
Cuban actions in Africa. This situation is one which could
very easily be stage managed from Moscow. Given Sofia's his-
torical allegiance, it is not difficult to envision the out-
break of hostilities between these two Balkan states, with an
ensuing Warsaw Pact/Soviet invasion designed to rescue the
Bulgarians. Again, in view of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations,
this particular scenario seems dangerously possible.^
Of the above three scenarios, the first provides the least
inherent justification for Soviet intervention. It would thus
have to fabricate some rationale for its attack. The latter
two scenarios provide significant justification, if only from
the point of view of trying to keep peace in Europe.
In what manner would the Soviet Union intervene militarily
in Yugoslavia? There would, first of all, seem to be three





would probably much prefer to send proxy troops than their own.
The potential for spill-over and escalation is such that Moscow
would prefer not to chance having Russian troops come up opposite
those of NATO or any one helping the Yugoslavs. But the avail-
ability of such proxies is doubtful. The next preference would
be a Warsaw Pact invasion force. A multinational force would
certainly lend credibility to the invasion itself and would still
limit Soviet losses and involvement. There is much question,
however, whether some Warsaw Pact countries would support an
invasion of Yugoslavia. It would depend on the initial ration-
ale and it is likely that individual countries would not perceive
threats to their security in the same way that Moscow does.
Finally, Moscow might choose to send Soviet troops into Yugo-
slavia alone. The benefits and the original threat would
clearly have to significantly counterbalance the inevitable
political costs of such a move. Furthermore, it can be assumed
that this would only be done if the Soviet Union perceived a
very grave and possibly imminent threat to its own security.
Of the above scenarios and force compositions, it would seem
that the third scenario is most likely to cause Soviet military
involvement in Yugoslavia, while the second troop composition
would be the most likely method of attack. This composition
provides the best mix of threat, credibility and justification.
It should be noted, however, that a civil war in Yugoslavia has,
due to the multinational character of the region, great potential
for drawing other nations into the conflict. For example,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania would all be sorely tempted to
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protect the lives of their respective ethnic minorities in
Yugoslavia. Thus scenario number two can be seen to fit nicely
with the Warsaw Pact invasion also. Finally, the first scenario,
while it might be highly unlikely, might be perceived as a very
great threat to the Soviet Union, and could cause a very viru-
lent response.
However the attack comes and for whatever reason it is
delivered, the likelihood of a complete surprise is low. Rising
tensions preceding the outbreak of military action would probably
cause at least a partial mobilization of the YPA and hundreds
of units of the TDF. This benefits the YPA considerably since
it alone would not necessarily have to hold back the enemy
attack for the full 48-72 hours normally discussed. This factor
adds significantly to the credibility of the Yugoslavs' promise
of a long and bloody war. It is also the only hope the Yugo-
slavs have against a massive mobile invasion.
The Soviet Union is very well aware of Yugoslavia's defense
posture and strategy. It thus knows that if it is to achieve
its military and political objectives, it must do so quickly
and decisively. Since the question of outside assistance to
Yugoslavia will almost surely arise, the Soviets will attempt
to seize political control of the country quickly enough to
present the West with a fait accompli.^2 Once this is done,
the Soviests can go about their business, so to speak, in trying
to defeat the armed resistance that will have returned to the




It is generally felt that the Soviet/Warsaw Pact massive
invasion force would consist of 40-45 divisions including
Soviet, Hungarian, Bulgarian and possibly Romanian troops.
This force according to Graham Turbiville would consist of at
least two airborne brigades, 480,000 troops, more than 10,000
tanks, 2500 medium artillery pieces, 1500 mortars and more than
700 multiple rocket launchers." It would not be difficult for
the Soviets to achieve air superiority. It can also be assumed
that Moscow would send at least a cruiser task force to the
Straits of Otranto to protect the entrance to the Adriatic.
This would have the effect of signalling to the West that a
major resupply of the Yugoslavs would be opposed.
Against this Soviet invasion force, Yugoslavia would put
up the equivalent of about twenty divisions which are lighter
in armor and responsible for the defense of some 2970 kilometers
of border. Outnumbered at least 2j to 1 in total manpower, they
would be even more greatly outnumbered due to their inability
to concentrate their defense. The invasion force would also
enjoy about a 5 to 1 superiority in tanks and other equipment.^
The access or invasion points are not difficult to determine.
Yugoslavia's terrain puts significant constraints on an invasion
force and does make the job of the defending army a little
easier. A quick glance at the map should suffice. The main
invasion force would probably attack over the Danubian plains
and flatlands in Northern Yugoslavia, entering from Hungary and
possibly Romania. These forces would be assigned to seal
Yugoslavia's northern borders, overrun the defenses and take
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key cities such as Zagreb, Rijeka, Ljubljana, Novi Sad, and
Belgrade as quickly as possible. Forces entering from Bulgaria
would have more difficult terrain to overcome and would seal
the southern borders and take Nis and Skopje.
"
Not surprisingly, Yugoslavia has the bulk of its personnel
and armor stationed at these primary access points. They are
deployed in northern Croatia, northern Serbia, and in southern
Serbia and Macedonia. They have been stationed there since the
1968 time frame when the direction of the threat became danger-
ously clear to Belgrade.-^ The Yugoslavs have run several
exercises which have responded to just such massive invasions.
The exercises have included coordination with TDF units, defense
against airborne assaults, and defense against amphibious
assaults in the Adriatic.
-
J '
If Western sources are correct, it would appear that both
sides know much of what to expect from their adversaries. The
invasion force must be large and it must be quick and it must
be decisive. The defense, on the other hand, seems to accept
these facts and will withdraw in as orderly a manner as possible,
fully intending to carry the fight to the interior and eventually
return to the conventional battlefield. In this way the Yugoslavs
feel they can exact such a heavy toll on the invader that he can
eventually be worn down and driven from the country, a la Vietnam.
The obvious question then is: Who will win the war of attrition?
Can Tito's successors really hope to turn Yugoslavia into the
Soviet Union's own Vietnam war?
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Naturally these questions are no more answerable than the
others presented thus far. But there are some facts worth
pointing out, and most of them deal with Yugoslav capabilities.
First of all, the possibility of outside assistance to Yugo-
slavia must be considered. General consensus is that if the
hostilities described thus far break out in a rather sudden
manner, there is little that the United States alone or in
concert with NATO could do to offset the initial Soviet vic-
tory. The West could not provide manpower or supplies
quickly enough to make a significant difference in the immed-
iate outcome. What the West could possibly do would be to
quickly establish links with the resistance forces, thereby
bettering the chances of resupply in the protracted war.
The next question deals with whether the Yugoslavs are
actually equipped well enough to do what they plan to do.
Phillip Karber and Jon Lellenberg provide the best look at
this question. ^9 Organizationally, they seem capable, for
while most ground force units are about 75^ manned, much
emphasis and practice has gone into integration with the TDF
units. In the area of manpower, Yugoslavia has rather a unique
problem. Almost one million of its militarily fit men are
presently working elsewhere in Europe. Only if hostilities were
preceded by a relatively lengthy period of tension, could these
men be expected to be able to return in time for battle. Thus
Yugoslav defense planners will be without a significant percentage
of their most able fighters.
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Regarding its own armor and firepower, the Yugoslav's tank
force is old and maintenance is growing very difficult. Artil-
lery is in a similar state, and is dependent on non-standard
ammunition and is non-self-propelled. Defensive weaponry, while
it has improved with some recent modern additions such as the
Sagger ATGW and the SA-3, -6, -7 SAM systems, there are not yet
enough of those to help much. Furthermore, their anti-tank
systems tend to be immobile and unsheltered, and they lack both
modern radar systems and anti-air weapons. A related area,
mobility, is a very serious weakness in that only three brigades
out of Yugoslavia's infantry forces are presently mechanized.
This could improve in the near future if the Yugoslavs can
produce their new M-98O MICV quickly enough.
The Yugoslavs face equally great obstacles in the area of
support. Its communication equipment is old and inadequate
especially for the added requirements of the total national
defense concept. Air support is sadly lacking and cannot be
depended upon. Even the new Orao will not satisfy the pressing
needs for airpower for it will not be internally sophisticated.
Finally, Yugoslavia today still has relatively few first class
highways and railways. They are difficult and expensive to
build due to terrain features, and once built are easy to
disrupt due to the many bridges and tunnels. Thus logistic
support will be undependable in any kind of scenario. The above
is certainly a rather dismal picture. As Karber and Lellenberg
point out, the Yugoslavs have modernization programs in effect
for each of the areas discussed. But Yugoslavia is a poor
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country and cannot afford modern, sophisticated military equip-
ment. It must therefore hope that its deterrent strategies
work, and barring that, it must depend upon an active guerrilla
resistance.
There are other problems. Since World War II, frontier
areas have become increasingly industrialized while those same
areas have become depopulated. Since 19^5 the urban population
has increased from 20 to 35 per cent (42^ by 1986). Yugo-
slavia simply is not the same country that harbored the Parti-
sans. There is economically more to lose outside of the cities,
yet demographically, fewer people are there to defend those
outer regions. Thus, as the people en masse move to the hills,
there will be major difficulties sheltering and feeding them.
One interesting problem is that of the differing experiences
of the country's youth and their parents. There are indications
that the young people are tired of hearing about the glory of
the Partisans. Furthermore, they are more cosmopolitan and
materialistic, thus not as suited to the rigors of guerrilla
warfare. 61
Another clear cause for concern is based on the historical
national problems of Yugoslavia. The ethnic imbalance of the
officer corps might lead to misplaced loyalties in time of
military crisis. For example, Serbs and Montenegrins, who
dominate military leadership, tend to be culturally and histor-
ically more pro-Russian than the other ethnic groups. According
to Robert Dean, however, there is little evidence to doubt their




remain firmly behind the principle of Yugoslav federation..."
This might provide solace in terms of a massive external attack
since that sort of invasion normally draws the ethnic groups
together, but if the war were to begin a_s a_ result of ethnic
animosities, then the officer corps' loyalties would be severely
tested. Furthermore, the TDF concept has resulted in arming
and organizing Yugoslavs on their republican foundations. It
thus has a distinct possibility of backfiring.
These questions point to the relatively certain fact that
some Yugoslavs will not fight. Some will actually help the
invaders. The percentages that follow either of those two
courses may determine the ultimate outcome of the war.
The invaders face problems as well. The Soviet Union can
in no way be sure that the Warsaw Pact will join in an invasion
of Yugoslavia. Only Bulgaria can be assumed to be a sure ally.
It is conceivable that Romania would attempt to help the Yugo-
slavs. Finally, there is still the very strong possibility
that Soviet troops on Yugoslav soil, regardless of the circum-
stances, might serve to unite the Yugoslavs so greatly that the
fighting would be as fierce, lengthy and bloody as Belgrade
promises
.
In summary, it seems as though the probability of a Soviet
attack on Yugoslavia Is very remote. The Yugoslavs will do
their best not to cause the Soviets to fear or perceive a threat
to their own security. Moscow stands to lose simply too much
politically and ideologically, as well as in terms of men and
arms in an attack.
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If however, Moscow did feel compelled to invade Yugoslavia,
it would have already decided to accept the consequences. Its
losses would be enormous. But in the long run it would seem
that it could achieve its strategic objectives. The Soviet
position would not be analogous to that of the United States
in Vietnam, for the Russians would have an unbroken ground link
between its own homeland and the occupation forces in Yugoslavia.
As stated earlier, the costs would be enormous but the Soviets
could eventually break the back of the Yugoslav resistance.
The bottom line here, however, is still that Yugoslav
deterrence will continue to succeed. It is just too expensive
for the Soviet Union to become militarily involved in Yugoslavia,
and there is much too much potential for such an involvement
spreading elsewhere in Europe.
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V. MAINTAINING THE BALANCE:
THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES
A. NONALIGNMENT AND THE AFRICA CONNECTION
Throughout the history of the nonaligned movement, the
roots of which date roughly to the early 1950 ! s, Yugoslavia has
been either its leader or one of its leaders. Thus the mention
of the movement or the country has generally conjured up the
image of the other. Yugoslavia is clearly considered a champion
of the rights of small states. Its opposition to superpower and
bloc politics and Its success in maintaining its independence
have earned it the respect of all nations, weak and strong.
This elevated image among nations has in turn Increased Yugo-
slavia's own dedication to the theory and practice of non-
alignment to the point where nonalignment is now the official
theoretical basis of the country's entire foreign policy and
most especially its relations with the Third World countries
of Africa.
Yugoslavia's own nonalignment came about gradually and was
a direct result of its expulsion from the Cominform. Stranded
between two worlds Tito was forced to develop new allies and a
new form of international interaction if he was to keep his
nation Independent of both of the major blocs. His early con-
tacts and friendship with Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India,
two men who were equally dedicated to maintaining their countries'
independent postures, eventually evolved into a foreign policy
based on the sovereignty and equality of all nations, regardless
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of size or power. As his foreign policy was taking shape in
the mid-1950' s, Tito saw Africa as an excellent arena for
expanding his influence, and even more importantly, for gaining
political support. As Alvin Rubinstein states, the Yugoslavs
saw in the new nations of Africa, "...the stuff of which influ-
ence is made; strategic and diplomatic importance, untapped
markets and resources, surplus manpower,...' They thus soli-
cited the support of African, as well as Asian, nations in every
possible way, from the offer of military support to cultural
exchange
.
The first major sign of Tito's success occurred in September
1961 when the First Conference of Nonaligned Countries was held
in Belgrade. Twenty-five heads of state met in the Yugoslav
capital to express their concern over the tensions and critical
situations existing in the world and to remind the great powers
that their actions could have consequences that might effect all
nations.-* It was an honor that Belgrade was chosen as the meet-
ing site and the choice recognized Yugoslavia's leading role in
bringing it all about. This first meeting was considered a
success, if for no other reason than that it brought together
the nonaligned leaders at a forum outside of the United Nations
and thus established a precedent.
It is at times difficult to pinpoint an accurate definition
of nonalignment. As Leo Mates suggests, "By its appelation it
is defined negatively, i.e., as a policy of nonparticipa tion in
bloc groupings, military alliances or political blocs. "^ While
that is true, it has come to mean significantly more than that.
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The doctrine is characterized by the demand for a decrease in
bloc politics and superpower domination of international affairs
and recognition of the equality and sovereignty of all nations.
In practice this means regular meetings of the nonaligned group
and extensive use of the United Nations as a forum at which
small nations can make themselves heard.
It should also be pointed out that nonalignment does not
7
mean neutrality, especially for Yugoslavia.' While Belgrade's
outlook on international disputes often seems to coincide with
that of Moscow, the Yugoslavs openly differ with the Kremlin
on questions of the international Communist movement and on
Moscow's policies toward Eastern Europe. Nor is Belgrade
hesitant to criticize the United States for its human rights
campaign and its Middle East policies, to name just two. Non-
alignment grants each country the right to take whatever stand
it chooses depending on its own interests.
Since 1961, the nonaligned movement has grown considerably.
The growing number of African states added significantly to its
size. The Fifth Conference of Nonaligned Countries, held in
Sri Lanka in August 1976, was attended by 36 nations. Of those,
44 of them were African countries, not including the outlying
island chains. The only continental African states that are
not members are the Republic of South Africa and Rhodesia, for
obvious reasons. It is understandable that the African nations
should subscribe to nonalignment. The creed is appealing to
almost all small nations, for in addition to those tenets already
mentioned, it is highly opposed to colonialism and nuclear
182

proliferation and very much in favor of worldwide economic
assistance of developing countries. The fact that it is not
a neutralist policy has also been a major inducement.
The actual power that the nonaligned movement has had at
any particular time is difficult to measure and is therefore
also highly debatable. In 1970 Alvin Rubinstein stated that
o
the movement was in "disarray". Yet in 1971 the People's
Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations largely
due to the voting of the nonaligned bloc and principally, the
African nations. Numerous economic and financial support
agencies have been established in the U.N. as a result of the
group voting of the nonaligned bloc. So it appears, that the
movement has at times achieved some success in its unity.
Any power that the nonaligned nations attain, evolves as a
result of unity, and despite the above examples, unity was seen
to be seriously lacking during the summer of 1978. At a July
Conference for the Ministers of nonaligned countries, Tito was
forced to try to reestablish nonalignment on its original peace-
ful foundation. The problem facing the group was that Cuba,
whose influence is increasing rapidly, is militarily embroiled
in several of the guerrilla wars going on in Africa. Further-
more its military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia is closely
linked with that of the Soviet Union. Finally, the Sixth Non-
aligned Conference was scheduled to meet in Havana in 1979 and
Castro is reportedly harboring ambitions as Tito's successor as
leader of the nonaligned. The "disarray" of 1970 was not nearly
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the threat to Tito's movement, as the divisions brought about
by Cuba's African policy.
Thus in the summer of 1978 Tito opened the meeting in
Belgrade with a warning to the nonaligned nations against
attempts to divide and weaken the movement. While he did not
speak specifically of Cuba, it was very clear that he was
referring to the Soviet-Cuban efforts in Africa, calling them
"new forms of colonial presence and of block dependence,
foreign influence and domination."" After a few days, Cuba's
policies were the subject of open debate, with Cuba carefully
justifying its actions, while other countries threatened a mass
boycott of the 1979 Havana Conference. By the end of the
Conference a temporary compromise was achieved in that the
final declaration "...failed to endorse the rights of non-
aligned states to receive foreign assistance, as urged by the
Cubans. On the other hand it failed to condemn foreign
intervention." 10
Short of a victory for Yugoslavia's moderate, anti-inter-
vention side, the compromise was acceptable to the Yugoslavs.
At the time, the Havana Conference was a full year away, plenty
of time in which to politic and patch up the movement. Never-
theless, while the final declaration was a compromise, the
closing Yugoslav address was considerably less so. The Yugoslav
Foreign Minister, Josip Vrhovec, insured that his address refer-
red to the nonaligned movements' struggle against imperialism,
colonialism, expansionism, political hegemony and foreign
domination as well as "
. .
. against foreign interference in the
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internal affairs of independent sovereign countries..." Tito
was not about to pass up his opportunity to have the last word
in the debate.
With all of the attention on Africa during the late 1970 '
s
it is interesting to review Yugoslavia's own African policy.
It is naturally closely linked with nonalignment. Furthermore,
it provides some enlightening insights into the Yugoslav modus
operandi for spreading its influence and for creating global
political support.
The extent of Yugoslavia's presence in Africa is signifi-
cant considering its own limited wealth and size. While it
cannot be considered a major influence on African events, it
is most certainly a minor actor of importance. In actual fact,
Africa is more important to Yugoslavia than Yugoslavia is to
Africa. The relationships that have developed are of question-
able value to the individual nations, while on a wholistic
basis they have been very beneficial to Yugoslavia. Tito's
support of the emerging bloc of African states has enabled him
to maintain Yugoslavia's high profile on the international scene
and has helped him battle the superpowers. It has also enabled
Yugoslavia to find new markets for its manufactured goods and
new sources of raw materials for its growing industry. The
benefits accrued by the African states have been Yugoslav support
of their anti-colonial policies, Yugoslav economic and technical
assistance, and membership in and support of the nonaligned world.
Tito has used several methods to spread his influence in
Africa. Politically, he has consistently supported anti-colonialist
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and national liberation movements throughout the continent.
His policies have ranged from public denunciation of colonial
powers to direct military support for rebel movements. He has
established trade relations with almost every African state.
While some relationships are of little economic value, politi-
cally most have proven worthwhile. Additionally, though Yugo-
slavia can afford to grant little foreign aid, it has an
excellent record of extending credits, providing technical
assistance and experts, establishing joint ventures and granting
university scholarships. Finally, Tito and his fellow Yugoslavs
have utilized personal diplomacy in the form of state visits
and exchanges that have made the Yugoslav model well known
throughout Africa. All of these policies have assisted Yugo-
slavia in spreading its influence and even more important,
gaining it respect and support on the international scene.
Yugoslavia's most visible policy in Africa has been its
anti-colonial posture and its open support for decolonization
and national liberation movements. In fact, according to
Rubinstein, "Anti-colonialism has become the Yugoslav credit
IP
card to the Third World." Yugoslavia normally supports
indigenous populations in their struggles for self-government.
If there are several indigenous movements, it will support the
most non-Western group. It two non-Western factions oppose each
other, Yugoslavia will most often support that group which has
other nonaligned support. 'The Yugoslavs use the United Nations
extensively in their support of these movements, but on occa-
sion, they have been very bold and overt in their bilateral
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assistance. The crises in Egypt in 1956, Algeria later in the
1950' s, the Congo in the early 1960's and Angola during mid-
1970's are illustrative of Yugoslavia's policies in Africa.
Egypt was Yugoslavia's first major ally in Africa. When
Nasser came to power in 1952, Tito and the Yugoslavs were at
first hesitant to recognize him due to their traditional view
of military dictators. But a Yugoslav newspaper correspondent
sent complimentary reports of Nasser's broadly based revolution
to Belgrade. Yugoslavia responded with arms sales in 195^> and
thus became the first non-Western nation to support Nasser
militarily. ^ By the time Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal
in 1956, he and Tito had become allies and Yugoslavia supported
the nationalization. A member of the U.N. Security Council at
the time, Yugoslavia played a major role there and in the
General Assembly in bringing about a solution using the Uniting
for Peace Resolution. It was the only Communist nation to
participate in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in
Egypt. Yugoslav assistance to Egypt led to a strong relation-
ship of mutual support that has lasted to the present time.
There are numerous reasons for the early friendship of Tito
and Nasser. The Yugoslavs were in need of allies in the early
1950's. Egypt too, needed friends and Yugoslavia had demon-
strated greater support than any other nation during the early
3tages of Egyptian independence. Furthermore, Yugoslavia's
independent status was appealing to Nasser, for by 1955* Yugo-
slavia had been accepted by both Washington and Moscow as a
Iktotally independent state. These and other mutual interests
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caused Tito and Nasser, who met for the first time in February
1955* to develop a relationship between their countries that
proved to be a major factor in the early success of nonalign-
ment. Yugoslavia learned from this, its first venture into
African politics and its first support of a foreign anti-
colonialist movement, that very lucrative and long-term
opportunities might result from an effectively implemented
African policy.
The Yugoslavs provided early support for Algeria as well.
Contact was made between Algeria's National Liberation Front
(FLN) and Yugoslavia's socialist Alliance as early as 1953.
From the outset of Algeria's uprising in 195^* Yugoslavia openly
supported the cause of FLN in the United Nations. At the same
time it secretly provided valuable small arms to the Algerian
rebels via Cairo and through coastal gunrunners. This military
assistance continued throughout the struggle. Additionally,
badly wounded Algerian soldiers were treated in Yugoslav hospi-
tals, Algerian medics were trained by Yugoslav doctors and
clothing and food were sent to Algerian refugees. ^ In February
1962, Yugoslavia gave recognition to the Provisional Government.
Once Ben Bella had succeeded in taking power, Yugoslavia was
the first European country that he visited. Though Ben Bella
was later deposed, Yugoslav-Algerian relations have continued
to be good as a result of Yugoslavia's early support of the
Algerian independence struggle.
The crisis in the Congo provided Tito with yet another
opportunity to expand his influence in Africa. Yugoslavia
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played an active role in the United Nations debates over the
Congo, because Yugoslav leaders in Belgrade saw the Congo as
the key to the independence of Africa. Though the Yugoslavs
provided financial aid and personnel support for the U.N.
peacekeeping effort, Tito was openly critical of Western policies
and the ineffectiveness of the U.N. Early on, he accused the
West of "...seeking to perpetuate their economic exploitation
...
' of the Congo, and later took the side of the Casablanca
group in support of Patrice Lumumba. In December i960, Yugo-
slavia withdrew izs personnel and financial support of the U.N.
forces in protest of the U.N. 's lack of support for Lumumba.
Soon afterward, Belgrade recognized the Gizenga faction in
Stanleyville. Once again Tito had supported an anti-colonialist
group in opposition to the West.
In Angola, Yugoslavia again supported a national liberation
movement. However, in this case there were three such movements
and the Yugoslavs chose the one which they perceived to be the
most Marxist and most non-Western, the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola <, Also, the other two groups were increas-
ingly supported by the PRC and the United States, while MPLA
was supported by the USSR. A number of Yugoslav ships assisted
those of Russia in the delivery of military supplies to the MPLA
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in the Fall of 1975. When the MPLA was victorious, Yugoslavia
was one of the first countries to recognize the Luanda based
government. The relationship between the MPLA and its original
supporters has continued and according to Thomas Henriksen,
"Currently, the MPLA is relying on outsiders, mostly Cubans,
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but also Russians, Algerians and Yugoslavs, to replace Portu-
guese administrators and technicians in education, health and,
notably, agriculture. * As recently as October 1977, Yugoslav
military officials hosted the Angolan Minister of Defense and
a group of Angolan war veterans. The Angolans thanked the
Yugoslavs for their support of the MPLA and visited several
Yugoslav military installations. It is probably that relations
will continue to develop between Yugoslavia and Angola as long
as the MPLA government remains in power in Luanda.
These four examples illustrate Yugoslavia's anti-colonialist
policy in Africa. Tito has pursued this policy primarily in the
pursuit of allies. He has certainly gained the friendship of
those whom Yugoslavia has assisted. Additionally, his support
of these movements has created an image for Yugoslavia that has
helped improve its relations with other African nations. His
policies have, at times, been calculated risks for his actions
in support of Egypt and Algeria brought displeasure from the
United States and France, respectively. But the gambles were
worthwhile, for he has maintained relatively good relations
with those two powers while gaining valuable allies in Africa.
Tito's Yugoslavia bears a close resemblance to many of
Africa's developing nations. It too is relatively new and is
comprised of several nationalities. It has won and zealously
tries to maintain its own independence. Though it is still one
of Europe's least developed countries, it has achieved a high
degree of economic growth since the end of World War II. It
has been able to balance the influence of the great powers while
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interraittantly receiving aid from both. These factors obviously
stand out to the leaders of newly independent African states
struggling under the effects of poor economies, tribal disson-
ance and great power pressures „ They can look to Yugoslavia
and see a symbol of success, an indication that their goals are
achievable.
One of the primary methods of influence building practiced
by Yugoslavia has been that of personal and public diplomacy.
Few heads of state travel as much or receive as many other
visiting leaders as Josip Tito. From 1971-1977, President Tito
visited 31 foreign nations. In that same period, 66 foreign
dignitaries met with Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito himself has
visited at least 17 African states, while his associates have
visited several others. In 1961, he became the first Communist
leader to visit African states located south of the Sahara.
During a 1970 trip to southern Africa, he met with numerous
heads of state and with representatives of liberation movements
from Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia. 20
The results of these meetings are normally joint pledges of
mutual support and dedication to nonalignment. They often lead
to economic and cultural exchanges, and occasionally to military
support and cooperation. Today, Yugoslavia maintains diplomatic
relations with 38 African countries and has embassies in 21 of
those. Belgrade is normally one of the first nations to grant
recognition to a new state, for the Yugoslavs are well aware of
the importance of such recognition in the eyes of the leaders
21
and people of newly independent nations.
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A second, and very important method of interaction between
Yugoslavia and Africa, is that of foreign trade. Economic
planners in Yugoslavia have long desired increased trade with
Africa, primarily in order to reduce their dependence on trade
with the West and the Communist bloc. Early on, it was expected
that Yugoslav trade with the Third World would be very profit-
able. Planners believed that their manufactures, while not
competitive of Western markets, would be of great demand in
Africa. It was also felt that demand in these less developed
countries would speed the industrialization process in Yugo-
22
slavia. Such was not the case, however. Yugoslavia was
initially unable to supply the necessary credit for African
nations to buy its exports. Furthermore, the developing
countries had limited import capabilities and their own products
were not competitive on the Yugoslav market. -J Nevertheless,
Yugoslavia has continued to press for increased trade with
Africa and in the early 1970' s these problems began to resolve
themselves. In 1975> trade with Africa accounted for about
five per cent of Yugoslavia's total trade, compared with about
two per cent in 1971. Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya,
Ghana and the Sudan have historically been the primary trading
partners. Within the last two years, Zambia, Nigeria and Angola
have also become important. In 1976, Yugoslavia conducted trade
with at least 24 African states. Though this trade is not
absolutely necessary to Yugoslavia's economy, it does help it
minimize its dependence on Western and Eastern Europe, and it




Yugoslavia provides a surprising amount of foreign aid in
the form of credits and joint commercial ventures in Africa.
By 1969, it had granted over $230 million in credits tied to
the purchase of its goods. Its privately owned companies are
encouraged to establish joint ventures in Africa and they have
an excellent record of good relations with the local governments.
The following list reflects the wide scope of projects in which
Yugoslav firms participate in on the African continent:
Zambia - maize development project
Guinea - bauxite mine, iron ore mine, furniture factory,
hydroelectric plant, aluminum plant
Togo - hydroelectric plant
Sudan - two tanneries, cardboard factory, cement works
Uganda - slaughterhouse, conference hall, hotel, textile
plant, airport terminal
Kenya - highway construction, generators for power plant
Ethiopia - hydroelectric plant, cement works, port facil-
ities
Algeria - textile mills, leatherwear factory, food
processing plant
Ghana - tractor plants, port construction, food
processing plant
Egypt - tractor plant, fertilizer plant, crude oil
exploitation facility




Gabon - conference hall
These joint ventures enable Yugoslav business firms to export
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their manufactures and technology and receive inexpensive raw
materials in return. Additionally, such enterprises help to
build strong economic and political ties between Yugoslavia
and the host countries.
Yugoslavia's technical cooperation has gained its people
one of the best reputations in Africa. In fact, according to
a 1973 Senate report, since the first team of Yugoslav experts
"...was sent to Ethiopia in 195^> Yugoslav experts have effec-
tively reinforced Africa's image of Yugoslavia as a constructive
friend.' Yugoslav technical assistance has ranged from medi-
cal assistance to industrial and construction expertise and
has, due to the nature in which it is given, been very successful
An excellent description of the Yugoslav method of administering
their technical aid is offered by the Senate report:
Once assigned to an African country through the Federal
Institute for International Technical Cooperation (Bel-
grade), Yugoslav experts come under the direct authority
of the host government. They do not have any special
diplomatic status, as have their UN, Soviet and some
American counterparts. This approach was chosen to
avoid any possible appearance of interference in the
host countries' affairs. ->
Finally, Yugoslavia provides more than 1000 college fellowships
per year to African students. These methods of providing aid
reflect Belgrade's desire to be considered an ally and a partner
amongst the developing nations of Africa.
Yugoslavia is too poor a nation itself to play a significant
role in the economic development of Africa Politically, how-
ever, Tito has already played a major role on the African con-
tinent and it can be expected that he will continue to do so in
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the future. His policies have gained for Yugoslavia a great
deal of respect in Africa. The relationships that have devel-
oped are a direct result of his desire to remain simultaneously
independent of both East and West. That desire continues to
exist today, and it is doubtful that Yugoslavia's African policy
will change considerably in the foreseeable future. The success
of the policy lies in the fact that the Yugoslav's have gone
about spreading their influence and recruiting support in a
constructive and friendly manner. It is to their credit that
no African nation has perceived Yugoslav presences as a Commun-
ist threat, for regardless of Yugoslavia's small size, its
presence might have been used as a tool for more covert inten-
tions. That has never been the case, however, and today Yugoslav-
support, assistance, and diplomatic relations are welcome through-
out the majority of Africa.
Tito's successors will benefit considerably ' from his achieve-
ments in nonalignment and his relations with African states.
Not that those achievements are easy to measure. They are of a
political nature and very difficult to assess. The primary
benefit is that Yugoslavia now has many allies, and though they
are small, they would oppose intervention in Yugoslavia just as
Belgrade opposed intervention and colonialism in their own
countries. This support, while not powerful in military terms,
is probably a deterrent of sorts to any nation that desires to
impose its will on Yugoslavia, for that nation would lose a
great deal of influence and seriously damage its international
image. This deterrent has been one of Tito's primary aims in
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spreading nonalignraent as widely as possible. It also explains
the vigorous Yugoslav attempts in July 1978 to avoid a schism
of the entire movement over African politics.
B. EUROCOMMUNISM: A TWO-EDGED SWORD?
The Eurocommunist phenomenon has generated considerable
stir in recent years. Certain Western European Communist
parties have begun to exert an apparently greater amount of
influence within their own countries, within Europe, and within
the worldwide Communist movement. As the importance of these
parties has grown, the superpowers have had an increasingly
difficult time determining their policies regarding them.
Other countries, meanwhile, have watched and waited in order
to see what it all means and to ensure that they are on the
"correct" side when the dust clears. Yugoslavia, however, is
one of the few countries, and its Party one of the few Communist
parties, that have exhibited support for the Eurocomraunlsts from
the beginning. By doing so, the Yugoslavs have endeavored to
capitalize on this new phase of Communist evolution.
The Yugoslavs have never liked being completely on their
own in a hostile world. Thus whatever changes they made inter-
nally and however independent they have been from Soviet domin-
ation, they have also continued to attempt to improve their
relationship with the remainder of the Communist world. Their
formula for doing so has been simple and straightforward, and
is a version of nonalignment designed for the socialist commun-
ity. They have consistently called for open dialogue between
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all Communist parties, they have demanded mutual respect and
equal status at all forums, and they have boycotted any Communist
conference or meeting at which these principles were not guar-
anteed. In short they have striven to remain a part of the
Socialist community, but never to the detriment or sacrifice
of their own independence as a Party or as a state. The one
prerequisite of friendship has been mutual recognition of the
equality of all states and parties, regardless of size or
importance. Until recently they have had little success, for
other parties, unlike the nonaligned states, have been reluctant
to openly espouse and follow independent roads to socialism.
In recent years the LCY has at long last found the ideolo-
gical allies it has so patiently waited for since 194-8. In the
Eurocommunist movement, however imprecise or ambiguous the term
itself is, the Yugoslav Communists have discovered other parties
which are willing to openly renounce their allegiance to Soviet-
led Communism and proudly declare their own methods of achieving
socialism. The rapid growth of relations between the LCY and
the Communist Parties of Italy (PCI), Spain (PCE), and France
(PCF) is indicative of Yugoslav support for the trends and
independent policies those parties espouse. It also reflects
the importance that these parties attribute to the LCY as a
"ruling party" following its own road to socialism. While other
parties are also considered "associate members" of the Euro-
communist movement, these three are the most important from the
Yugoslav point of view.
1Q7

The present affinity between the LCY and these three most
important Eurocommunist parties did not evolve overnight.
While the Yugoslavs have grown closer to the Communists in
Italy, Spain, and France at an accelerated rate in recent
years, the bases for these ties have, to varying degrees,
existed for sometime. It is instructive to briefly trace the
growth of the relationships between the Communists of Yugo-
slavia and those of the Eurocommunist parties.
It must be emphasized at the outset that in 19^8* when
Tito broke with Stalin, Yugoslavia was truly considered hereti-
cal throughout the Communist world. While the level of denun-
ciation varied from party to party, no Communist Party failed
to attack the Yugoslavs for their defection. This was as true
of non-ruling parties as it was of those in power. Since that
time, Yugoslavia's acceptance within the Communist movement has
largely been dictated by Moscow. During periods of Moscow-Belgrade
rapprochement, other parties have felt compelled or allowed to
improve their relations with the Yugoslavs. But they have been
in the habit of doing so hesitantly for they could never be sure
if and when Moscow's own policy might once again shift. With
the progressive dissolution of Russian control, this has become
less and less true, but it is with this background that the
attitudes of the PCI, PCE, and PCF must be viewed. For example,
it might explain the fact that while the PCI and the PCE showed
early signs of defying Moscow themselves, friendship with the




Of the three parties, the Yugoslavs have developed the
strongest links with the PCI. Even this relationship, however,
had a typically weak beginning due to the events of the raid
and the late 1940' s. The Yugoslavs' success and revolutionary
zeal caused them to be extremely critical of less successful
and less aggressive parties at the end of World War II. Among
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those they criticized were the Italians. Thus, when the
Yugoslavs were expelled from the Cominforra in 19^8, the PCI
would have been one of the last parties to consider supporting
the heretics.
Conditions improved rather quickly, however, and by the
mid-1950 's the rehabilitation of the Yugoslavs coincided with
the growth of polycentrist concepts within the PCI, and espe-
cially associated with Palmiro Togliatti. While the Italians
were initially reluctant to forgive the Yugoslavs, by 1957 they
were working hard to make recognition of Yugoslav-style inde-
27pendence more acceptable. ' Togliatti and Tito appeared to
agree on many things and a close relationship began to develop.
The relationship was at times somewhat difficult to practice,
however, because the Yugoslav stand almost necessitated a polemi-
cal style toward the Soviet Union, while the Italians preferred
not to rock the boat too much. As Donald Blackmer states, "The
PCI, unlike the Yugoslav party, was not prepared to go it alone.
"
2°
The Yugoslav example was never, in itself, enough of a precedent
to enable other Communist parties to consider similar complete
defections of their own.
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Though Yugoslavia remained a virtual "untouchable" in terras
of full fledged alliances, the early ties between Tito and
Togliatti served as the foundation for a continuation of good
bilateral party relations. The PCI saw Yugoslavia as the best
test of Soviet willingness or nonwillingness to recognize other
roads to socialism. During the early sixties the two parties
grew closer and the Yugoslavs openly praised the Italian Com-
munists and their polycentrist tendencies. This was still a
rather dubious honor under the circumstances but dialogue slowly
increased and the Italian Communists expressed more and more
29
support for a revision of Moscow's Yugoslav policies. ? In
1964 Togliatti visited Belgrade for a second time, and together
he and Tito expressed opposition to the ideological and poli-
tical isolation of the Chinese Communists. Then in 1968 the
PCI and the LCY both became part of a larger group which openly
protested the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The next
high point in their growing bond was the 1976 Berlin Conference
of European Communist Parties and the planning forums preceding
it. Their common demand for unity through diversity and equal-
ity amongst parties strengthened the relationship further. Today,
the mutual desire for independence and common security problems
tie the two parties closer than ever and strengthens both in
their efforts to remain free of Soviet domination.
The relationship between the LCY and the PCF has evolved
much differently, is a much newer bond, and is also much weaker.
The French were also victims of the zealous post-War Yugoslavs
who attacked all who did not use any means whatsoever in order
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to assume power. In 1948 the French, behind Maurice Thorez,
were vicious in their revenge. They called Tito a traitor for
building socialism with American dollars and compared his use
of the term "socialist" to that of Mussolini. 3° The PCF dis-
tinguished itself by its furious attacks and its reluctance to
change its mind vis-a-vis the decisions of 1948. In 1956, the
French Communists, with much reservation and embarrassment,
admitted to certain excesses in their treatment of the Yugoslavs
In 1948. In 1958, however, with the airing of the Yugoslav
Draft Program and the renewed attack on Belgrade from almost
all quarters, Thorez and his fellow French Communists proudly
claimed that they had always felt the original judgements were
correct.-*
The PCF's attitudes toward the LCY were thus clear, at
least as long as Thorez was in charge. In 1963* when Moscow
was again softening on Yugoslavia, the PCF followed suit, but
once again with reservations. Typically, Thorez claimed to be
trying to reestablish links with the people and the organizations
of Yugoslavia, while continuing his fight against the revisionist
leaders of the LCY.^ 2 The events of August 1968, however,
finally gave the Yugoslav and French Communists something in
common, for both were opposed to the Soviet actions against the
Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia. For the first time the PCF
felt compelled, at least briefly, to openly oppose Moscow on a
foreign policy issue. As a result of doing so, it found itself
in a group which included the Yugoslavs. 33 Thereafter relations
between the two parties grew slowly but steadily better. While
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the French were somewhat late and reluctant in joining the
"southern axis" which opposed the CPSU at East Berlin in 1976,
their entry on the side of the Italian, Yugoslav, Spanish, and
Romanian Communist parties sealed, at least temporarily, a new
relationship with the LCY. Mutual desire for autonomy had
proved strong enough to overcome the differences that had
existed in the past.
The Yugoslav bond with the Spanish Communists is probably
the fastest growing of the three. Yugoslav-Spanish cooperation
dates back many years to the Spanish Civil War. There, many of
Yugoslavia's World War II leaders cut their teeth as members
of the International Brigade.^ Yet in 19^8 the PCE was as
loyal to Moscow as most other Communist parties and thus criti-
cized Tito and his fellow revisionists. Through the 1950' s and
early 1960's the PCE moved progressively toward national autonomy
in its strategy for achieving socialism in Spain. It thus grew
closer and closer to the parties of Italy, Yugoslavia, and
Romania .-^ The Spanish were very quick to oppose the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, and like the Yugoslavs, have remained
critical of the Soviet action to the present time.
Throughout the preparations for the 1976 party forum, the
PCE was aligned with the Yugoslavs, the Italians, and the Ro-
manians. This group formed the core of the "southern axis" and
was the instrumental group in turning the conference into a
political and ideological defeat for the Soviet Union. Since
that time, relations between the LCY and the PCE have grown
rapidly stronger. The Yugoslavs campaigned openly for the
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release of Santiago Carrillo and for the legalization of the
PCE in Spain. Party delegations are exchanged on a regular
basis and Carrillo has himself visited Yugoslavia. The PCE is
generally considered the most Eurocomraunist of the Eurocomraun-
ists. The relationship between the Yugoslav Communists, the
first "practicing" autonomists, and the PCE is therefore easily
understood.
The basis of the Yugoslav policy toward all three of these
parties, and the Eurocommunlst movement as a whole, is the
autonomist element of their strategy. Though he is certainly
not a spokesman for the LCY, Milovan Djilas was undoubtedly
accurate when he said that the one reason the Yugoslav Commun-
ists defend Eurocommunism is to constantly keep their distance
from Moscow.^' That reason alone is enough to explain the
support that the Yugoslavs have thus far exhibited for the Euro-
communists. There are, however, other aspects of Eurocommunism,
and while there is little consensus in the West regarding just
what is and is not part of Eurocomraunist strategy, the Yugoslavs
have defined it in rather specific terms. Their discussion of
the question helps explain their present supportive policy and
also points out some reservations they may have toward certain
elements of the movement.
The official Yugoslav outlook centers on what are referred
to as "positive trends and tendencies" emanating from the
growth of certain Communist and workers' parties in Western
Europe. 3° The Italian, Spanish, and French Parties are the
most commonly mentioned. The Yugoslavs have praised them for
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their response to national conditions, their independent roads
to socialism, and their willingness to recognize other roads as
well. This is only natural for those concepts are basic to
Yugoslav Communists. Furthermore, the basic element of Euro-
communist strategy, outspoken independence from Moscow, has roots
in the 1948 schism between Stalin and Tito. Much of the present
movement reflects the high points of Soviet-Yugoslav relations
and polemics over the past three decades, and in some aspects,
even draws on the documents of those relations. * Thus an open
dialogue between Communist parties, long called for by the here-
tics in Yugoslavia, is now becoming a reality and there appears
to be a trend toward a democratization in the decision making
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amongst the Communist parties and states.
Despite the affinity that all of these parties have for each
other, it appears that certain policies of the PCI, the PCE, and
the PCF cause a degree of nervousness at the top levels of Yugo-
slavia's leadership. In fact, it seems that there are elements
of Eurocommunism that challenge the very legitimacy of the LCY.
Certain conclusions at the recent 11th Party Congress of the LCY
indicate that there have already been major domestic reverbera-
tions that may be partially attributed to trends in Western
41European Communist parties.
It is instructive at this point to determine the Yugoslav
definition of Eurocommunism, for whether it is a movement or just
a passing fad, it is apparently taken quite seriously in Belgrade
In official documents it is seldom referred to directly as
Eurocommunism. In his official report to the 11th LCY Congress
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in June, Tito spoke highly of the growing reputation and influ-
ence of some parties of Western Europe, the necessity for wider
socialist development in various forms without universal models,
and the advantages of pragmatic alliances with socialist and
lip
social democratic forces. He went on to speak of the negative
tendencies represented by certain groups trying to "institu-
tionalize" relations in the workers' and progressive movement.
On another occasion, that of a visit by Poland's Edward Gierek,
Eurocommunism was openly discussed and described as a "trend
in the communist and workers ' movement which suits the circum-
stances of the industrially developed countries of West Europe." ^
Tito's broad definitions tend to highlight the positive aspects
of the trend and thus justify the general Yugoslav support.
More detailed definitions have been offered by the LCY's
Aleksandar Grlickov, secretary in the Executive Committee of
the LCY Central Committee Presidium, and the individual respon-
sible for relations with other Communist parties. In May of
1977> he broke Eurocommunism down into several specific elements:
(1) On the strategy for assuming power he stressed the
Eurocommunist emphasis on peaceful transformations to socialism
through Communist party cooperation in parliamentary elections
and through alliances with other progressive forces.
(2) He characterized these parties' foreign policies as
dedicated to overcoming bloc politics slowly, and in the mean-




(3) Individual countries and parties should be free of
foreign influence in their transformations to socialism and
should have complete control of their own wealth.
(4) Finally, regarding relations between workers' parties,
he asserted that the Eurocomrnunist parties speak only for them-
selves and that relationships with Moscow should not be used
as a yardstick in judging the acceptability of various roads
to socialism.
Grlickov has since added to or expounded on various parts of
this definition. Occasionally, he uses a shortened version
referring to Eurocommunism as a non-uniform trend or strategy,
which reflects the Eurocomrnunist parties' desires to peacefully
achieve socialism using means applicable to the specific condi-
tions within their countries. ^
It Is much easier to find a Yugoslav definition than it is
to find Yugoslav opinions on the various tenets or parts of
Eurocommunism. Grlickov has pointed cut that the LCY can
support the trend on principle and is not obliged to state its
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views on each element of the strategy. Indeed, to do so
might appear to be passing judgment on someone else's road.
In fact, however, the Yugoslavs have, on various separate
occasions, commented on most of the elements mentioned by
Grlickov. In looking at these comments, a pervasive under-
lying qualification to the Yugoslav acceptance of Eurocomrnunist
strategy is discernible.
First and foremost, they make it clear that Eurocommunism
is just one of several different roads and as such it is
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generally and on principle not applicable to Yugoslavia. The
LCY marked Gierek's June 1978 visit by once again extending
full support to the Eurocomraunists, "...but of course, not
identifying with their strategy and all their views."' The
Yugoslavs consistently point out that the strategies in ques-
tion are designed to fit conditions that do not now exist in
Yugoslavia and which did not exist there during the revolution.
The Yugoslav revolution was played out according to internal
necessities and today Yugoslavia continues to build socialism
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in a manner consistent with its own changing environment.
Based upon the historical Yugoslav appraoch to the world
Communist process, the above statements would seem to be both
consistent and sufficient. They have, however, often been
expanded. For instance, while Grlickov recognizes the Euro-
communists' peaceful approach to socialism, he has recently
pointed out that such an approach is not at all applicable to
those countries in which armed struggle has already taken place,
and furthermore, that there are countries today where violence
may still be necessary. ° He has also noted that even the Euro-
communists do not rule out the use of force in order to defend
the wishes of the people.
While the question of human rights is not included in the
Yugoslav definition of Eurocommunism, the Yugoslavs have felt
compelled to respond to the question and the Eurocommunist
approach to it. In an editorial comment in February 1977,
Milika Sundic responded to Western European communist parties
which had referred to oppression in Yugoslavia. He sternly
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reminded them of the need for respect for separate roads and
warned them against getting involved in polemics over human
rights in other countries.^1 Grlickov, a year later, felt it
was necessary to emphasize the fact that democracy in social
production, as exists to a degree in Yugoslavia, is a prere-
quisite for political democracy and human freedom.^2
The element of Eurocommunism that has received the most
attention, however, is that of pluralism and the parliamentary
process in which the ?CE, PCI, and PCF have been willing to
cooperate. The Yugoslavs have stepped up their legitimization
process during recent years via a visible campaign to explain
their form of socialist pluralism. This campaign may be par-
tially designed to offset the effects of the Eurocommunist 3 and
their professed willingness even to be voted out of government.
Self-management socialism has become increasingly discussed
along with "self-management pluralism" which, according to
Yugoslav writing, is a third and previously unknown alternative
to raulti- or single-party systems.-^ Yugoslav officials have
devoted much time and space stressing the advantages of their
system and they like to claim that while others talk of demo-
cracy at length, in Yugoslavia they are busy implementing it.
However much freedom of choice there is among Yugoslav workers,
the fact remains that the LCY is not about to be voted out of
power or even accept a challenge from another party. While it
is granted that such a party may not presently exist, LCY




The point here is that certain elements of Eurocommunism,
even as the Yugoslavs themselves define it, pose a threat to
the legitimacy of the regime, just as is the case in the USSR
and in some other Eastern European countries. Possibly this
is even more true for Yugoslavia due to the openness of its
society. Even its proud position as the most humane and open
of the world's Communist states may be in jeopardy. The West-
ern European Communist parties premise more political freedom
than exists in Yugoslavia. Thus Belgrade's boast of relative
freedom compared to its Eastern European neighbors may be
negated somewhat by better examples in the West.
The parliamentary question is even more potentially
damaging. There is already a comparatively high level of
pluralism in domestic Yugoslav decision making. Furthermore,
ethnic loyalities have challenged Belgrade's central authority
in the past. Thus Yugoslavia may be ripe for rapid formation
of contending parties based upon republican interests. Such
tendencies in Croatia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia could con-
ceivably be set off by electoral success or even the acceptance
of electoral defeat by the Communists in Italy, for example.
These possibilities may explain the increased campaign to sell
Yugoslav pluralism and tie it to political democracy and human
freedoms. The Yugoslavs are masters of legitimization and no
doubt can deal effectively with such challenges, but it is
necessary to recognize them nonetheless for these latent threats





None of the negative aspects of Eurocommunism are in
themselves enough to change Yugoslavia's present attitude
toward these parties. For the time being, the positive aspects
outweigh the negative. Indeed, it may only be as power-sharing
or ruling parties that these parties seriously threaten Yugo-
slavia's internal stability. As long as they do not hold a
significant amount of power they will not shine too brightly
as alternative examples to reformists in Yugoslavia. It is in
the event that they do attain the requisite power to be consid-
ered ruling parties that the latent threatening aspects of their
strategies become operative.
If these parties do attain such power a change in the
Yugoslav regime's attitudes might evolve. If the LCY were to
feel threatened by a ruling or power-sharing Eurocommunist
party, the response would most probably be seen in a drop in
the levels of Yugoslav support for that party cr the trend in
general. The LCY would not criticize, nor would it attempt to
alienate the offending party. It simply would not support
Eurocommunism as actively as it does at present. Clearly, the
continued existence of such independent parties would still be
beneficial to Yugoslavia in the fight against institutionalization
of the world Communist process. But the Yugoslavs made their
way for many years without the political and moral support of
Eurocommunism. Even without Tito, it seems likely they would
be willing to do so again Thus their unbridled support of this
trend may only be temporary. It will last, however, as long as
they consider it beneficial.
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In summary, it would seem that Yugoslavia approaches
Eurocommunism in much the same way as the United States and
the Soviet Union. That is, they approach it with mixed reac-
tions. Belgrade is certainly pleased to have found allies in
its efforts to steer a course separate from that of Moscow.
On the other hand, neither Tito nor his successors can promise
the degree of political freedom offered by the Communist par-
ties of Italy, Spain, or France. The relationships the LCY
presently maintains with the PCE, PCI, and PCF may thus be of
a very temporary nature and may cool considerably if the LCY
perceives any threat to its legitimacy. For the present,
however, the LCY will continue to support the Eurocommunists
no less than it would support any other party or group that
respects the concept of different roads to socialism.
C. THE CHINA CARD
A third and a rapidly developing aspect of Yugoslavia's
nonaligned balancing act is Its relationship with the Peoples
Republic of China. The Chinese Communists, due to their numbers
and their power represent an expanding influence both within
the Communist world and on the international scene. Yugoslavia's
desire to establish closer relations with the PRC is therefore
understandable. China is a counterweight to the Soviet desire
to dominate the socialist world and furthermore offers an
alternative to the blocs of the United States and the Soviet
Union.
Traditionally Yugoslavia has not had very good relations
with the Peoples Republic of China. In fact since 1948 there
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have been long periods during which the two countries have had
no official contacts at all. The LCY and the Communist Party
of China (CPC), similarly, have often been the bitterest of
enemies, openly and vehemently disclaiming the other's right
to call itself a true follower of Marx and Communism. Despite
this rather unfriendly history, however, 1977 and 1978 marked
a turning point in their relations and indications were that
they were moving closer together than ever before.
There are many factors which influence affairs between
nations. In the case of the SFRY and the PRC there are a number
of political and ideological factors which would indicate poten-
tial for excellent relations. Of the factors drawing Yugoslavia
and the PRC together, by far the strongest is their mutual
distrust of the Soviet Union. China has a long history of
border disputes with Russia that the Communist regimes of the
two countries have far but solved. Peking was nearly as con-
cerned over the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine in 1968
as the nations of Eastern Europe. Yugoslavia's similar fears
of Soviet intentions date back to 19^8 and have seldom shown
sign of being forgotten.
Both countries are likewise adamantly opposed to Soviet
domination of world Communism. Like Yugoslavia, Communist
China was early on a loyal supporter of Moscow's leadership,
but since the late 1950 ' s it also has claimed complete inde-
pendence of thought and policy. China's challenge to the
Soviets has obviously been more serious from a worldwide
influence point of view since Peking could actually assume a
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leadership position. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has been
more of a symbolic reminder of the death of monolithic Communism,
The PRC and the SFRY have, at least theoretically, very
comparable outlooks regarding foreign affairs and the rela-
tionships of nations on the international scene. China's
foreign policy has, since 195^^ been guided by the Five Prin-
ciples of Peaceful Coexistence. They are "...mutual respect for
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states - nonaggres-
sion, nonintervention in each other's affairs, equality and
mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."-^ Obviously these
principles coincide favorably with Yugoslavia's policy of non-
alignment. In short, both nations demand the right to determine
and follow their own policies, both internally and externally.
Freedom from Soviet dominance is naturally a corollary of both
doctrines.
Yugoslavia and the People '3 Republic of China also share
similar views toward Eastern Europe. In the case of the Yugo-
slavs, they have always worked for the dissolution of Soviet
control in the area in hopes that their own independence would
become more secure. The Chinese have similar objectives.
According to Vernon Aspaturian, the Chinese desire to loosen
the bond between the USSR and Eastern Europe for four reasons.
First, it would weaken the Soviet posture with respect to China
by depriving it of human and natural resources. Second, it
would make the USSR vulnerable to attack from the West. Third,
Peking might be able to challenge Moscow's ideological suprem-
acy by depriving it of its Eastern Europe constituency. And
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finally, the PRC would hope to establish an ideological commun-
ity between itself and Eastern Europe. So while Yugoslavia
and China do not have mutual long term designs for the future
of Eastern Europe, they do most certainly agree on the principle
of breaking down Soviet dominance of the area.
One particularly interesting aspect of commonality between
these two nations is their recent historical development. Both
the PRC and the SFRY evolved from self-won revolutions which
were dependent on peasant or partisan forces. Neither Communist
party received extensive assistance from the Russians,-5 ' In
fact at one time or another in their struggles, both Tito and
Mao were told by Stalin to go more slowly and be more patient.^
Furthermore, both nations were established under the strong
leadership of dynamic, charismatic individuals. Both Mao and
Tito managed to construct auras of power around themselves.
This power was then projected into the national characters of
the two countries and enhanced both nations' self-images. As
Alfred Low states, "Like Tito later, Mao, though a dedicated
Communist, had never been Moscow's agent in the true sense of
the word, but in the last resort was a self-made and independent
man. "5° This characteristic has been reflected in the two
countries' policies toward the Soviet Union.
Finally, both nations have individual reasons for desiring
a close relationship with the other. Since its expulsion from
the Cominform, Yugoslavia has sought better relations with
Communist Parties that might challenge the Kremlin's pre-eminence
Secondly, in the practice of nonalignment, it has attempted to
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develop broad international support. Contacts with East Asia
can help strengthen Belgrade's international nonaligned image.
Additionally, Yugoslavia's leaders are well aware of the Soviet
concern over the possibility of two front wars. Belgrade's
cultivation of ties with Peking would play on Moscow's fears.
China, on the other hand, can most assuredly recognize that
Yugoslavia has been a weakness to the Soviet Union since 19^-8.
It is Yugoslavia's success that makes Peking feel it is possible
fiC)
to further weaken Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Further-
more, if China cannot dominate world Communism, it at least
prefers pclycentrism, and support of Yugoslavia bolsters the
polycentric movement. Finally, in Peking's debate with Moscow,
much depends on power plays within the Communist bloc. When
Sino-Soviet disputes arise, the Soviet Union cannot depend on
Yugoslav support. It is understandable that Peking would try
to retain Yugoslavia's support in these inter-bloc quarrels.
It would appear then that there are many forces pulling
Yugoslavia and the PRC together. China's strong anti-Soviet
policies, Yugoslavia's mistrust of the Kremlin, common foreign
policies, and common socialist development all point to a
potential for excellent relations. But, for a number of reasons,
good relations between Peking and Belgrade have been the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
The greatest barrier to a Peking-Belgrade axis is the lack
of geographical ties between the two nations. Neither country
can expect much support from the other in the event of a struggle




often quoted as saying, "...distant water cannot quench fire."
A by-product of distance is the total lack of cultural ties.
The two countries have such diverse histories, languages and
religions that there is no real opportunity for a close rela-
6?
tionship of peoples. Clearly then there simply is no natural
Chinese-Yugoslav connection.
The connection that does exist is tenuous indeed, for it
is totally ideological and political. According to Robin
Remington in "China's Emerging Role in Eastern Europe", "Peking's
relationship to these countries (Eastern Europe) has been a
function of ideological, organizational considerations flowing
from their membership in what today has become a multiply defined
'socialist commonwealth'." ^ Such relationships are tradition-
ally weak, especially when lacking in geographical or cultural
foundations. Furthermore, Yugoslav-Chinese affairs have been
based almost entirely on their changing relationships with the
Soviet Union. Yugoslavia has cared about China only insofar as
64China affects Yugoslavia's freedom from the USSR. China has
historically cared about Yugoslavia only as a method of weak-
ening the Soviet Union. Such relationships are not the stuff
of which lasting alliances are made.
There are historical aspects which also preclude solid
Peking-Belgrade relations. Yugoslavia was early on forced to
turn to the West In order to withstand Stalin's pressures.
Yugoslavia has since grown to be the most "westernized" of the
Communist states and has much better relations with the capital-
ist world than most of the Communist bloc. China has, until
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recently, found Yugoslavia's western connections extremely
distasteful from an ideological point of view. Additionally,
China developed close relations with Albania when that country
defected from Moscow's satellite system in the early 1960's.
Historical animosities between Yugoslavia and Albania make any
union of these three countries very unlikely. Thus as long as
Yugoslavia maintains good relations with the West and China
does the same with Albania, the chances of a Chinese-Yugoslav
axis are limited.
While their foreign policies seem to coincide, China and
Yugoslavia have actually been opponents in international affairs,
especially in the Third World. In the late 1950' s and early
1960's many of the small and new nations of the world took part
in movements designed to break down or circumvent the dominance
of the super powers and their respective blocs. In their attempts
to achieve a stronger voice in international affairs these nations
established various organizations which themselves acted as
blocs on the international scene. The People '3 Republic of
China played a major role in the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity
Organization. Yugoslavia, meanwhile, led the movement of non-
aligned nations. Both China and Yugoslavia were attempting to
strengthen their own independence and bargaining position vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union. Eventually Chinese and Soviet efforts
to dominate AAPSO weakened that organization. ^ But Yugoslavia,
despite its European location, had gained considerable support
in the Third World and by 1964 the nonaligned movement had
66become the stronger of the two organizations. Even worse,
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from a Chinese standpoint, was that Peking's attacks on Yugo-
slavia during that period eroded China's own support in Africa
and Asia. Yugoslavia will never be a major influence in the
Third World but it has been a source of competition for Communist
China in the race to gain friends in Africa and Asia.
Finally, the two countries have such different individual
security requirements that it is difficult for them to reach
agreement on several issues. To begin with, Yugoslavia is as
opposed to Chinese domination of Eastern Europe as it is toward
Soviet domination. Belgrade will thus watch carefully as China's
Eastern Europe policy unfolds. They have occasionally found
themselves at odds over countries like India who China 3ees as
a security threat and Yugoslavia respects as a fellow founder
of nonalignment. ^ Finally, China is a major political power
with dreams of becoming a major military power. As such it has
completely different views concerning disarmament and nuclear
proliferation than little Yugoslavia, which actively supports
arms limitations talks and force reductions.
Relations between Yugoslavia and Communist China are thus
subject to a variety of both positive and negative forces. The
dominant adhesive force is their mutual dislike of the Soviet
Union. The dominant divisive forces are their opposing ideolo-
gical orientations and their differing long-term aspirations for
the world order. Depending upon which forces have been pre-
dominant during a given period, their relations have ranged




Affairs between the PRC and the SFRY are best described in
four phases. The first period began in the post-World War II
years and ended in 1955. When Tito's unwillingness to "kow-tow"
to Stalin's dictates in 1948 earned the Yugoslavs excommunication
from the Cominform, the Chinese supported the Moscow originated
f>P>
resolution. Then in 1949 the PRC was founded. The Yugoslavs
were one of the first nations to extend recognition, most pro-
bably because they saw similarities between their revolution
and that of the Chinese and therefore hoped to gain an ally.
Belgrade's hopes were quickly dashed, however, when Peking did
not grant reciprocal recognition. Instead the Communist Chinese
remained loyal to Moscow and were therefore no friends of the
Yugoslavs.
Yugoslavia vainly continued to try to recruit friends in the
Communist world. For example, despite China's support of the
Cominform resolution, Yugoslavia campaigned openly for the cause
of the PRC in the United Nations. The official Yugoslav position
was that "This Government (the PRC) enjoys the confidence of the
Chinese people. The government of the Peoples Republic of China
has the right to represent the Chinese people,..." 9 gut Belgrade
got little response until 1954, when Khrushchev's regime began
to express a changed attitude toward Tito, and China followed
suit. By 1956, the 1948 resolution was being called a mistake
in both Moscow and Peking.' All aspects of Sino-Yugoslav
relations soon began to improve.
Warm relations did not last long, however. In late 1956,
Peking and Belgrade began to openly disagree on certain issues
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being debated within the Communist world. China supported the
Soviet invasion of Hungary in October 1956, while Yugoslavia
objected to the Stalinist tactics employed. Furthermore,
according to Hinton, Mao was particularly impressed with Soviet
feats in missilery and space technology during the period.
Therefore the Chinese were quick to raise the banner of Soviet
71
supremacy. When Yugoslavia refused to recognize such suprem-
acy and denounced Moscow's programs, the Communist Chinese
became even more virulent in their attacks on the Yugoslavs
than were the Russians. Mao launched a violent propaganda
campaign against Tito and his "revisionist" domestic policies.
On May 5, 1958, an article in Jen Min Jih Pao stated that Peking
now felt that:
...the criticism contained in the Resolution of the Informa-
tion Bureau of Communist Parties of June 19^+8 was basically
correct... It is quite obvious that an open and uncompromising
struggle must be launched against a series of anti -Marxist,
anti-Leninist and wholly revisionist views... of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia .'3
Yugoslavia responded in kind. On June 15, 1958, both countries
recalled their ambassadors. Thus ended the second phase of
Sino-Yugoslav relations.
The next period of relations was based greatly on the grow-
ing Sino-Soviet conflict. Chinese denunciation of Yugoslavia's
revisionism continued as Peking and Moscow moved further apart.
Albania defected from the Soviets to the Chinese and Khrushchev
sought better ties with Tito in order to unify Eastern Europe.
By 1962 the PRC and the USSR had taken to attacking each other
by proxy. China constantly denounced Yugoslavia, while really
meaning the Soviets, and the Soviets likewise aimed their attacks
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at Albania. In fact during the early 1960's Moscow and Peking
spent considerable time debating over Yugoslavia's right to
74
membership in the socialist community of nations.
This period, which lasted until the latter part of 1968,
was also characterized by rather consistent disagreement between
Yugoslavia and China over political issues. China felt that
the Soviets buckled under American pressure when the missiles
were removed from Cuba, while Yugoslavia supported the move in
the interests of world peace. When Albania shifted its alle-
giance to China, largely due to the Soviet-Yugoslav rapproche-
ment, Yugoslavia could hardly be expected to move any direction
except further from Peking. -J Additionally, Chinese and Yugo-
slav policies and intentions in the Third World clashed during
this period. In 1964, when most Afro-Asian states chose a
second nonaligned conference over a second Ban-dung meeting,
the Chinese could place partial blame on the Yugoslavs. Finally,
China's militant dogmatism during this period placed her
squarely opposite Yugoslavia in such issues as peaceful coexis-
tence and nuclear test ban treaties.
Until late 1968, the one most unifying element of Sino-
Yugoslav relations was missing. Except for a brief period
between 1955 and 1958> whatever the two countries shared in
common simply was not strong enough to overcome their respective
good relations with Moscow. One of the effects of the Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia, however, was the initiation of
a new era of relations between the SFRY and the PRC. Finally
they shared a mutual policy important enough to overcome most
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other factors that in the past had precluded closer relations.
The events of 1968 made them more suspicious than ever of their
mutual antagonist, the Soviet Union.
During the last decade relations have improved rapidly and
have been characterized by increasing exchange at a number of
levels. In the spring of 1970 ambassadors were once again sent
to Belgrade and Peking. At a reception in Peking on November
29, 1970, the two nations toasted the similarities between
7fi
nonalignment and the five principles. In 1971 Yugoslavia was
a major supporter of China's successful bid to assume represen-
tation in the United Nations. Trade between the two countries
has more than quadrupled and though its total volume is still
small it is an indication of better relations. Between 1971 and
1977 the SPRY and PRC traded visits by their ministers for
foreign affairs, secretaries for trade, and parliamentary
77delegations.
'
The best evidence of the enormous improvement in Sino-
Yugoslav relations was the visit by Tito to Peking in September
1977. It was the first visit by Tito to Communist China and
clearly marked a major turning point in almost 30 years of poor
relations between the two countries. Tito was extremely well
received. Large crowds greeted him and he was given the honor
of being the first foreigner to visit the tomb of Mao-Tse-tung.
Furthermore Tito's visit marked the establishment of relations
between the two Communist Parties, a link as important as that
78
of the states themselves.
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In August of 1978, Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the CPC and
Premier of the Peoples Republic, visited Yugoslavia , in addi-
tion to Romania. His visit thus sealed the new bond between
the two countries. The reception given him matched that pro-
vided for Tito of a year earlier. He spent an entire week in
Yugoslavia during which he visited several republics, including
Macedonia (considered a direct affront to Bulgaria and the
Soviet Union), ^ had extensive talks with Tito and was billed
as the "first most eminant personality of China to visit
Yugoslavia." 80
It is the flexibility of Yugoslav ideology and new leadership
in the PRC that enables the two countries to almost euphorlcally
greet their new relations. While they do not entirely ignore
their previous differences, they no longer consider them
important. Tito, in his welcoming toast stated that relations
between the two were now based on the traditional common prin-
ciples of their policies in addition to "...respect for contri-
butions by all other countries, both to the building of one's
own path of development and to equitable cooperation in the
world." Such courtesies have not characterized these two
countries* relations at any time in the past. Both leaders
emphasized their people's admiration for the others' achieve-
ments in building socialism with special regard to the conditions
prevailing in their respective countries.
The two leaders took different approaches when referring to
other countries, however. Tito, for example, attempted to
discount the implications of Hua ' s "Balkan holiday". In an
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obvious reference to the Soviet Union, he stated that the PRC
and Yugoslavia were "...promoting relations between (their) two
countries. . .and not at the expense of good relations and cooper-
go
ation with other countries." Hua, on the other hand, in an
equally obvious reference, distinguished between the positive
relationship of the SFRY and the PRC, and some others who see
"...the nonaligned movement as a serious obstacle to implemen-
tation of their aggressive and expansionist policy. They are
trying... to reorient it and subjugate it to their hegemonistic
goals.' 3 The Soviets criticized Hua for his "demagogic and
hypocritical" remarks and noted their disappointment with the
Yugoslavs for failing to dissociate themselves from the Chair-
man's anti-Soviet attitude.
Aside from the polemics, Hua ' s visit to Yugoslavia was
substantially important to Yugoslavia for a number of reasons.
First, Tito, despite remarks to the contrary, was certainly
well aware in advance of the offensive nature of the visit as
far as Moscow was concerned. In no way could Hua have gone to
the Balkans without offending the Soviets. Due to differences
over Eurocommunism, Africa, Cuba, and nonalignment in general,
Moscow-Belgrade relations had not been good for some time. Hua '
s
visit thus gave the Yugoslavs a chance to reassert their inde-
pendence while gaining the added prestige of having the leader
of nearly a billion people visit their own small country.
On the other hand, Tito does not unnecessarily aggravate
Soviet leaders. Thus his comments can be seen as being partially
in earnest. Looking at the visit in this manner, it can be seen
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as merely another step In Tito's attempts to broaden the scope
of nonalignraent. The more support his country has in all
corners of the world, the more maintainable nonalignment will
be once he is gone. The Peoples Republic of China is a very
important "corner". It is likely that Tito saw and planned for
both of these aspects of Hua's visit.
Finally, one outcome of Hua Kuo-feng's visit to Yugoslavia
was the news that the Communist Chinese were considering
adopting some aspects of Yugoslavia's self-management for their
own economy. This was startling and fascinating news. It was
known that economic delegations had exchanged visits, but
recently the favorable report of one of those delegations was
considered at the highest level of the CPC. Furthermore, books
by Tito and Kardelj explaining the system are reportedly under-
8=5
going a hurried printing in China. **
The implications of Communist Chinese interest in self-
management are stunning. According to one author, "A seal of
approval from the world's largest communist party would elevate
or
it (self-management) to a quite new level of relevance."
That is probably an understatement. The fact is that while
some Eastern European regimes have borrowed aspects of the
Yugoslav system, the overall concept has never before been
taken very seriously by Communists outside of Yugoslavia. Now
to have their system be considered applicable in the world's
most populous Communist state would do wonders for Yugoslav
Communists. Their internal image and legitimacy would increase
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immeasurably. There is simply no greater compliment that the
CPC could pay to their Yugoslav counterparts.
The Yugoslavs have benefited greatly from the general
improvement in their relations with the PRC. Their indepen-
dence is at least somewhat more secure, though the "distant
water" concept still applies. In addition their image amongst
the Communist states of the world has been significantly
enhanced. As long as relations with the USSR remain cool and
as long as an open-minded regime holds power in Peking, the
Yugoslavs are likely to continue improving their relations with
Moscow's arch enemy in the East.
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VI. AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
The Yugoslavia that exists today is very much Tito's
Yugoslavia. All aspects of its internal and external orienta-
tion are in some way attributed to his leadership. The Socialist
orientation, the independent Communism, and the system of Self-
Management are his constructs. Rapid economic growth and afflu-
ence are intricately associated with his tenure. Nonalignment
and independence from both superpowers are solely credited to
his own defiant independence. And finally, while multination-
alism existed prior to his leadership, the apparent internal
national stability did not. Understandably, it is very difficult
to visualize Yugoslavia without Josip Broz Tito.
The end of Tito's tenure concerns many people, both inside
and outside of Yugoslavia. The Balkan region as a whole, and
Yugoslavia in particular, are historically unstable. Yet since
the end of World War II, Tito has mastered the "politics of the
middle" and created at least the appearance of stability. He
has not always accomplished this with forethought and analytical
planning. On the contrary, his leadership has sometimes been
characterized by lurches and overreactions to crises. In
between crises it has appeared that his principal policy has
been to let well enough alone. Such an approach can work
successfully when an aura of power exists around the leader of
the country, but it may not be practicable when the leader and
his charisma are gone.
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What planning has occurred has been designed to perpetuate
Tito's Yugoslavia in his absence. Theoretically the system that,
exists today can continue without him. The only aspects missing
will be his personal charisma and his domestic and international
prestige. But the system is totally untested under those cir-
cumstances and obviously cannot be tested until Tito is gone.
To be untested, however, does not necessarily imply that Yugo-
slavia's system is incapable of meeting the many challenges
that loom ahead. Tito may very well be correct in his assertion
that his departure will not cause any changes.
Actually, on the surface, stability looks as though it should
be relatively easy to maintain. After all, successors are desig-
nated, the system has been constructed and has been operating
for a number of years, and the policies, both domestic and
foreign, are already established. If Tito's successors main-
tain a course down the middle of the road, rule by consensus,
and avoid substantive changes, they should have little diffi-
culty. The problem is that environments and forces do not
remain the same and systems must adapt to changing situations,
values, and relationships. Thus, the successors can only allow
the system to run itself, and the present policies can only be
strictly adhered to until new challenges appear. At that point
people, groups, and leaders often become divided. And it is
at that point in time that the true test of Tito's legacy and
the Yugoslav system will occur.
The success with which Yugoslavia meets the challenges of
the future will be greatly determined by the interplay of three
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categories of important actors. The first category is comprised
of the actors that will definitely play the most decisive roles
in the country's future. Internally, the LCY, the YPA, and the
power-sharing personalities will be dominant. Naturally there
are other groups in Yugoslavia that will have a say in the
post-Tito decision-making, but it will be some combination of
the Party, the Army, and the elite that will rule the country.
Externally the obvious and principal actors are the Soviet
Union and the United States. Their actions in dealing with
Yugoslavia can effect its internal stability as well as its
foreign policy orientations. A second category of actors
includes those that have a limited potential to effect Yugo-
slavia's future. For example, geographical neighbors and ethnic
emigre groups both may prove unimportant, but they have the
potential to take certain actions that could lead to or create
instability. A third and final group of actors are those that
may be passively used for political support. In this category
are China, the Eurocommunists, and the Nonaligned nations.
None of these, with the remotely possible exception of the PRC,
can really be expected to do much to help Yugoslavia in the
event of an attack or even massive political pressure, but their
political voice is, to some degree, a possible deterrent to
Yugoslavia's enemies.
The actors and the relative importance of their roles will
depend significantly on the period immediately following Tito's
departure or death. For instance, if internally, the LCY, the
YPA, etc. can quickly and smoothly consolidate power, then the
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effects of the actions of external actors will be minimized.
The interplay is still very important, however, for the external
actions of even minor states, such as Bulgaria pressing its
claims on Macedonia, can greatly effect the ability of the
internal principals to consolidate power. Quite clearly, the
longer that Yugoslavia goes without a powerful and decisive
central authority, the more susceptible it is to challenges
from within and without the state.
A number of the likely challenges have already been men-
tioned. Multinationalism and its divisive aspects was discus-
sed at length in Chapter II, but it is important to try to
assess just how serious or explosive it may be. It touches so
many aspects of Yugoslav society and it is still the major
problem of the country. Looking again at the three major
groups, it appears that there is no threat of Serbian hegemony.
Most Serb nationalists in the party were purged during the early
1970 's, and what Serb feeling is expressed will probably take
the form of support for the federation as a whole. It is very
difficult to assess the depth of Croatian independence desires.
It is probably true, however, that the feelings of Croat emigre
groups in the West do not accurately represent the feelings of
Croats in Croatia, who are probably more committed to the
federation. Finally, Albanian demands are likely to grow and
may require the greatest amount of attention in the future.
Their desires for improved living conditions and greater autonomy
threaten the other nationalities and the state itself.
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In more general terms there are some very destabilizing
aspects of multinationalism. First it is probably true that
each of the republics would like more independence. Tito's
death may be the catalyst that sets off their demands and the
resulting clash of ethnic representatives in the central
government might freeze decision-making. Secondly, the econo-
mic inequalities simply cannot be solved to the satisfaction
of all. That factor is related to a third element, the mutually
threatening nature of the various nationalities. In too many
cases the gains of one ethnic group can only be achieved at
the loss of another. Finally, while emigre groups may not
necessarily be representative, they can definitely effect the
domestic stability of the country by stirring up ethnic animos-
ities through their actions on the international scene.
Fortunately there are a number of factors which tend to
stabilize Yugoslavia's multinational character. The first
factor to be considered is that the country's political inde-
pendence from Russia is often equated with its unity. Thus,
according to Robin Remington, the majority of Yugoslavs whatever
their nationality, realize that "...they stay together or they
hang separately."" Secondly, it is very questionable whether
any of the republics is truly economically viable as an inde-
pendent state. And over the past 60 years they have become
increasingly interdependent. Thirdly, there is just no peaceful
way in which the republics could divide themselves into separate
and independent political units. The different nationalities
are too greatly mixed and any boundary system proposed would
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create extensive minorities within each unit. A good example
is offered by the independent state that Croatian emigres
demand. It would include Slovenia, Croatia, much of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and part of Serbia itself. Yugoslavs, regardless
of their nationalities, are aware of the obstacles in the way
of ethnic independence and, while that does not guarantee peace
amongst them, it is at least a step in that direction. Finally,
there does exist a Yugoslav nationalism born out of the last
three decades of defiance, independence, and prestige in inter-
national politics. Dusko Doder offers evidence to the fact
that Serbs, Croats and the rest are all openly Yugoslav when
p
they play the Soviet Union in soccer or basketball. It is
their opportunity to openly express their independence from the
Soviet Union.
It is impossible to measure just how far below the surface
of Yugoslavia's society ethnic animosities may lie. Much evi-
dence seems to, at least logically, support unity. Yet as
recently as 1971 there was a major independence movement in
Croatia. The national problems are clearly the most unpredict-
able aspect of Yugoslavia's future. Unfortunately, if they
explode they can also lead to the greatest amount of instability
there and possibly elsewhere in the Balkans and in Europe.
A second major challenge is the fact that the system itself
is untested. It is not known how it will actually work. It may
be that it will be pulled in so many directions that it eventually
will simply come apart. Worse yet, external actors may not have
the patience to wait for Yugoslavia to stabilize. It will be a
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political unknown for a while and other states may feel very
uncomfortable with a political unknown in their midst. They
might take actions that are designed to push Yugoslavia in a
particular direction. Such added challenges will not be needed
and can only make eventual stability more difficult to maintain.
A third challenge for Tito's successors will be that of
handling the openness of the Yugoslav borders and society.
While political repression still exists and there is occasional
"tightening up" politically, the fact remains that Yugoslavia
has been becoming progressively more liberal and free over the
last 30 years. This policy has worked relatively well with an
authoritative and, for the most part, unchallenged ruler like
Tito, but it will be more difficult for those who follow him to
reconcile the pull between East and West and the probable demand
for continued liberalization of society.
The economy and its increasing list of vulnerable aspects
is a fourth challenge. With over fifteen per cent of its trade
being conducted with the USSR it is likely that Yugoslavia is
already feeling overly dependent on Moscow. It is certainly
very dependent on Western Europe and has an increasing trade
deficit with the capitalist countries. And recently the Yugo-
slavs have felt the pinch of rising prices for both Soviet oil
and for Middle East oil. In the future, it will be increasingly
more difficult to satisfy the consumer demands that are beginning
to characterize Yugoslavia.
Soviet intentions will obviously be a major challenge to
Yugoslavia's leadership. From Belgrade's point of view it will
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probably be desirable to maintain as much distance as possible
from Moscow. Yet this must be done carefully and unprovocatively
for it is Important that the USSR remain unthreatened by Yugo-
slavia's political posture. Suffice to say that the Yugoslavs
will keep themselves well aware of Soviet actions and policies.
Finally, a related challenge will be that of continuing
Tito's foreign policy. Nonalignment has now become an important
aspect of domestic politics in the country and is probably a
significant source of unity. 3ut like Yugoslavia, nonalign-
ment as a movement has never existed without Tito. Even with
him still on the scene It is facing difficulties. His absence
may also tend to weaken such policies as the China and the
Eurocommunist "cards". Only time will show if Yugoslavia as
a state has assumed some of Tito's prestige. If it has, his
successors will be more able to carry on the present foreign
policy.
Whatever the nature of the challenges, Tito's successors
will find their own actions and decisions more effective If
they early on recognize a few realities of their position.
First, and foremost, they must be aware of the fact that their
country is a potential confrontation area. According to
Horhager, Yugoslavia's political uncertainty and its high geo-
strategic value make it very prone to conflict.^ Furthermore
the leaders may be working under terms of crisis management.
In response to such conditions they may unite and thus improve
their ability to make quick decisions. It is doubtful that
that will occur, however, since power-sharing principles will
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most probably rule the day and decision-making under such
conditions is usually slow. Either way, their primary goal
will be to maintain order and their ability to act quickly
enough at key moments in time will determine their success.
There will be very definite limits on their freedom of
action. For example, there is little that they can change
regarding self-management or the federal organization of the
state. According to A. Ross Johnson, the LCY will be limited
in its liberalization or "Social Democratization" of the party
and state without weakening its own function and letting nation-
alist tendencies run wild. On the other hand, it will be
equally limited in its ability to increase its "command func-
tion" over society without similarly bringing about nationalist
rebellion or civil war. Johnson's limits can be seen to apply,
not only to the LCY, but to whatever combination of institutions
and individuals succeeds Tito. These limitations imply that the
people of Yugoslavia are quite satisfied with conditions just
as they are and that they are dedicated to perpetuating Titcisra
without Tito. As a result, the successors will be likely
limited to a middle-of-the-road approach to domestic decision-
making. While "republican" pressures may work to overcome this
conservationist urge, the basic tenor of domestic policy will
have to be the maintenance of the status quo.
A similar limitation can be seen to work on external policy
changes. Not only do the people enjoy Yugoslavia's international
image, it can be assumed that after three decades of independence,
there is a very definite limit on how much external influence
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they will accept or allow. For instance, balanced nonalignment
is much more desirable than close association with either of the
superpowers. There is some room for movement within a nonaligned
context in that some may prefer a more European orientation
while others may prefer a greater pro-Arab-Third-World approach.
But nonalignment must stay, in one form or another, even if a
nonaligned split occurs. Keeping good relations with the Euro-
communists will probably also be required since it tends to
make the Yugoslavs feel less isolated. The developing rela-
tionship with China is possibly the most difficult to handle.
Here the limits are more external since this policy has great
danger of provoking the USSR and therefore must be pursued very
carefully.
There are other provocative policies that will require
careful handling. For example, though little is known about
what type of arrangements exist between Yugoslavia and Romania,
it is assumed that there are agreements that in some way would
involve each other if one were to be attacked by the USSR or
its allies. It is understandable why the two countries would
have common security problems and Yugoslavia can effectively
consider its Romanian border neutralized. It is better for
Belgrade, however, to avoid entangling "alliance" that test its
system unnecessarily. Being involved in a Soviet-Romanian
dispute, such as that of December 1978 when it is believed that
a coup of Romania was considered in Moscow, could be considered
an unnecessary test.^ It is in the practice of this sort of
policy that the leaders may feel the greatest limitations.
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It would appear that Tito's successors will rule Yugo-
slavia much as he has done. They too will attempt to achieve
balance by mastering the politics of the middle. And since
they will be quite restricted in their freedom of action, they
too may find themselves reacting to crises in lurches. It will
be hard for them to avoid leading Yugoslavia in this way, but
if they can avoid it they must do so. Lacking Tito's aura and
prestige, they must try to rely on planning and anticipation
in order to limit and manage crises.
The Soviet Union and the United States will be very influ-
ential in determining whether post-Tito Yugoslavia can evolve
peacefully. This will be true whether their influence is
exerted through action or inaction. Important here is that
Yugoslavia is not and will not be a vital ally of either super-
power. It may be, however, that its nonalignment, that is its
non-alliance with the superpowers, is vital to both. According
to Johnson:
A viable, integral, independent Yugoslavia, not attached
to either the Warsaw Pact or NATO, is vital for the main-
tenance of geopolitical stability and progress in grad-
ually overcoming the artificial divisions between the
two halves of Europe.
°
A shift toward an alliance with either bloc can thus be seen as
very destabilizing. It is with that thought in mind that one
must try to assess the intentions and probable actions of Moscow
and Washington.
It is generally assumed that the Soviet leadership still
desires some degree of control over Yugoslavia. It can be argued
that they do not desire full integration of Yugoslavia into the
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bloc for it might prove too destabilizing and unpredictable.
It would probably best serve Soviet interests to have a signi-
ficant control over Yugoslavia's foreign policy and alignment
while leaving the handling of Belgrade's complicated domestic
problems to the Yugoslavs. Such an arrangement might even be
acceptable to some Yugoslavs since they would keep their freedom
and their unique socio-economic structure while gaining the
security guarantees of the Soviet Union. But this would only
be true in the long term and the Yugoslavs are not at all
likely to voluntarily enter into such an agreement.
How might Moscow achieve a more beneficial relationship if
on the one hand it is reluctant to employ military force, while
on the other, the Yugoslavs are not likely to peacefully accede
to any change? One option would be to patiently wait, hoping
that over time, Belgrade is more likely to slide further East
than West. A second option would be to utilize political and
economic pressures combined with clandestine intrigues in hopes
of creating greater independence on the USSR and greater
instability and weakness in Yugoslavia's government and society.
Russia has made quite extensive use of this 3econd option even
while Tito has been in power so it is doubtful that they will
hesitate to use it in his absence.
Soviet intrigues may be one of the most serious threats to
Yugoslavia in the coming years. It is generally believed that
the Soviets have close links with emigre groups such as the
Ustache, and with dissident groups, also known as Corainformists,
7
within the country. While these groups may be small, it is
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feared that Soviet infiltration of them could lead to their
actual use by Soviet agents. Furthermore such groups might,
under certain circumstances, give the Soviets the justification
for large scale involvement in the name of national liberation.
A very disturbing threat to the Yugoslavs was posed by the
discovery in the mid-1970' s of a clandestine Communist Party of
Yugoslavia. In April 197^ this group adopted a document,
allegedly approved by Moscow and now known as the Bar Manifesto,
which criticizes the present regime on ideological terras and
calls for its replacement with a more classical communist
government. Within two years the Yugoslav security service
had captured and jailed most of the attendees of the meeting
and another "Cominformlst" (as such dissidents are called in
Yugoslavia) threat was thus ended. But the danger lies not in
this small group of men, but rather in the group's connection
with some leaders in Moscow, for the Kremlin could conceivably
intervene in Yugoslavia in behalf of these "healthy forces".
It should be recalled that just such healthy forces in
Czechoslovakia called on the Soviets in 1968. Political
pressure could also be applied by mere overt means such as
denial of credits and trade restrictions or Warsaw Pact
maneuvers near Yugoslavia's Bulgarian and Hungarian borders.
It is the concern in the West that the Kremlin may employ some
combination of these tactics in an attempt to either sway
Belgrade to a closer relationship with Moscow, or to induce
certain republics to secede."
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Soviet leaders also have certain limitations on their
actions. They obviously cannot ignore the international situ-
ation where they could suffer political loss due to untimely
aggressive acts toward Yugoslavia. Though detente seems to
have crumbled in recent years, the Kremlin is still anxious to
push SALT treaties through, and gain technology from the U.S.
Furthermore it is already under fire for its policies in Africa
so aggressive actions in Europe are not likely to be accepted
lightly. Soviet leadership also faces its own impending
succession crisis and may thus desire to avoid confrontation
in the near future. And finally, it must be remembered that
the Kremlin does have an increasingly Independent and vocal
constituency in Eastern European states who would probably not
approve of bullying tactics toward nonaligned Yugoslavia. All
of these factors will have some effect on the Kremlin's actions
following Tito's death.
As in the late 1950' s and 19o0's, Soviet-Yugoslav relations
have not been very cordial during the late 1970' s. The two coun-
tries have been at odds over Eurocommunism, the Yugoslav relations
with the Peoples Republic of China, the image of the nonaligned
movement, Soviet-Cuban policies in Ethiopia, the Soviet-backed
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and Yugoslav-Bulgarian disputes
over Macedonia. In a way their relations seem surprising in
that it could have been expected that with their respective
succession periods approaching, both Tito and 3rezhnev would
have endeavored to keep events on an even keel. In terms of
regional stability, it would be more desirable for the
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relationship to be improved before internal events in either
country begin to take precedence.
In contrast, Yugoslavia's relations with the United States
have improved considerably in recent years. President Carter
in 1978 seemed determined to minimize the effects of his pre-
election statements. On the occasion of Tito's departure from
the U.S., Carter declared the United States to be supportive of
Yugoslavia's "unity" as well as its territorial integrity and
its independence. 1 This may have been a veiled warning to
Moscow to avoid involvement in the country's internal national
problems. Improved relations have been reflected in increased
arras sales and dialogue between Washington and Belgrade. Over-
all, the mood regarding American-Yugoslav relations during the
summer of 1978 was optimistic and pointed to a strengthening
relationship.
If the United States desires to maintain and improve its
relations with Yugoslavia, however, the lessons of the early
and mid-1960' s must be kept in mind. Expectations must be
determined realistically and in a manner that recognizes zhe
internal and external limitations on Yugoslavia's leaders. In
simple terms, Yugoslavia does not desire to provoke the Soviet
Union, and its relations with the U.S. must therefore be devel-
oped carefully. American policy might be formulated in a manner
designed to check any slow shift toward a Yugoslav-Soviet
alignment. Favorable economic policies and limited arms sales





It should also be emphasized that much of what Moscow does
will depend upon its perception of the Western commitment to
Yugoslavia's nonalignment. It may be that a public consensus
of NATO and American policy will be necessary to secure Yugo-
slavia's independence and stability. A lack of consensus will
increase Belgrade's vulnerability to Russian pressure and
intrigue. The West should not, however, attempt to politi-
cally pull Yugoslavia in its own direction for such policies
could be as dangerous to peace as those normally attributed to
Moscow. 'The point is that external pressure, by either side,
could exacerbate the already existing problems. Both Moscow
and Washington must be made aware of each other's intentions in
regard to Yugoslavia's future.
Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the United States can, if
they choose to do so, act in concert to maintain regional sta-
bility. Noncontentious policies followed by all three countries
could ease the probable tension of the post-Tito period consid-
erably. Despite conflicting interests in Yugoslavia, Moscow
and Washington do have other interests in common, most especially
the avoidance of confrontation in Europe. If they seriously
desire to avoid any chance of confrontation over Yugoslavia, a
mutual hands-off policy would best serve that purpose. As John
C. Campbell puts it:
If security in Europe Is of importance to the two powers
in their present global relationships, then it should be
worth the effort for a specific understanding on Yugo-
slavia by which each would make clear its intention not
to intervene In that country. A tacit or unannounced
agreement might be as effective as a formal one. 12
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Such an agreement would certainly be in the spirit of detente
to say the least of the interests of Yugoslavia and possibly
Europe as a whole.
It is very tempting, in investigating Yugoslavia, to try to
develop an "equation" that will predict whether stability can
be maintained in the post-Tito era. It is not possible to do
so because there is only one constant value in the equation;
that of Tito. As long as his presence affects the other values,
those values have a limited effect on the solution. However,
when Tito is removed from the equation, all of the variables gain
added significance. But a prediction is still not possible
because there are too many significant and indeterminable var-
iables. This explains why there are few actual predictions and
very little consensus regarding Yugoslavia's future. The best
one can do is to present the forces and actors that will have
significant influence on the situation. Even scenario building
is very difficult due to the requirement for too many assumptions
about aspects that can control the evolution of Yugoslavia's
future. In short, "bottom line" predictions about Yugoslavia's
future are likely to be inaccurate unless couched in general
terras.
In general terras, opinion does range from unreserved pessim-
ism to veiled optimism. For example, Andrew Borowiec feels that:
Yugoslavia '3 vital strategic position between the Danube
and the Adriatic, between the Balkans and the Alps, its
multinational tangle, its inherent economic problems and




He also feels that the Yugoslav system has a basic flaw which
stems from the government's inability to determine how much
freedom is safe, and which results in "chronic tension". While
the country does labor under the effects of the above factors,
this author would argue that the tension is a natural result of
maintaining a precarious domestic and foreign balance. There
is, however, very definite potential for danger. At the other
end of this rather narrow spectrum, one finds Johnson's conclu-
sion that "Yugoslavia will at worst muddle through. nl 5 But even
this rather optimistic prognosis is quickly qualified by the
possibilities of Internal disorder blooming into regional con-
flict. It is the nature of the Yugoslav system and the longevity
of the pre-post-Tito era that has led to the inability to assess
the country's chances.
In the final analysis, it appears that so much can go wrong
for Tito's successors, that something probably will go wrong.
When this occurs, the Yugoslav system can react sufficiently
and handle the crisis and thus muddle through. But this ability
becomes very uncertain if the Yugoslavs are not left alone.
External actors must exercise restraint and neglect opportunities
to take advantage of Yugoslav weakness. Interestingly, the
cultivation of external restraint is at least one purpose of
Tito's foreign policy for it enhances the ability of the Yugo-
slavs to handle their own internal problems. If this policy
fails, however, it is very possible that other aspects of Tito's
system of balances will also fail, and that the situation or
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crisis will escalate and involve other nations in Europe, the
United States and the Soviet Union. That is a development
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